How liberal democracy might lose the 21st century

A scary little theory about information and freedom.

I was raised in an age of liberal triumphalism. Liberal democracy won the 20th century — imperialism, fascism, and communism all collapsed, and by the end of the century the U.S. and its democratic allies in Asia and Europe were both economically and militarily ascendant. Even China, which remained an autocracy, liberalized its economy and parts of its society during this time. Even scholars who turned up their noses at Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” were generally favorable to arguments that capitalism and/or liberal democracy fostered peace, happiness, and prosperity. There was an overwhelming sense that freedom — the freedom to speak your mind, to live as you liked, to buy and sell what you wished — was the thing that won.

Just two decades later, that idea is deeply in doubt. The wave of democratization and social liberalization went into reverse. The U.S. has been riven by social and political chaos, and its weaknesses in manufacturing and homebuilding have been starkly exposed. Meanwhile China, the ascendant superpower of the early 21st century, has moved back toward a more dirigiste economy and a more totalitarian society under Xi Jinping.

A number of people I know who travel to China these days come back with starry-eyed tales of how wonderful it is compared to the U.S.:

Now, let’s not get carried away here. The asylum seekers fleeing China for the U.S. might disagree, as would many regular Chinese people whose nest eggs have been destroyed by the real estate bust. Glittering new shopping malls and train stations might simply be at the beginning of their capital depreciation cycle. Chinese apps and gadgets might simply be a case of technological leapfrogging that will eventually be leapfrogged in turn. High-speed rail might turn out to be a waste of resources in many areas. It’s important to remember that China is only about 30% as rich as the U.S., even by the most optimistic measures.

And yet there’s no doubt that China’s cities are much cleaner and safer than San Francisco or NYC. Meanwhile, China can make electric vehicles, batteries, and computer chips galore, while it has yet to be shown that America can do the same. China can provide plentiful housing to its people (sometimes too plentiful), while America struggles with chronic housing shortages. China is beating the U.S. handily in terms of switching to green energy. Nor is China’s strength limited to manufacturing — TikTok is so well-made and addictive that it has outcompeted homegrown American short video services in their home market.

And despite the U.S.’ well-documented difficulties, its liberal democratic allies are in an even worse condition. Meanwhile, China is gathering a powerful network of allies — Russia, Iran, and North Korea — putting paid to the idea that autocracies can’t cooperate, and forming a coalition that might militarily outmatch the West already. And although it’s far too early to draw conclusions about political regimes, the possible return of Trump despite Biden’s many successes contrasts notably with the stability of Xi Jinping’s rule despite his many missteps.

China hasn’t yet proven the superiority of its system, but its successes raise the uncomfortable question: Can this be what wins? Can universal surveillance, speech control, suppression of religion and minorities, and economic command and control really be the keys to national power and stability in the 21st century? How could that be true, when those same things failed so comprehensively in the 20th?

I don’t know. But it’s useful and to think about how and why totalitarianism might be well-adapted to the world of the 21st century. In fact, I have a theory of how this might be true. This theory is only a conjecture — it’s something I don’t believe in, but also something I can’t yet convince myself is wrong. It’s a refinement and extension of some of the things I’ve written about before, but over time I’ve begun to bring these ideas together in a more coherent form.

So here you go: a theory of how totalitarianism might naturally triumph. The basic idea is that when information is costly, liberal democracy wins because it gathers more and better information than closed societies, but when information is cheap, negative-sum information tournaments sap an increasingly large portion of a liberal society’s resources. Remember that I don’t believe this theory; I’m merely trying to formulate it.

Liberal democracy as an information aggregator