India does have a President who is elected by the central and state legislatures, but is mostly a ceremonial figure, with no real power.
Comparing Modi to Xi is emblematic of the ignorance and condescension that is embedded into how even people who might claim to be “India hands” view India.
Xi is a dictator. Modi, on the other hand, has won election after election since 2002, but has worked his ass off to win those votes. He has then governed as both a moderniser and a welfare-statist focused on getting Govt benefits directly into the hands of the poor. And it is they who are his most ardent supporters, even more than urban Indians, who where his party(the BJP)’s base originally.
5 Indian states with a collective population a little less than that of the US just concluded in India, with the results out yesterday. Modi’s party was the incumbent in 4 of them and won all 4 handily; they got clobbered in the 5th (Punjab), but have always been a marginal player there. One of these states (Uttar Pradesh) has 220M people, and has never re-elected a state government since 1985. And in fact, most Indian states rarely re-elect their state Governments, which is why this lack of anti-incumbency is so astonishing, even to veteran observers of Indian elections. And no one doubts that it was Modi that was the deciding factor in all these states.
Absolutely. Modi might have some authoritarian tendencies and not great on relations with the Indian Muslim community, but he's absolutely no Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin.
India is still a democracy, even if a flawed one (and really the US is not in a position to quibble over India's democratic problems).
Fareed Zakaria recently made the point that, while the Xinjiang/Uyghur problem is obviously terrible, the US state dept decided to label it as genocide for purely political reasons--it is brutal but CCP is not actually killing people at any scale as far as we know. Meanwhile, Indian muslims are being killed regularly in Kashmir and by hindu nationalist vigilantes. Modi does not seem to care and maybe is even encouraging it. I don't think US foreign policy can do a whole lot about either of these things, but his point is a good one.
Zakaria is well known to be a stooge of the Congress party. His family connections go deep within this grand old party of India, now decimated, election after election, into oblivion He is not an unbiased commentator on its opposition, led by Modi.
American commentary on India is so superficial, awful. I mean, have you even heard of the Kashmiri Hindu Pandits? Their genocide and exodus?
I am starting to really learn about all this, and would not dream of turning to someone as mediocre as Zakaria for it. Have you heard prominent Muslims such as Arif Mohammed Khan who give you another Indian Muslim perspective ? It might be worth it. I am trying to learn about all this from multiple angles and honest thinkers.
Liked for the “trying to learn” bit. Hopefully, most of us here are trying to do the same thing. It’s a bit challenging to keep your eyes on everything going on in the world + history + get out once in a while; thanks for the tip on another (hopefully) reputable source for perspective.
Really? Modi has lost elections too and badly, even when he campaigned like a demon. Some damage he’s done if he can’t even rig a vote or few in his favour.
He’s definitely NOT a liberal. But you don’t have to be a liberal to be a democrat and to be representative of your people. Until Western Govts understand that, they’re going to get nowhere beyond a transactional use-and-throw (from both sides) relationship with India.
Democracy isn't just about free elections. Its about civil liberties, political expression, the level of fear as well.
India ranked 27th in 2014, and now ranks 54th.
Edit. I understand, and I agree with you. I was just pointing out the decline of democracy in India. Of course, democracy has declined all over the world, so there's no point singling out only India on this. Erdogan, Bolsonaro, Modi, Trump.
How can you possibly have free, hard-fought, highly contested, contentious federal and state elections between diverse political parties, and repeatedly - in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022 - and claim with a straight face that democracy is in decline in India? If anything, there’s too much of it!
Hot Take: India is experiencing the early stages of the same Duverger path that the US's two-party system took.
Someone pointed out to me a few weeks ago that what's unique about the US party system is the insane extent to which the parties have consolidated control over the mechanisms of democracy. In other countries where Duverger's law resulted in two-party systems, they were less stable because they were less mature of democracies.
The US and India examples, however, suggest that when the country in question is large enough, it's impractical for any large unified faction from mounting a coup or consolidate power. There was this report a few years back about how presidential systems tend to fail more than parliamentary ones; but the thing is, most of the data set was composed of small island republics with thin histories of democracy. The thing is, it's pretty easy to consolidate autocratic power in a small country. Even a place like Hungary is small enough that Orban can turn it into a competitive autocracy.
I submit that India, on the other hand, is suffering from the fact that its high internal diversity keeps its party system relatively fragmented, but its SMD+FPTP electoral system encourages zero-sum polarization. The early United States also faced the same problem; hence why Modi/BJP is following the same playbook as Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren: assembling a national-level party coalition using broad but ethno-national and ethno-religious appeals, and intended to be permanently competitive in national elections.
That is an interesting theory and it sounds plausible, though I think it would be more accurate to argue that India is becoming more like the UK and Canada's two-party system since they have the most similar systems to India. So far, India has essentially had three party systems: A Congress-dominated one from 1947-1989 (the Indian National Congress, that is), a fractious coalition period from 1989-2014, and since Modi's 2014 victory we've essentially been in a BJP-dominated system at the national level.
Though I see the BJP dominance as likely lasting until at least 2029, its attempts at making a unified Hindu political identity may accelerate the development of a two-party system as you describe since it would narrow the fracturing effects of India's diversity.
America also has hard fought, free and contentious federal and state elections. But democracy is certainly in decline. As I said, democracy was never just about elections. It includes freedom of speech and assembly, compromise,other civil liberties, voting and minority rights as well.
In fact, fighting majoritarianism is a fundamental pillar of democracy.
Hitler? Just a word of advice and with respect. You have chosen the most threadbare and cliched comparison possible. Please, everyone, stop referring to Hitler! If you have to invoke him or the Nazis you are not helping your argument.
I don't have a problem with elections, I have a problem with reducing democracy to just elections, ignoring other factors that are also included in a democracy.
It's self-assured, condescending comments like these that rile me up. The choice is simple for India: America or self-respect.
But given how the Indian young generation lacks self-respect, I'd think allying with west would happen sooner or later.
All that said, any indian that believes India can pursue an independent policy (both foreign or domestic) while being allied with west needs to be booted off the conversation for being uneducated.
It's silly to think that you can only have self-respect by not being in an alliance, but I see this sentiment a lot among some Indians. To me, it reeks of insecurity and lack of self-confidence.
There’s a distinction between an ally and a vassal state. America often thinks “vassal” when they say “ally” - thus the broad outrage when the US invaded Iraq in 2003 and France flatly opposed it. Britain showed itself to be a US vassal when they joined that war. France is a better model for India, but they would prefer even fewer obligations than those that go with being an ally and would like to be able to make up their minds on a case-by-case basis.
There’s a difference between being secure and being insecure. The UK didn’t have to join the Iraq war either. You can blame Blair for that. I notice that a lot of Indians seem to be very insecure and definitely see themselves as a weak power in their own minds rather than the rising great power that you guys are. In the latter half of the 21st century, India will be a great power along with China and the US with China being autocratic and right next door and that is what you folks need to be concerned with. According to you, the US was a “vassal state” to the UK in the early 19th century, but Americans didn’t think of it that way. Because Americans then aren’t nearly as insecure as many Indians now are.
India does not trust the US which many see as irresponsible, self-righteous and self-centered, esp thanks to its blundering into and stampeding out of Afghanistan twice, with blowback on India via Kashmir (1991 and 2021). So, they will be cautiously friendly with the US because they have to be, but will probably never transform into an ally. And since the US wants its allies to be poodles, that will further ensure that outcome.
This reinforces my belief that I, and every other patriotic Indian, need to work to strengthen the Modi government and the Hindi base as much as possible. Otherwise India would end up becoming a satellite state, susceptible to be bullied by American liberals -- who will gain much more prominence in coming years. We must do everything we can to empower and strengthen the Indian right further to negate the American influence as much as possible.
Second, a miscalculation in this post is that current Indian government is "forced" to choose sides because of dependence on Russian military equipments. That assertion ignores the fact that Modi was sanctioned and had his US visa denied before becoming the prime minister. He is totally aware of the danger American liberals pose to everything from India's national security interest to family values. India would have abstained, irrespective of its dependence on Russia.
I wish India could make it clear that time-tested friendship with Russia is not up for sale. But the current diplomatic and geopolitocal realities doesn't allow for that. Nevertheless, the Indian political establishment need to be more careful of the United States and stay wary of it going forward.
I really doubt supporting Modi is a matter of Indian patriotism - I'm sure that others in a country as great as India can offer a vision that lets India chart it's own course without his other unfortunate tendencies (whatever you may think they are). Modi is no savior of the nation, no more than any of the other mere politicians.
How does the US threaten India's national security interests?
It seems that, like in the US, plenty of Indians are more interested in fighting culture wars rather than care about their actual national security interests. I notice that you didn't mention China even once in your post. How does China fit in with your national security interests/family values paradigm?
The US has a history of supporting Pakistan with weapons and money. Pakistan was a major non-nato ally during the War on Terror. The US has granted more than $15B in military aid to Pakistan since 2002. The ISI uses much of which to destabilize and conduct terror strikes inside India, like the 26/11 Mumbai attack. During the 1971 Indo-Pak war, Nixon sent a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise towards Bay to Bengal to prevent Pakistan from getting overrun. Then Russia sent its nuclear-armed fleet, forcing the US to go back. Source: https://swarajyamag.com/world/december-1971-when-the-us-sent-its-naval-ships-into-bay-of-bengal-and-ussr-responded.
Further, the US political environment is leaning more and more left, and this trend will continue to hold as US politics keeps getting more divided. The moderate core establishment of the democratic party is ceding ground to radicals like AOC and Illah Omar. They will be detrimental to India's national security interest, especially on the issue of Kashmir, as they perceive the current BJP government as radical far-right extremists. Evidently, the US can't be a reliable ally; see the example of how the current establishment is alienating the most significant US ally in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, so much so that they are not picking Biden's phone. They also left state of the art military equipment in Afghanistan, which will be used by AQIS (Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) and Kashmiri Mujaheedeen to conduct terror strikes on the Indian army and soil.
Re China: The border issue is prominent and cannot be avoided, although, unlike Ukraine, India has nukes with the second-largest army. We also bolster the third-largest defense budget in the world. I'd say that we are capable enough to defend ourselves without needing US help. The US army is getting more liberal and soft anyway, as the recruitment ads about two mothers tweeted by Ted Cruz would attest.
LOL. Russia has way more awesome military recruitment ads than the US or Ukraine. How's their military performing in the field? It seems like you're the type who falls more for propaganda BS and mistake fighting culture wars than actual wars.
Anyway, to your points, supporting both Pakistan and SA was a strategic mistake by the US. Why I am arguing to cut ties with them. And why allying with India makes sense. But if you think India can take on China in an actual war by itself, good luck, man. Again, it seems like you mistake propaganda with reality.
This paragraph (and the post in general) suffers from low quality historiography:
"Nowhere did shifting alliances make more of a difference than in the middle of World War 2. In late 1940, Nazi Germany had conquered France and was allied with Japan, while the USSR had helped Hitler devour Poland. The U.S. was neutral, still hobbled by isolationism. It looked as if totalitarian powers would dominate the globe. But a year later, when Hitler turned on Stalin and Stalin allied with the U.S., the tables were entirely turned — the Allies now had a coalition that could beat the fascist powers."
It was a surprise to few that Hitler turned on Stalin in tearing up Molotov-Ribbentrop--an alliance of convenience. What was surprising was the million man Red Army getting bogged down in tiny Finland in late 1939. Additionally, (I learned this from an Adam Tooze interview) no one was more surprised by the rapid Nazi take over of France, than the Nazis themselves. The blitz is now seen as a deliberate and brilliant success, but even its commanders had no expectation it would go so well. These events boosted Hitler's confidence that the time was ripe to go after Russian oilfields, which he was bound to do anyway.
The contingency of these events was an important cause of the "shifting alliances" that Noah chalks up to savvy decision making. My point is you can put together the biggest and best alliance in history, but nobody knows how things will play out--look at the Brooklyn Nets with KD, etc. If you are trying to recreate the magic, you better do your research and say your prayers.
Not sure Noah suffers from “low quality historiography” so much as that he is trying to condense a lot of historical material into a couple of paragraphs.
The US did not meaningfully enter WW2 until 1942. Aside from the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and Pearl Harbor, America’s first major combat actions occurred in 1942. A lot happened in Europe and East Asia prior to America entering the war. It is challenging to capture all those dynamics in a single paragraph.
Honestly, I don't see the upside in NOT pivoting to Iran. The Saudis and Emiratis are already in Putin's corner. Iran, despite its overtly autocratic regime, has an oddly strong tradition of democratic competition among its complex and admittedly illiberal institutions. Iranians are also highly educated and have a tradition of liberal-mindedness, again despite their regime. They're not as "open for business" as the Saudis are, but they're probably the lesser of the two evils at this point.
I'm obviously biased (half Cuban, half Venezuelan) and I bring no solution, but there's no "good faith" to be had with the regimes in Cuba and Venezuela.
"by convincing the Cuban people that their economic woes are America's fault, it probably solidifies the regime's control."
You assume the Cuban people are convinced of this because that's what the left says. The Cuban people are not convinced of this.
"Opening up to Cuban people and goods won't make them ditch communism in a day"
You assume Cuban people embrace communism, as if they're thinking, "this would be great if we could just get rid of that pesky embargo!". Not so.
"Maduro has obviously been making overtures in this direction"
No shit. If you think this will benefit the common Venezuelan you're mistaken.
Think of it this way: if you’re desperate and starving, you’ll be highly favorable to the guy who gives you even one or two additional meals’ worth of income per week. Maduro’s government deserves no more legitimacy than the birds imparted with the spirit of Chavez he listens to do.
I’m a white American Democrat born in Iowa, and I know that Maduro is a f*cking crackpot who is deep in debt to Putin’s regime. Would I give a thumbs up to aligning with Maduro’s government in the event Putin went full world-domination Hitler mode, and Maduro wanted to turn on the guy he owes money to? Sure. In the meantime, legitimizing his government is (alongside cozying up to Iran) the very LAST thing we should be considering. Noah’s point is valid - we were full-on allies with one of the most murderously brutal dictators in history! (Stalin) - but only when the circumstances were absolutely dire.
It’s easy to miss the forest for the trees, but sometimes it’s easy to miss the trees for the forest, too. I don’t disagree in the slightest with pragmatism-dictated alliances with imperfect (or even straight-up bad if necessary) leaders/countries. Until it’s truly necessary, though, let’s not.
We may have to choose between the lesser of two evils, but we cannot let them or us forget the policies that we find objectionable. Such alliances will expose the United States to charges of hypocrisy which is very useful if we are to correct our unrepresentative form of government and our extreme economic inequality.
A large part of this piece echos Jeanne Kirkpatrick's seminal Commentary article Dictatorships and Double Standards. For some, that would be a slight, for me, that is a compliment. Regardless of our aspirational foreign policy morality, we live in a flawed world, which demands a practical, operational morality. Your piece addresses these complex questions quite well. Thanks.
I absolutely agree. We've spent the last few decades staining ourselves by association with the Saudis and others, no reason to close ourselves to new and better alliances just because they don't fit our moral standards either.
That's the big field of competition in the latter half of the 21st century. China is building dependencies but we'll see how much Africans prefer authoritarianism to liberal democracy.
I like this article, but I think you've got but things majorly wrong with Iran. The Iranian regime is a fanatical theocracy, which devotes its meagre resources to funding terrorists around the Middle East. To abandon traditional US allies and empower Iran (by lifting sanctions) would hugely destabilise the region, not just threatening oil producers but leading to a the nightmare of a nuclear arms race between Iran and Saudi Arabia. And if both Iran and Saudi Arabia become nuclear powers, who knows which other regional actors will follow.
They can fight it out. The US has about as much reason to care about the Middle East as Russia has to care about South America (pretty much none at all).
The analogy used is faulty. US allied with Stalin after Hitler broke the Nazi-Soviet alliance. US allied with China about a decade after the Sino-Soviet split and after they and the USSR came to blows. By contrast, with the possible exception of India, none of the regimes here are willing to outright switch sides. It would be more akin to normalizing with Cuba _during_ the Cold War, when they were still allied with the USSR - a domestic and foreign policy disaster. Lets leave India aside and talk about the clear cases.
Foreign policy wise, these regimes don't _want_ American policy to work. Aside from ideological convictions, you're asking them to abandon a stable alliance for a country (US) that they have good reason to believe will stab them in the back the moment it gets stronger.
We see a live demonstration of this in the new Iran talks: Russia is making trouble with new demands. It would be easy to cut off Russia, their only importance is for Uranium storage; The original JCPOA deal already used a different mechanism for dealing with excess Uranium. However, Iran is unwilling to abandon their Russian ally, ergo deadlock. Meanwhile, you will get blowback from all the US's previous allies, also for perfectly understandable reasons. The Saudis can definitely pump less since they also profit from higher prices. Israel can easily decide to cooperate more with China. Same could apply to Latin America: Many LATAM countries refused to condemn Russia for their invasion of Ukraine.
Domestically, this idea is also a disaster. There are too many Hispanic victims of Chavez/Maduro. The original outreach to Cuba already played a role in losing Florida. Another public outreach and the Dems will be underwater with Hispanics. By the same token Iran will never abandon their call to eliminate Israel, and this is distinctly unpopular.
Lastly, this is horrible precedent. There's no doubt Putin is looking at this, and wondering whether a decade from now people will call to normalize with Russia to counter China when they make a move - while Russia is still holding Ukraine.
The only viable way to improve relations with Cuba/Venezuela/Iran is for them to commit to the side of the US against their former allies, while toning down policies that the US public opposes. There's no way ideological regimes can do that, and given the blowback this may not be worth it for the US. India might be possible since Modi is not defined by hostility to US and can afford some compromise, while few US voters care about India.
Honestly, India is really the only country discussed that matters. All these other countries don't really matter that much in the grand scheme of things and the US should stop caring so much about what they do or don't do.
Y.—it may seem I am splitting hairs here, but the distinction is important. The Soviets had a non-aggression pact with the Nazis and were not technically allies. Also, America supported the USSR with material but was not a formal ally until after Pearl Harbor.
Even with Britain, America remained unallied until after it was brought into the war through Pearl Harbor.
I think the important part of where the analogy is somewhat inapt is that it was a “hot war” that married America and the USSR together.
> There are too many Hispanic victims of Chavez/Maduro. The original outreach to Cuba already played a role in losing Florida. Another public outreach and the Dems will be underwater with Hispanics.
Then don't says much publically. Just do the necessary diplomacy without making much of a fuss. Ditto with Iran.
> There's no doubt Putin is looking at this, and wondering whether a decade from now people will call to normalize with Russia to counter China when they make a move - while Russia is still holding Ukraine.
If Putin is still in control of Russia in 10 years time, its economy will have gone down the shitter so much by then that Russia will be in no position to counter China even if it wanted to.
>Then don't says much publically. Just do the necessary diplomacy without making much of a fuss. Ditto with Iran.
It's not possible to realign quietly. Removing sanctions must be public to have an effect. Similarly, diplomatic realignment (if they ever agreed to it) cannot be anything but public. Besides, the US is not Russia. Media is not controlled. This will be reported on, and GOP will seize on it because they ain't dumb.
>If Putin is still in control of Russia in 10 years time, its economy will have gone down the shitter so much by then that Russia will be in no position to counter China even if it wanted to.
Regardless of how bad the economy gets, Russia will always have oil, minerals, a SC veto, and a geographic position that is extremely critical to China.
Also, the worst sanctions on Russia are nothing compared to the self-imposed sanctions Venezuela did on themselves due to economic mismanagement - at least Russia is self-sufficient in food, Venezuela had actual starvation. Still, this post advocates rapprochement. If Venezuela is important enough, the much bigger Russia sure would be.
We could copy the post, do a few search/replace, and end up with the same argument for normalizing with Russia 10 years from now when China does something very bad like say invading Taiwan - even in a scenario where Russia still oppresses Ukraine.
> This will be reported on, and GOP will seize on it because they ain't dumb.
Then smear them as being Putin-loving traitors. This is an accusation with bite because (1) anyone opposing measures that would harm Putin is objectively on Putin's side, and (2) the vast majority of people in the USA are against Putin.
You can't spin a diplomatic realignment as anti-Putin when the countries in question refuse to cut links with Putin or even to stop referring to Russia as 'ally'. There's no way Iran, Cuba or Venezuela will do that for both ideological and practical reasons (by contrast, the realignments Smith mentions were total realignments with the countries in question already being hostile to the same enemies). The moment their trade with Russia expands or say anything nice about Putin your narrative bursts.
So the GOP will counter with smearing Dems as weak in foreign-policy, bootlicking to all US-hating regimes, which is something the GOP always does. 'We want to stand up to Putin *and* the bad Ayatollahs/Commies and we're strong enough to do it! We have enough oil, just drill baby drill!' Telling the voters US is too weak won't cut it, regardless of how true it is. There's a reason why 'only Nixon could go to China'.
Lastly, the vast majority of people in the USA are against Putin, but they care less about this than the blocks in question care about Maduro/Israel. Lets say you get to supercharge GOP Evangelical base, push the Hispanics strongly towards GOP in return for a smaller push in general against GOP (I don't think the latter will happen, but lets pretend it does) - the electoral math is very grim.
> You can't spin a diplomatic realignment as anti-Putin when the countries in question refuse to cut links with Putin or even to stop referring to Russia as 'ally'. There's no way Iran, Cuba or Venezuela will do that for both ideological and practical reasons
What does USA want out of Venezuela and Iran? To pump more oil. If they do that then the oil price goes down, which hurts Putin. This is true regardless of their rhetoric.
> but they care less about this than the blocks in question care about Maduro/Israel
The number of people who care about Maduro or Israel is less than those who care about Putin. US policy can't please everyone and shouldn't try to.
> 'We want to stand up to Putin
Lots of Republicans have been soft on Putin; the way to counter this would be to simply play recordings of them being so.
> We have enough oil, just drill baby drill!
Yes the USA should. To reduce the price of oil and hurt Putin.
I think I misunderstood you earlier, and that explains our disagreement. I've replied at length in the sister comment but I want to also reply to the specific points you've raised:
>What does USA want out of Venezuela and Iran? To pump more oil. If they do that then the oil price goes down, which hurts Putin. This is true regardless of their rhetoric.
I argued in the other comment they aren't that useful oil price wise. Both are very underinvested, and Iran normalization will trigger Saudi blowback. Anyhow, the problem with their links with Putin is that when they turn around and use their newfound oil money to buy stuff from Russia, there'd be no good way to spin this as 'weakening Putin'. This is why the US could not accept Russia's demand to totally exempt Iran trade from sanctions in the current Iran talks.
>The number of people who care about Maduro or Israel is less than those who care about Putin. US policy can't please everyone and shouldn't try to.
Some people care more about certain issues, and when these people care much more than the general public they have outsized power. When these people are more represented in swing States they have even more power. That's political reality for you.
GOP won't spin this as 'either Maduro or Putin'. They'll suggest being nasty to both. Telling Americans that they can't get everything they want is never popular.
>Lots of Republicans have been soft on Putin; the way to counter this would be to simply play recordings of them being so.
In return GOP will play recordings of Democrats being soft; That's a bit more common than recent memory recalls. Ultimately, both parties tried to mend relations with Putin, and neither could. That's not the US's fault. Putin has had more than enough opportunities.
I'm glad you wrote that, because now I'm understanding the sources of our disagreement better. Or at least I think I do. Correct me if I don't. What Smith suggests, and what you want are a bit different, and I did not notice that.
This article is about policy for a new Cold War. Smith wants to recruit new allies, and has a particular list; My criticism was that for most countries listed it's a bad policy: strengths countries very likely to still be on the other side while generating significant foreign and domestic blowback.
You want Venezuela and Iran to pump oil now, the long term Cold War 2 implications not being much of a consideration. This explains your suggestion to do stuff quietly. I've been thinking of normalization where this can't be done - but one can quietly ignore oil exports. The Biden administration has arguably already been doing that! Both countries have recovered their pre-COVID exports, and rumors have it there's less enforcement.
The thing is that neither country has that much more to give in the short term (Iran has a one-time jolt of a fleet of tankers, and that's likely to be more than balanced by Saudi being upset with this). Both countries have domestic mismanagement - especially Venezuela - and massive underinvestment, partly as a result of sanctions.
Bringing them up to speed requires foreign investments + time, they can't do it on their own. But there cannot be foreign investments in the absence of normalization with US + stability + rule-of-law. This isn't happening for all the reasons I've stated.
So the US won't be getting anything in the short or long term, while IMHO there'll be significant in Cold War 2. Ultimately, the only long term option is domestic production + oil demand reduction, but in the short term one could beg the Saudis (who will demand a tough Iran line).
A very good summary. While Smith's posts about economy are insightful, this post doesn't make any sense. But India and the US can indeed improve relations.
Well, this is an interesting piece. America finally admits it needs help. The years of being the global sheriff, and doing rather badly at it, thankfully seem to be over.
First off, anyone under the delusion that China and Russia are better alternatives to America probably can no longer be helped. However, it is actually a good thing that China is now the first legitimate rival America has had in fifty years: post-1970 Soviet Union doesn't count.
The simple truth is everyone behaves better and acts smarter when there's competition. This is true of leaders, lovers, companies, economies, and as we can see, countries. Rivalry spurs technological innovation and reinstates a healthy balance between parochial nationalism and arrogant condescension on the global stage.
So, this might actually be the start of a very flourishing period again for America. Although several other things have to go right first.
On to India, I am very skeptical of any true alliance with the USA. India has a long, successful history of sitting on the fence. It won't change that now. But it certainly won't be joining up with China and Russia in any kind of alliance either.
Finally, there should be more concern over the fate of Saudi Arabia. If renewables fully or significantly replace fossil fuels as the engine of the global economy, we are looking at a country in which almost non-existent education, severe religious conservatism, significant numbers of young people, and a corrupt, unaccountable ruling class could all combine into a very explosive mix.
International law is simply the actions of power followed up with 'moral' justifications. And there's not too much wrong with that as long as that power is accountable. But we should not pretend like this isn't the case. That would simply be another immoral act.
Yes, one upside to great power rivalries (besides generally improving the lot of the lower economic classes) is that stupid and inane culture wars tend to take the back seat when there is an existential threat.
> there should be more concern over the fate of Saudi Arabia. If renewables fully or significantly replace fossil fuels as the engine of the global economy, we are looking at a country in which almost non-existent education, severe religious conservatism, significant numbers of young people, and a corrupt, unaccountable ruling class could all combine into a very explosive mix.
That is certainly something Saudis should be concerned about. The rest of the world, less so.
[Haven't read yet, just wanted to add this cuz I like the headline...]
One of my favorite personal takes about Star Trek's United Federation of Planets is that its diplomatic corps serves as a "fourth branch of government". Because the Federation is essentially a President + Senate, IE with 1 rep per planet, the diplomats are basically their primary means of greasing the wheels of democracy. They mediate its crisis management on the ground in a way that interstellar communications simply can't substitute for.
It just makes me wonder what kind of role your new notion of diplomacy is going to play in the "optimal timeline" where Earth actually does manage to overcome the challenge of autocracy and unite in a one-world government.
Appreciate the opening disclaimer. Wish we saw more of that. Anyway, I like the idea of going neutral in the middle east. Agree that Saudi Arabia would be mad. I don't understand the history of their relationship to Yemen, and would be curious as to why we are involved
Noah you are so close! Did you notice how your column about Russia spent 2/3rds of its time on China and India? I’d like to offer that’s because China and India are important and Russia really isn’t. I try to think about it this way, is there a way Russia could dominate Europe? Given that the EU has 3-4x times the number of people and Germany alone has 3-4x the GDP, I just don’t see how that happens. So why is the US paying to “protect” EU countries. When the EU was a 9 year old pip squeak, it made sense to protect him from the bully on the block. But it’s all grown up now. The EU is a 6 foot 3 man and the bully is a 5 foot 13 year old. What are we doing?
2nd question is there a way China dominates Asia? Clearly I think the answer is yes. It might not be likely but it is possible, so we should concentrate there. In this case the bully, China, is a grown man with knives and guns. We need to organize the block and boot him out. To torture my metaphor, the EU lives two towns over and doesn’t really care about the bully in India’s neighborhood. In fact, they’ll do deals with him (see German/Chinese trade. Germany actually has a trade surplus with China). So Europe isn’t a steadfast ally against China. They’ll bail because they aren’t threatened by the Chinese bully. As I see it we are spending our time and money protecting someone who doesn’t need protecting and who won’t help us with the real threat. Your piece works if you just drop the league of democracies stuff. The EU ain’t going to be there to help and we should get out while there is still time to concentrate on China.
We are in agreement over certain points. First off, yes, Europe will likely bail over China. NATO is the closest thing The Europeans have to a continental army and the US contributes more to it financially than all of Europe altogether.
Second, I'm very skeptical of all this wonderful talk about a united Europe currently going around. It's never happened in the past as evidenced by their very impressive contributions to war history and it won't happen now because a truly united Europe will require individual European countries giving up some of their sovereignty and making serious sacrifices for the greater good.
So, while they have acted admirably in helping Ukraine, and finally shown us all that their immigration concerns were really just racism concerns - Poland took over one million Ukrainians in less than 2 weeks - real unity will demand full consistency over long periods of time and a lot more sacrifice, which again will not happen.
Where we disagree is in this American obsession with China. Is China a rival? Yes. Does it despise america? Yes. For very legitimate reasons.
But the real problem is this: if America just fixed its own problems and paid attention to all the considerable issues it is facing, investing in its infrastructure for a start and breaking apart its numerous monopolies is another among several, it won't have to worry about China because China wouldn't even be able to compete.
You can only be defeated by an enemy if you have already defeated yourself.
I fully agree on fixing things at home. A pull back from Europe might even help that and at the same time China could be a real threat. I tend to think realists like me overplay that threat. China’s demography and need for adjustment from an investment driven to a consumer driven economy spell low if not negative growth going forward. Still, there is a decent chance China could consolidate regional hegemony in the absence of the the US in Asia. To me that means we need to focus on building relationships and the deterrence capabilities of India, Japan, Australia, S Korea, Vietnam, etc. On that I think we agree. The part where we might not is that I think we should acquiesce to a Finlandized Ukraine and similar arraignments for other Russian neighbors in order to do two things: first turn down the temperature with Russia and get the US out of the position as key Russian rival and second coax them into the China containment coalition. This alliance between China and Russia seems very fragile and if we would back off in Europe, Russia would face far greater long term threats from China than the US.
Well, I don't disagree with any of these points. They are perfectly reasonable.
However, I also don't see any USA- Russia alliance happening.
There's too much of an ideological separation, too much historical bad blood, and there's little value to either of them in a partnership: Russia mostly sells raw commodities that the USA not only produces by itself, but could also get elsewhere. And again, a lot of those exports could all disappear with renewables.
On the American side, while American consumers can usually be relied upon to buy literally anything, there isn't much Russia has to offer.
I can understand the political value of such an alliance, but even the political value will be diluted by what the rest of the world will simply perceive as realpolitik taken too far.
There's not much to fear from a China-Russia alliance anyway. It sounds threatening but it isn't, in a similar way that an horror movie is a very different experience from an actual murder.
I think you're really underestimating how much has changed in Europe since the second world war. The EU is no federal state like the US, but it's clearly on the way there and serious concessions of sovereignty have been made already. It survived Brexit rather easily, and troubles with integration of southern/eastern European countries can and have been overcome over time.
The EU needs an army. At that point, NATO would be really obsolete.
I admire the reach of your optimism and yes, Europe has changed much from 1945: it had no choice but to change. The world had moved on.
But in important ways, Europe hasn't changed or rather hasn't changed enough.
Take economically. For the euro to have any chance of working, it needed a way to recycle surpluses from very productive countries into far less productive ones.
Within countries, governments do these by taking taxed capital and redirecting it into investment.
Or people simply do it by moving somewhere else for better opportunities.
The first can't happen unless Europe has an integrated overall political system, an alternative which for good reasons and otherwise, Germany rejected in the early 1990s.
And the second will require full and seamless immigration, which again, blue collar workers in richer countries are unlikely to accept: Brexit parly happened for this reason.
So, any talk of economic unity is mere rhetoric until that happens. Article 105 of the EU charter itself expressly guarantees that European countries won't shoulder debts of other European countries.
Military unity, as in a continental army, is also deeply unlikely. If it is pose any kind of significance, it will need lots of capital. Who will be supplying that capital? Well, largely, the wealthy European countries, who would simply think to themselves and ask quite sensibly why they aren't just spending that money on their own military or on something else for that matter.
Unity needs sacrifice.
Strong countries require individuals to sacrifice some of their strength and sovereignty: you accept taxes, give up the ability to inflict violence, etc.
In the same vein, strong international organizations require countries to sacrifice some of their strength and sovereignty.
And with Europe, that is simply very, very, very unlikely to happen.
The Euro has been working (maybe not so well, but working) for 20 years.
I'm not sure how much more seamless you want immigration to get, at least within the Schengen area.
Articles can and have been changed...
Common debt is already an established thing - you can thank the pandemic for that. Why should France shoulder Bulgaria's debt? New York doesn't pay for North Carolina's. But everyone in the EU pays for common EU debt.
So what? By a similar argument we could have said the Euro would have never happened. An EU military is inevitable if the EU states continue down their path of tighter integration, and I contend that they will.
The current state of the EU is already a moderately integrated, if somewhat patchwork, economic area. This situation isn't that sustainable if things like a common currency are going to work well, so the EU will naturally move in one direction or another. They've shown their ability to move towards tighter integration, though not without setbacks (not convinced Brexit was that bad for EU unity anyway).
The EU states have given up plenty of sovereignty already because they know it works for the common European good as well as benefiting them. Sure they will take their time, but I would be very surprised if by the end of my lifetime we thought of the EU and US as different categories of entity.
Everyone would have called the EU in its current state extremely unlikely in 1945. And yet, we're here. Why are you so confident as to predict that a similar magnitude of change is nearly impossible in another 70 years?
Modi is India’s Prime Minister, not President.
India does have a President who is elected by the central and state legislatures, but is mostly a ceremonial figure, with no real power.
Comparing Modi to Xi is emblematic of the ignorance and condescension that is embedded into how even people who might claim to be “India hands” view India.
Xi is a dictator. Modi, on the other hand, has won election after election since 2002, but has worked his ass off to win those votes. He has then governed as both a moderniser and a welfare-statist focused on getting Govt benefits directly into the hands of the poor. And it is they who are his most ardent supporters, even more than urban Indians, who where his party(the BJP)’s base originally.
5 Indian states with a collective population a little less than that of the US just concluded in India, with the results out yesterday. Modi’s party was the incumbent in 4 of them and won all 4 handily; they got clobbered in the 5th (Punjab), but have always been a marginal player there. One of these states (Uttar Pradesh) has 220M people, and has never re-elected a state government since 1985. And in fact, most Indian states rarely re-elect their state Governments, which is why this lack of anti-incumbency is so astonishing, even to veteran observers of Indian elections. And no one doubts that it was Modi that was the deciding factor in all these states.
For now, Modi IS India.
Absolutely. Modi might have some authoritarian tendencies and not great on relations with the Indian Muslim community, but he's absolutely no Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin.
India is still a democracy, even if a flawed one (and really the US is not in a position to quibble over India's democratic problems).
Fareed Zakaria recently made the point that, while the Xinjiang/Uyghur problem is obviously terrible, the US state dept decided to label it as genocide for purely political reasons--it is brutal but CCP is not actually killing people at any scale as far as we know. Meanwhile, Indian muslims are being killed regularly in Kashmir and by hindu nationalist vigilantes. Modi does not seem to care and maybe is even encouraging it. I don't think US foreign policy can do a whole lot about either of these things, but his point is a good one.
Zakaria is well known to be a stooge of the Congress party. His family connections go deep within this grand old party of India, now decimated, election after election, into oblivion He is not an unbiased commentator on its opposition, led by Modi.
American commentary on India is so superficial, awful. I mean, have you even heard of the Kashmiri Hindu Pandits? Their genocide and exodus?
I am starting to really learn about all this, and would not dream of turning to someone as mediocre as Zakaria for it. Have you heard prominent Muslims such as Arif Mohammed Khan who give you another Indian Muslim perspective ? It might be worth it. I am trying to learn about all this from multiple angles and honest thinkers.
Liked for the “trying to learn” bit. Hopefully, most of us here are trying to do the same thing. It’s a bit challenging to keep your eyes on everything going on in the world + history + get out once in a while; thanks for the tip on another (hopefully) reputable source for perspective.
“Regularly” sounds like a huge stretch. The treatment of Uyghurs is in no way on the same level of the status of Indian Muslims.
Disagree.
Absolutely, Erdogan or Orban are much closer to Modi, but I don't think he's even as consolidated in power as either of them.
I agree.
With all due respect, even Hitler won elections. There can be no denial in the deterioration of democratic institutions in India in the last 10 years.
Really? Modi has lost elections too and badly, even when he campaigned like a demon. Some damage he’s done if he can’t even rig a vote or few in his favour.
He’s definitely NOT a liberal. But you don’t have to be a liberal to be a democrat and to be representative of your people. Until Western Govts understand that, they’re going to get nowhere beyond a transactional use-and-throw (from both sides) relationship with India.
Democracy isn't just about free elections. Its about civil liberties, political expression, the level of fear as well.
India ranked 27th in 2014, and now ranks 54th.
Edit. I understand, and I agree with you. I was just pointing out the decline of democracy in India. Of course, democracy has declined all over the world, so there's no point singling out only India on this. Erdogan, Bolsonaro, Modi, Trump.
How can you possibly have free, hard-fought, highly contested, contentious federal and state elections between diverse political parties, and repeatedly - in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022 - and claim with a straight face that democracy is in decline in India? If anything, there’s too much of it!
Hot Take: India is experiencing the early stages of the same Duverger path that the US's two-party system took.
Someone pointed out to me a few weeks ago that what's unique about the US party system is the insane extent to which the parties have consolidated control over the mechanisms of democracy. In other countries where Duverger's law resulted in two-party systems, they were less stable because they were less mature of democracies.
The US and India examples, however, suggest that when the country in question is large enough, it's impractical for any large unified faction from mounting a coup or consolidate power. There was this report a few years back about how presidential systems tend to fail more than parliamentary ones; but the thing is, most of the data set was composed of small island republics with thin histories of democracy. The thing is, it's pretty easy to consolidate autocratic power in a small country. Even a place like Hungary is small enough that Orban can turn it into a competitive autocracy.
I submit that India, on the other hand, is suffering from the fact that its high internal diversity keeps its party system relatively fragmented, but its SMD+FPTP electoral system encourages zero-sum polarization. The early United States also faced the same problem; hence why Modi/BJP is following the same playbook as Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren: assembling a national-level party coalition using broad but ethno-national and ethno-religious appeals, and intended to be permanently competitive in national elections.
That is an interesting theory and it sounds plausible, though I think it would be more accurate to argue that India is becoming more like the UK and Canada's two-party system since they have the most similar systems to India. So far, India has essentially had three party systems: A Congress-dominated one from 1947-1989 (the Indian National Congress, that is), a fractious coalition period from 1989-2014, and since Modi's 2014 victory we've essentially been in a BJP-dominated system at the national level.
Though I see the BJP dominance as likely lasting until at least 2029, its attempts at making a unified Hindu political identity may accelerate the development of a two-party system as you describe since it would narrow the fracturing effects of India's diversity.
America also has hard fought, free and contentious federal and state elections. But democracy is certainly in decline. As I said, democracy was never just about elections. It includes freedom of speech and assembly, compromise,other civil liberties, voting and minority rights as well.
In fact, fighting majoritarianism is a fundamental pillar of democracy.
Hitler? Just a word of advice and with respect. You have chosen the most threadbare and cliched comparison possible. Please, everyone, stop referring to Hitler! If you have to invoke him or the Nazis you are not helping your argument.
I chose this comparison for a reason. His comment reduces democracy to just elections and electoral victory, which it's not.
Hitler won elections. Biden wins elections. So did Trump. Sounds like you have a problem with elections. Maybe as long as your guy wins, it's all ok.
I don't have a problem with elections, I have a problem with reducing democracy to just elections, ignoring other factors that are also included in a democracy.
It's self-assured, condescending comments like these that rile me up. The choice is simple for India: America or self-respect.
But given how the Indian young generation lacks self-respect, I'd think allying with west would happen sooner or later.
All that said, any indian that believes India can pursue an independent policy (both foreign or domestic) while being allied with west needs to be booted off the conversation for being uneducated.
It's silly to think that you can only have self-respect by not being in an alliance, but I see this sentiment a lot among some Indians. To me, it reeks of insecurity and lack of self-confidence.
There’s a distinction between an ally and a vassal state. America often thinks “vassal” when they say “ally” - thus the broad outrage when the US invaded Iraq in 2003 and France flatly opposed it. Britain showed itself to be a US vassal when they joined that war. France is a better model for India, but they would prefer even fewer obligations than those that go with being an ally and would like to be able to make up their minds on a case-by-case basis.
There’s a difference between being secure and being insecure. The UK didn’t have to join the Iraq war either. You can blame Blair for that. I notice that a lot of Indians seem to be very insecure and definitely see themselves as a weak power in their own minds rather than the rising great power that you guys are. In the latter half of the 21st century, India will be a great power along with China and the US with China being autocratic and right next door and that is what you folks need to be concerned with. According to you, the US was a “vassal state” to the UK in the early 19th century, but Americans didn’t think of it that way. Because Americans then aren’t nearly as insecure as many Indians now are.
India does not trust the US which many see as irresponsible, self-righteous and self-centered, esp thanks to its blundering into and stampeding out of Afghanistan twice, with blowback on India via Kashmir (1991 and 2021). So, they will be cautiously friendly with the US because they have to be, but will probably never transform into an ally. And since the US wants its allies to be poodles, that will further ensure that outcome.
This reinforces my belief that I, and every other patriotic Indian, need to work to strengthen the Modi government and the Hindi base as much as possible. Otherwise India would end up becoming a satellite state, susceptible to be bullied by American liberals -- who will gain much more prominence in coming years. We must do everything we can to empower and strengthen the Indian right further to negate the American influence as much as possible.
Second, a miscalculation in this post is that current Indian government is "forced" to choose sides because of dependence on Russian military equipments. That assertion ignores the fact that Modi was sanctioned and had his US visa denied before becoming the prime minister. He is totally aware of the danger American liberals pose to everything from India's national security interest to family values. India would have abstained, irrespective of its dependence on Russia.
I wish India could make it clear that time-tested friendship with Russia is not up for sale. But the current diplomatic and geopolitocal realities doesn't allow for that. Nevertheless, the Indian political establishment need to be more careful of the United States and stay wary of it going forward.
I really doubt supporting Modi is a matter of Indian patriotism - I'm sure that others in a country as great as India can offer a vision that lets India chart it's own course without his other unfortunate tendencies (whatever you may think they are). Modi is no savior of the nation, no more than any of the other mere politicians.
How does the US threaten India's national security interests?
It seems that, like in the US, plenty of Indians are more interested in fighting culture wars rather than care about their actual national security interests. I notice that you didn't mention China even once in your post. How does China fit in with your national security interests/family values paradigm?
The US has a history of supporting Pakistan with weapons and money. Pakistan was a major non-nato ally during the War on Terror. The US has granted more than $15B in military aid to Pakistan since 2002. The ISI uses much of which to destabilize and conduct terror strikes inside India, like the 26/11 Mumbai attack. During the 1971 Indo-Pak war, Nixon sent a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise towards Bay to Bengal to prevent Pakistan from getting overrun. Then Russia sent its nuclear-armed fleet, forcing the US to go back. Source: https://swarajyamag.com/world/december-1971-when-the-us-sent-its-naval-ships-into-bay-of-bengal-and-ussr-responded.
Further, the US political environment is leaning more and more left, and this trend will continue to hold as US politics keeps getting more divided. The moderate core establishment of the democratic party is ceding ground to radicals like AOC and Illah Omar. They will be detrimental to India's national security interest, especially on the issue of Kashmir, as they perceive the current BJP government as radical far-right extremists. Evidently, the US can't be a reliable ally; see the example of how the current establishment is alienating the most significant US ally in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, so much so that they are not picking Biden's phone. They also left state of the art military equipment in Afghanistan, which will be used by AQIS (Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) and Kashmiri Mujaheedeen to conduct terror strikes on the Indian army and soil.
Re China: The border issue is prominent and cannot be avoided, although, unlike Ukraine, India has nukes with the second-largest army. We also bolster the third-largest defense budget in the world. I'd say that we are capable enough to defend ourselves without needing US help. The US army is getting more liberal and soft anyway, as the recruitment ads about two mothers tweeted by Ted Cruz would attest.
LOL. Russia has way more awesome military recruitment ads than the US or Ukraine. How's their military performing in the field? It seems like you're the type who falls more for propaganda BS and mistake fighting culture wars than actual wars.
Anyway, to your points, supporting both Pakistan and SA was a strategic mistake by the US. Why I am arguing to cut ties with them. And why allying with India makes sense. But if you think India can take on China in an actual war by itself, good luck, man. Again, it seems like you mistake propaganda with reality.
To riff on a military truism: Cosplayers focus on military recruitment ads. Professionals focus on logistics.
This paragraph (and the post in general) suffers from low quality historiography:
"Nowhere did shifting alliances make more of a difference than in the middle of World War 2. In late 1940, Nazi Germany had conquered France and was allied with Japan, while the USSR had helped Hitler devour Poland. The U.S. was neutral, still hobbled by isolationism. It looked as if totalitarian powers would dominate the globe. But a year later, when Hitler turned on Stalin and Stalin allied with the U.S., the tables were entirely turned — the Allies now had a coalition that could beat the fascist powers."
It was a surprise to few that Hitler turned on Stalin in tearing up Molotov-Ribbentrop--an alliance of convenience. What was surprising was the million man Red Army getting bogged down in tiny Finland in late 1939. Additionally, (I learned this from an Adam Tooze interview) no one was more surprised by the rapid Nazi take over of France, than the Nazis themselves. The blitz is now seen as a deliberate and brilliant success, but even its commanders had no expectation it would go so well. These events boosted Hitler's confidence that the time was ripe to go after Russian oilfields, which he was bound to do anyway.
The contingency of these events was an important cause of the "shifting alliances" that Noah chalks up to savvy decision making. My point is you can put together the biggest and best alliance in history, but nobody knows how things will play out--look at the Brooklyn Nets with KD, etc. If you are trying to recreate the magic, you better do your research and say your prayers.
Not sure Noah suffers from “low quality historiography” so much as that he is trying to condense a lot of historical material into a couple of paragraphs.
The US did not meaningfully enter WW2 until 1942. Aside from the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and Pearl Harbor, America’s first major combat actions occurred in 1942. A lot happened in Europe and East Asia prior to America entering the war. It is challenging to capture all those dynamics in a single paragraph.
Stalin was surprised by Hitler turning on Stalin.
Honestly, I don't see the upside in NOT pivoting to Iran. The Saudis and Emiratis are already in Putin's corner. Iran, despite its overtly autocratic regime, has an oddly strong tradition of democratic competition among its complex and admittedly illiberal institutions. Iranians are also highly educated and have a tradition of liberal-mindedness, again despite their regime. They're not as "open for business" as the Saudis are, but they're probably the lesser of the two evils at this point.
Stick with economics
I'm obviously biased (half Cuban, half Venezuelan) and I bring no solution, but there's no "good faith" to be had with the regimes in Cuba and Venezuela.
"by convincing the Cuban people that their economic woes are America's fault, it probably solidifies the regime's control."
You assume the Cuban people are convinced of this because that's what the left says. The Cuban people are not convinced of this.
"Opening up to Cuban people and goods won't make them ditch communism in a day"
You assume Cuban people embrace communism, as if they're thinking, "this would be great if we could just get rid of that pesky embargo!". Not so.
"Maduro has obviously been making overtures in this direction"
No shit. If you think this will benefit the common Venezuelan you're mistaken.
The sanctions don't benefit the common Venezuelan either. What rational purpose are they serving? They're not going to kick Maduro out.
Think of it this way: if you’re desperate and starving, you’ll be highly favorable to the guy who gives you even one or two additional meals’ worth of income per week. Maduro’s government deserves no more legitimacy than the birds imparted with the spirit of Chavez he listens to do.
I’m a white American Democrat born in Iowa, and I know that Maduro is a f*cking crackpot who is deep in debt to Putin’s regime. Would I give a thumbs up to aligning with Maduro’s government in the event Putin went full world-domination Hitler mode, and Maduro wanted to turn on the guy he owes money to? Sure. In the meantime, legitimizing his government is (alongside cozying up to Iran) the very LAST thing we should be considering. Noah’s point is valid - we were full-on allies with one of the most murderously brutal dictators in history! (Stalin) - but only when the circumstances were absolutely dire.
It’s easy to miss the forest for the trees, but sometimes it’s easy to miss the trees for the forest, too. I don’t disagree in the slightest with pragmatism-dictated alliances with imperfect (or even straight-up bad if necessary) leaders/countries. Until it’s truly necessary, though, let’s not.
> If you think this will benefit the common Venezuelan you're mistaken.
It will weaken Russia, which is the point.
We may have to choose between the lesser of two evils, but we cannot let them or us forget the policies that we find objectionable. Such alliances will expose the United States to charges of hypocrisy which is very useful if we are to correct our unrepresentative form of government and our extreme economic inequality.
A large part of this piece echos Jeanne Kirkpatrick's seminal Commentary article Dictatorships and Double Standards. For some, that would be a slight, for me, that is a compliment. Regardless of our aspirational foreign policy morality, we live in a flawed world, which demands a practical, operational morality. Your piece addresses these complex questions quite well. Thanks.
I absolutely agree. We've spent the last few decades staining ourselves by association with the Saudis and others, no reason to close ourselves to new and better alliances just because they don't fit our moral standards either.
What's a stain to a barrel of oil.
Well, these days, we're not even that reliant on them for that. There's no reason for the US to ally with SA.
What about African countries? I believe China is building alliances and dependencies across the continent.
That's the big field of competition in the latter half of the 21st century. China is building dependencies but we'll see how much Africans prefer authoritarianism to liberal democracy.
I like this article, but I think you've got but things majorly wrong with Iran. The Iranian regime is a fanatical theocracy, which devotes its meagre resources to funding terrorists around the Middle East. To abandon traditional US allies and empower Iran (by lifting sanctions) would hugely destabilise the region, not just threatening oil producers but leading to a the nightmare of a nuclear arms race between Iran and Saudi Arabia. And if both Iran and Saudi Arabia become nuclear powers, who knows which other regional actors will follow.
They can fight it out. The US has about as much reason to care about the Middle East as Russia has to care about South America (pretty much none at all).
The analogy used is faulty. US allied with Stalin after Hitler broke the Nazi-Soviet alliance. US allied with China about a decade after the Sino-Soviet split and after they and the USSR came to blows. By contrast, with the possible exception of India, none of the regimes here are willing to outright switch sides. It would be more akin to normalizing with Cuba _during_ the Cold War, when they were still allied with the USSR - a domestic and foreign policy disaster. Lets leave India aside and talk about the clear cases.
Foreign policy wise, these regimes don't _want_ American policy to work. Aside from ideological convictions, you're asking them to abandon a stable alliance for a country (US) that they have good reason to believe will stab them in the back the moment it gets stronger.
We see a live demonstration of this in the new Iran talks: Russia is making trouble with new demands. It would be easy to cut off Russia, their only importance is for Uranium storage; The original JCPOA deal already used a different mechanism for dealing with excess Uranium. However, Iran is unwilling to abandon their Russian ally, ergo deadlock. Meanwhile, you will get blowback from all the US's previous allies, also for perfectly understandable reasons. The Saudis can definitely pump less since they also profit from higher prices. Israel can easily decide to cooperate more with China. Same could apply to Latin America: Many LATAM countries refused to condemn Russia for their invasion of Ukraine.
Domestically, this idea is also a disaster. There are too many Hispanic victims of Chavez/Maduro. The original outreach to Cuba already played a role in losing Florida. Another public outreach and the Dems will be underwater with Hispanics. By the same token Iran will never abandon their call to eliminate Israel, and this is distinctly unpopular.
Lastly, this is horrible precedent. There's no doubt Putin is looking at this, and wondering whether a decade from now people will call to normalize with Russia to counter China when they make a move - while Russia is still holding Ukraine.
The only viable way to improve relations with Cuba/Venezuela/Iran is for them to commit to the side of the US against their former allies, while toning down policies that the US public opposes. There's no way ideological regimes can do that, and given the blowback this may not be worth it for the US. India might be possible since Modi is not defined by hostility to US and can afford some compromise, while few US voters care about India.
Honestly, India is really the only country discussed that matters. All these other countries don't really matter that much in the grand scheme of things and the US should stop caring so much about what they do or don't do.
Y.—it may seem I am splitting hairs here, but the distinction is important. The Soviets had a non-aggression pact with the Nazis and were not technically allies. Also, America supported the USSR with material but was not a formal ally until after Pearl Harbor.
Even with Britain, America remained unallied until after it was brought into the war through Pearl Harbor.
I think the important part of where the analogy is somewhat inapt is that it was a “hot war” that married America and the USSR together.
> There are too many Hispanic victims of Chavez/Maduro. The original outreach to Cuba already played a role in losing Florida. Another public outreach and the Dems will be underwater with Hispanics.
Then don't says much publically. Just do the necessary diplomacy without making much of a fuss. Ditto with Iran.
> There's no doubt Putin is looking at this, and wondering whether a decade from now people will call to normalize with Russia to counter China when they make a move - while Russia is still holding Ukraine.
If Putin is still in control of Russia in 10 years time, its economy will have gone down the shitter so much by then that Russia will be in no position to counter China even if it wanted to.
>Then don't says much publically. Just do the necessary diplomacy without making much of a fuss. Ditto with Iran.
It's not possible to realign quietly. Removing sanctions must be public to have an effect. Similarly, diplomatic realignment (if they ever agreed to it) cannot be anything but public. Besides, the US is not Russia. Media is not controlled. This will be reported on, and GOP will seize on it because they ain't dumb.
>If Putin is still in control of Russia in 10 years time, its economy will have gone down the shitter so much by then that Russia will be in no position to counter China even if it wanted to.
Regardless of how bad the economy gets, Russia will always have oil, minerals, a SC veto, and a geographic position that is extremely critical to China.
Also, the worst sanctions on Russia are nothing compared to the self-imposed sanctions Venezuela did on themselves due to economic mismanagement - at least Russia is self-sufficient in food, Venezuela had actual starvation. Still, this post advocates rapprochement. If Venezuela is important enough, the much bigger Russia sure would be.
We could copy the post, do a few search/replace, and end up with the same argument for normalizing with Russia 10 years from now when China does something very bad like say invading Taiwan - even in a scenario where Russia still oppresses Ukraine.
> This will be reported on, and GOP will seize on it because they ain't dumb.
Then smear them as being Putin-loving traitors. This is an accusation with bite because (1) anyone opposing measures that would harm Putin is objectively on Putin's side, and (2) the vast majority of people in the USA are against Putin.
You can't spin a diplomatic realignment as anti-Putin when the countries in question refuse to cut links with Putin or even to stop referring to Russia as 'ally'. There's no way Iran, Cuba or Venezuela will do that for both ideological and practical reasons (by contrast, the realignments Smith mentions were total realignments with the countries in question already being hostile to the same enemies). The moment their trade with Russia expands or say anything nice about Putin your narrative bursts.
So the GOP will counter with smearing Dems as weak in foreign-policy, bootlicking to all US-hating regimes, which is something the GOP always does. 'We want to stand up to Putin *and* the bad Ayatollahs/Commies and we're strong enough to do it! We have enough oil, just drill baby drill!' Telling the voters US is too weak won't cut it, regardless of how true it is. There's a reason why 'only Nixon could go to China'.
Lastly, the vast majority of people in the USA are against Putin, but they care less about this than the blocks in question care about Maduro/Israel. Lets say you get to supercharge GOP Evangelical base, push the Hispanics strongly towards GOP in return for a smaller push in general against GOP (I don't think the latter will happen, but lets pretend it does) - the electoral math is very grim.
> You can't spin a diplomatic realignment as anti-Putin when the countries in question refuse to cut links with Putin or even to stop referring to Russia as 'ally'. There's no way Iran, Cuba or Venezuela will do that for both ideological and practical reasons
What does USA want out of Venezuela and Iran? To pump more oil. If they do that then the oil price goes down, which hurts Putin. This is true regardless of their rhetoric.
> but they care less about this than the blocks in question care about Maduro/Israel
The number of people who care about Maduro or Israel is less than those who care about Putin. US policy can't please everyone and shouldn't try to.
> 'We want to stand up to Putin
Lots of Republicans have been soft on Putin; the way to counter this would be to simply play recordings of them being so.
> We have enough oil, just drill baby drill!
Yes the USA should. To reduce the price of oil and hurt Putin.
I think I misunderstood you earlier, and that explains our disagreement. I've replied at length in the sister comment but I want to also reply to the specific points you've raised:
>What does USA want out of Venezuela and Iran? To pump more oil. If they do that then the oil price goes down, which hurts Putin. This is true regardless of their rhetoric.
I argued in the other comment they aren't that useful oil price wise. Both are very underinvested, and Iran normalization will trigger Saudi blowback. Anyhow, the problem with their links with Putin is that when they turn around and use their newfound oil money to buy stuff from Russia, there'd be no good way to spin this as 'weakening Putin'. This is why the US could not accept Russia's demand to totally exempt Iran trade from sanctions in the current Iran talks.
>The number of people who care about Maduro or Israel is less than those who care about Putin. US policy can't please everyone and shouldn't try to.
Some people care more about certain issues, and when these people care much more than the general public they have outsized power. When these people are more represented in swing States they have even more power. That's political reality for you.
GOP won't spin this as 'either Maduro or Putin'. They'll suggest being nasty to both. Telling Americans that they can't get everything they want is never popular.
>Lots of Republicans have been soft on Putin; the way to counter this would be to simply play recordings of them being so.
In return GOP will play recordings of Democrats being soft; That's a bit more common than recent memory recalls. Ultimately, both parties tried to mend relations with Putin, and neither could. That's not the US's fault. Putin has had more than enough opportunities.
I'm glad you wrote that, because now I'm understanding the sources of our disagreement better. Or at least I think I do. Correct me if I don't. What Smith suggests, and what you want are a bit different, and I did not notice that.
This article is about policy for a new Cold War. Smith wants to recruit new allies, and has a particular list; My criticism was that for most countries listed it's a bad policy: strengths countries very likely to still be on the other side while generating significant foreign and domestic blowback.
You want Venezuela and Iran to pump oil now, the long term Cold War 2 implications not being much of a consideration. This explains your suggestion to do stuff quietly. I've been thinking of normalization where this can't be done - but one can quietly ignore oil exports. The Biden administration has arguably already been doing that! Both countries have recovered their pre-COVID exports, and rumors have it there's less enforcement.
The thing is that neither country has that much more to give in the short term (Iran has a one-time jolt of a fleet of tankers, and that's likely to be more than balanced by Saudi being upset with this). Both countries have domestic mismanagement - especially Venezuela - and massive underinvestment, partly as a result of sanctions.
Bringing them up to speed requires foreign investments + time, they can't do it on their own. But there cannot be foreign investments in the absence of normalization with US + stability + rule-of-law. This isn't happening for all the reasons I've stated.
So the US won't be getting anything in the short or long term, while IMHO there'll be significant in Cold War 2. Ultimately, the only long term option is domestic production + oil demand reduction, but in the short term one could beg the Saudis (who will demand a tough Iran line).
A very good summary. While Smith's posts about economy are insightful, this post doesn't make any sense. But India and the US can indeed improve relations.
Well, this is an interesting piece. America finally admits it needs help. The years of being the global sheriff, and doing rather badly at it, thankfully seem to be over.
First off, anyone under the delusion that China and Russia are better alternatives to America probably can no longer be helped. However, it is actually a good thing that China is now the first legitimate rival America has had in fifty years: post-1970 Soviet Union doesn't count.
The simple truth is everyone behaves better and acts smarter when there's competition. This is true of leaders, lovers, companies, economies, and as we can see, countries. Rivalry spurs technological innovation and reinstates a healthy balance between parochial nationalism and arrogant condescension on the global stage.
So, this might actually be the start of a very flourishing period again for America. Although several other things have to go right first.
On to India, I am very skeptical of any true alliance with the USA. India has a long, successful history of sitting on the fence. It won't change that now. But it certainly won't be joining up with China and Russia in any kind of alliance either.
Finally, there should be more concern over the fate of Saudi Arabia. If renewables fully or significantly replace fossil fuels as the engine of the global economy, we are looking at a country in which almost non-existent education, severe religious conservatism, significant numbers of young people, and a corrupt, unaccountable ruling class could all combine into a very explosive mix.
International law is simply the actions of power followed up with 'moral' justifications. And there's not too much wrong with that as long as that power is accountable. But we should not pretend like this isn't the case. That would simply be another immoral act.
Yes, one upside to great power rivalries (besides generally improving the lot of the lower economic classes) is that stupid and inane culture wars tend to take the back seat when there is an existential threat.
> there should be more concern over the fate of Saudi Arabia. If renewables fully or significantly replace fossil fuels as the engine of the global economy, we are looking at a country in which almost non-existent education, severe religious conservatism, significant numbers of young people, and a corrupt, unaccountable ruling class could all combine into a very explosive mix.
That is certainly something Saudis should be concerned about. The rest of the world, less so.
[Haven't read yet, just wanted to add this cuz I like the headline...]
One of my favorite personal takes about Star Trek's United Federation of Planets is that its diplomatic corps serves as a "fourth branch of government". Because the Federation is essentially a President + Senate, IE with 1 rep per planet, the diplomats are basically their primary means of greasing the wheels of democracy. They mediate its crisis management on the ground in a way that interstellar communications simply can't substitute for.
It just makes me wonder what kind of role your new notion of diplomacy is going to play in the "optimal timeline" where Earth actually does manage to overcome the challenge of autocracy and unite in a one-world government.
Appreciate the opening disclaimer. Wish we saw more of that. Anyway, I like the idea of going neutral in the middle east. Agree that Saudi Arabia would be mad. I don't understand the history of their relationship to Yemen, and would be curious as to why we are involved
Noah you are so close! Did you notice how your column about Russia spent 2/3rds of its time on China and India? I’d like to offer that’s because China and India are important and Russia really isn’t. I try to think about it this way, is there a way Russia could dominate Europe? Given that the EU has 3-4x times the number of people and Germany alone has 3-4x the GDP, I just don’t see how that happens. So why is the US paying to “protect” EU countries. When the EU was a 9 year old pip squeak, it made sense to protect him from the bully on the block. But it’s all grown up now. The EU is a 6 foot 3 man and the bully is a 5 foot 13 year old. What are we doing?
2nd question is there a way China dominates Asia? Clearly I think the answer is yes. It might not be likely but it is possible, so we should concentrate there. In this case the bully, China, is a grown man with knives and guns. We need to organize the block and boot him out. To torture my metaphor, the EU lives two towns over and doesn’t really care about the bully in India’s neighborhood. In fact, they’ll do deals with him (see German/Chinese trade. Germany actually has a trade surplus with China). So Europe isn’t a steadfast ally against China. They’ll bail because they aren’t threatened by the Chinese bully. As I see it we are spending our time and money protecting someone who doesn’t need protecting and who won’t help us with the real threat. Your piece works if you just drop the league of democracies stuff. The EU ain’t going to be there to help and we should get out while there is still time to concentrate on China.
We are in agreement over certain points. First off, yes, Europe will likely bail over China. NATO is the closest thing The Europeans have to a continental army and the US contributes more to it financially than all of Europe altogether.
Second, I'm very skeptical of all this wonderful talk about a united Europe currently going around. It's never happened in the past as evidenced by their very impressive contributions to war history and it won't happen now because a truly united Europe will require individual European countries giving up some of their sovereignty and making serious sacrifices for the greater good.
So, while they have acted admirably in helping Ukraine, and finally shown us all that their immigration concerns were really just racism concerns - Poland took over one million Ukrainians in less than 2 weeks - real unity will demand full consistency over long periods of time and a lot more sacrifice, which again will not happen.
Where we disagree is in this American obsession with China. Is China a rival? Yes. Does it despise america? Yes. For very legitimate reasons.
But the real problem is this: if America just fixed its own problems and paid attention to all the considerable issues it is facing, investing in its infrastructure for a start and breaking apart its numerous monopolies is another among several, it won't have to worry about China because China wouldn't even be able to compete.
You can only be defeated by an enemy if you have already defeated yourself.
I fully agree on fixing things at home. A pull back from Europe might even help that and at the same time China could be a real threat. I tend to think realists like me overplay that threat. China’s demography and need for adjustment from an investment driven to a consumer driven economy spell low if not negative growth going forward. Still, there is a decent chance China could consolidate regional hegemony in the absence of the the US in Asia. To me that means we need to focus on building relationships and the deterrence capabilities of India, Japan, Australia, S Korea, Vietnam, etc. On that I think we agree. The part where we might not is that I think we should acquiesce to a Finlandized Ukraine and similar arraignments for other Russian neighbors in order to do two things: first turn down the temperature with Russia and get the US out of the position as key Russian rival and second coax them into the China containment coalition. This alliance between China and Russia seems very fragile and if we would back off in Europe, Russia would face far greater long term threats from China than the US.
Well, I don't disagree with any of these points. They are perfectly reasonable.
However, I also don't see any USA- Russia alliance happening.
There's too much of an ideological separation, too much historical bad blood, and there's little value to either of them in a partnership: Russia mostly sells raw commodities that the USA not only produces by itself, but could also get elsewhere. And again, a lot of those exports could all disappear with renewables.
On the American side, while American consumers can usually be relied upon to buy literally anything, there isn't much Russia has to offer.
I can understand the political value of such an alliance, but even the political value will be diluted by what the rest of the world will simply perceive as realpolitik taken too far.
There's not much to fear from a China-Russia alliance anyway. It sounds threatening but it isn't, in a similar way that an horror movie is a very different experience from an actual murder.
I think you're really underestimating how much has changed in Europe since the second world war. The EU is no federal state like the US, but it's clearly on the way there and serious concessions of sovereignty have been made already. It survived Brexit rather easily, and troubles with integration of southern/eastern European countries can and have been overcome over time.
The EU needs an army. At that point, NATO would be really obsolete.
I admire the reach of your optimism and yes, Europe has changed much from 1945: it had no choice but to change. The world had moved on.
But in important ways, Europe hasn't changed or rather hasn't changed enough.
Take economically. For the euro to have any chance of working, it needed a way to recycle surpluses from very productive countries into far less productive ones.
Within countries, governments do these by taking taxed capital and redirecting it into investment.
Or people simply do it by moving somewhere else for better opportunities.
The first can't happen unless Europe has an integrated overall political system, an alternative which for good reasons and otherwise, Germany rejected in the early 1990s.
And the second will require full and seamless immigration, which again, blue collar workers in richer countries are unlikely to accept: Brexit parly happened for this reason.
So, any talk of economic unity is mere rhetoric until that happens. Article 105 of the EU charter itself expressly guarantees that European countries won't shoulder debts of other European countries.
Military unity, as in a continental army, is also deeply unlikely. If it is pose any kind of significance, it will need lots of capital. Who will be supplying that capital? Well, largely, the wealthy European countries, who would simply think to themselves and ask quite sensibly why they aren't just spending that money on their own military or on something else for that matter.
Unity needs sacrifice.
Strong countries require individuals to sacrifice some of their strength and sovereignty: you accept taxes, give up the ability to inflict violence, etc.
In the same vein, strong international organizations require countries to sacrifice some of their strength and sovereignty.
And with Europe, that is simply very, very, very unlikely to happen.
The Euro has been working (maybe not so well, but working) for 20 years.
I'm not sure how much more seamless you want immigration to get, at least within the Schengen area.
Articles can and have been changed...
Common debt is already an established thing - you can thank the pandemic for that. Why should France shoulder Bulgaria's debt? New York doesn't pay for North Carolina's. But everyone in the EU pays for common EU debt.
So what? By a similar argument we could have said the Euro would have never happened. An EU military is inevitable if the EU states continue down their path of tighter integration, and I contend that they will.
The current state of the EU is already a moderately integrated, if somewhat patchwork, economic area. This situation isn't that sustainable if things like a common currency are going to work well, so the EU will naturally move in one direction or another. They've shown their ability to move towards tighter integration, though not without setbacks (not convinced Brexit was that bad for EU unity anyway).
The EU states have given up plenty of sovereignty already because they know it works for the common European good as well as benefiting them. Sure they will take their time, but I would be very surprised if by the end of my lifetime we thought of the EU and US as different categories of entity.
Everyone would have called the EU in its current state extremely unlikely in 1945. And yet, we're here. Why are you so confident as to predict that a similar magnitude of change is nearly impossible in another 70 years?