I actually think the real determinant will be geography. It's not just India that matters here. I strongly suspect it will be 'The Entire World' vs 'China'
We have that China has an attack vector aimed at all of its neighbours: Vietnamn, Thailand, The Phillipines, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and so forth. However, the USA has no attack vectors aimed at any of these countries! Being the far away power.
This means that the rational realist approach for any of these nations is to ally with the United States.
The USA can not threaten the sovereignty of any of these nations the way that China can. Which means they will ally with the USA. Furthermore the USA has proved to uphold international law over the past 60 years or so which allowed these nations to trade freely and they do not know if China will allow them to do the same.
Some of these nations will try to balance for as long as they and can as I suspect Indonesia will. But if push comes to shove they will ally with the USA.
Due to the USA (And perhaps ultimately the Dutch) creating the current structure of the global liberal word order China is checkmated at the outset because of where all the attack vectors point at. China will undoubtedly try to invade Taiwan, but strongly suspect it will find itself with no allies besides a weak ally in Russia.
I suspect we will have hot proxy conflicts with in total a few million dead the coming decade, and with near certainty we will have navy battles in the Indo-Pacific for a while but I think due to the structure of the international system and nuclear weapons we won't have a WW3.
The global liberal order is indeed dead. The world is multipolar now and you will find a rise in illiberal nationalism in all of the western world (as is already happening(and this is rational btw)), Israel is an apartheid state (and we will continue to support Israel), and you will see China spend all of its energy to carve out it's own block in this world. They will try, and we will try, but we'll mostly end up on top.
(Also 85% of the world's trade is done in dollars and the Ukraine war didn't change this)
We should still manufacture all of the important things as much as possible of course.
The problem of distance cuts both ways. If I were in a country that neighbored China then sure, I wouldn't want to see them dominate the region.
But would I trust the distant United States to protect me from China? Probably not. When push comes to shove, and China's neighbors are forced to choose a side they might(accurately) perceive China as their only real choice. Better to be subservient to China than to be outright conquered by them.
China has bought Indonesia. No attack vector needed. And China is critically important to Japan, S Korea and Taiwan for manufacturing and components. Taiwan’s elite have also been bought off by China for economic reasons. I have yet to meet a wealthy Taiwanese (living in Taiwan) who doesn’t own multiple flats in China.
Japan and Vietnam are stalwart. Philippines and S Korea are now, but they vacillate
Indonesia will be balancing for as long as it can, and then it will fight for the USA (is my claim). Unless indeed the USA is complete shit in projecting power in the indo-pacific, but I doubt that. but idk ultimately ofcourse.
Just like Putin's rationale for joining China over the West--he has more to lose by opposing China, than joining it--Indonesia has more to lose by joining China over the West in a war. Like England has the English Channel, they have a fabulous and even more bigly moat: the S China Sea.
Another excellent and timely article by Noah. And a lot to unpack.
The absolute best case scenario for deterrence is a global alliance arrayed against China, where an attack against one is an attack against all. NATO, ASEAN, Japan, S.Korea, India and Taiwan. But the 11 ASEAN nations don't have anything like the chummy cohesion and interoperbility shared by fellow NATO states. Vietnam and Myanmar being the most glaring examples. Any divide and conquer scenario where any major stakeholder, like India, remains 'neutral' will strongly favor Chinese war goals.
If the balloon goes up, China will likely steamroll mainland SE Asia; but go no further than the Straits of Malacca (Malaysia). All of their amphibious and airborne (infantry) delivery assets will be committed to Taiwan; at least initially. India will be their real challenge; and only if they can penetrate deep into the Ganges plain would they be able to force India to the negotiating table, and out of the conflict. Taking Phillipines & Indonesia would require enormous amphibious assets that China currently does NOT have. So, just as the English Channel became a major theatre demarcation line in WW2, so would the S.China Sea in a China war.
The biggest STRATEGIC wild card is whether or not Russia would join the conflict militarily. If Putin is too exhausted by his Ukraine gambit--even if he bigly wins it--he might want to be like Franco's Spain was in WW2, friendly neutral (supplying strategic commodities + maybe some 'volunteers'). But if Russia goes all in, then the bulk of any US ground intervention would be needed to shore up NATO forces on the Russian border; and secondarily in Alaska.
If I was the PLA general staff, my war goals would loosely be to: A) Invade and take Taiwan, while; B) Steamrolling mainland SE Asia; then C) Knock India out of the war; and then D) Transfer enough ground assets to the European theatre to crush NATO. Then sit back and enjoy the new world order.
The biggest TACTICAL wild card is the size of China's amphibious and airborne assets. They would almost certainly need enough to establish a decisive beachhead in Taiwan; and then repair/recycle those assets for use later against other possible objectives, like Luzon, Okinawa, Sumatra, Kalimantan. Guam, Alaska, etc.
Regarding strategic commodities, petroleum still tops the list. Not just used in plastics, fertilizers & chemicals, most importantly mechanized/motorized assets as well air and (non-nuclear) naval assets won't run without it. China will need overland access (pipelines) to a sizeable portion of Russia's 11.2 miilion b/d capacity; because even all of SE Asia's 2 million b/d would not satisfy their needs.
Nice summary of how this would go. Imo, all we need to do is defend Taiwan.
I disagree with steamrolling SE being easy. Their last Vietnam venture didn't go so well. The geographic barriers in that region are just absurd. It's not easy to get your tank crew all the way to malaysia. Rivers and jungle everywhere.
Like, what you are describing here is a decade long campaign in the very best case for China. Russia gains like 1km a week of ground in Ukraine, or something, if that. I highly doubt they'd end up in the European theatre to crush NATO, seems like it brings very few strategic benefits after having establish hegemony in the SEA area. Also I think we will start throwing 'tactical' nukes if Russia invades Poland.
But yeah if the balloon goes up...
Anyway, all the more reason to bring Russia into our fold if we can do it.
Ukraine started with extremely fluid thrusts and counter-thrusts by divisions and entire Army Groups. It eventually settled into its current static (trench warfare) phase.
My understanding of China vs. Vietnam 1979, was that the Chinese deployed overwhelming strength, and that Vietnamese forces pulled back. The Chinese troops were recalled after penetrating 30-50km into Vietnamese territory, having taught the Vietnamese 'a lesson'.
As for how fast or slow a Chinese offensive would cover ground in various theatres, it'd be a mix of mostly infantry with some motorized/mechanized. Possibly with some amphibious/airmobile support along the SE Asian coast; but mostly infantry/mountain troops in SE Asian interior & the Himalayas. The Japanese ground conquests in SE Asia in 1941-42 could possibly be a template of how rapidly the PLA might make their way to the Straits of Malacca.
Can't really see Putin prying himself free of his new alliance, for all the reasons stated in an earlier post.
What do you think about the USA and USSR having such a hard time winning in Vietnam? What makes modern China different?
I'm not 100% convinced on the previous statements wrt Russia. I think some agreement of neutrality with NATO benefits Russia more than the relationship he has with China now.
As far as I know, Vietnam's military isn't really set up to factor in dedicated cadres of guerillas to be dispersed in areas invaders (China) would occupy. Historically, insurgencies happen after a country's main armies are smashed, and survivors hide in rough territory forming said cadres.
The effectiveness of guerilla movements would also be inversely proportional to the size of the security garrisons a victorious PLA would leave behind as it moved south. The Vietnam War saw a huge and effective insurgency because the entirety of North Vietnam existed as a sanctuary/resupply zone because US forces refused to invade, lest there be a repeat of Chinese intervention as in the Korean War. In a China war, this would be a non-issue.
Putin has steadily marinated Russians in a stream of anti-NATO propaganda for two years now. The NATO powers are all baby-eating Nazi demons, brazenly arming and aiding Ukraine in its evil fight to invade Russia, etc., etc. To think he could turn on a dime and have his people believe Europeans are now Russia's BFF's against China seems a hard sell.
As you say, if a China war erupts, Putin will be much more likely to stay neutral if Ukraine succeeds in bleeding him white as they have already very skillfully been doing. When we supply them with the munitions to do so. Which is why it is crucial to overcome GOP resistance to building up our own munition manufacturing capacity--and supply source for Ukraine--ASAP. If Johnson continues to serve the Moscow consensus, then he and his party must be voted out.
It will need to be protected against drones and missiles the way Israel was today. Fortunately, it is close to US Air Force bases, so as threats materialize, it will not require too much adjustment to defend it.
For the 2024 election, Ukraine hitting Russian oil targets is problematic, because it causes inflation, which US voters get furious about. But it’s a very important illustration of the weakness in the new Axis.
If oil supplies get disrupted by war, this number can ramp up very rapidly. GM has got a handle on EV production finally, and cheaper models will appear later this year:
Starting a war with the New Allies would be bad business for China. Selling $15K EVs in the US would destroy our auto industry, which would make us weaker in a war. But it would take a few years, so China would have to wait.
Then again, both Biden and Trump know $15K EVs will destroy the US auto industry (and our economy for several years), so neither are likely going to let China sell them here. Dangling a carrot in the grey area could both keep US auto-makers in business and delay China’s plans for war.
The New Allies are very big markets for Chinese goods and EVs. They would lose those very rapidly.
Russia is not going to switch to EVs: its grid sucks, it is giant, and it’s got lots of oil, which it will keep trying to use, even as Ukraine keeps blowing their facilities up.
India may have a hard time weaning itself from cheap Chinese EVs, but it is developing its own EV industry:
Your link https://www.axios.com/2022/07/29/china-taiwan-xi-pelosi-biden from nearly two years ago, says "But U.S. officials now believe China may make a strong move against Taiwan within the next 18 months" Worth reassessing the credibility of these unnamed officials, I think.
Perhaps. But the recent terrorist attack in Moscow was successfully predicted by the US intelligence establishment, they just got the date wrong by a month or so. And they also predicted that Russia would invade Ukraine and got the timing nearly right for that too. I am not reassured by the fact that they are making such time bounded predictions now
If they predict that the invasion will take place in a month, I'll pay attention. Such a prediction is based on observation of actual preparations, such as assembling troops and landing ships (which China doesn't have in anything like the required numbers).
J.D. came up with a new retort over his position on Ukraine. The US has limits and needs to focus on ourselves first and our strategic allies in the rest of the world. He doesn’t believe Ukraine is important enough.
To focus mean this. The US according to him manufactures about 550 Patriot missiles a year and with the supplemental it will go to 650 missiles a year. Hardly enough for Ukraine Israel and Taiwan. There for we come first followed by Israel which is far more strategic ally. He mentioned the same problem with 155mm artillery shells.
What I found more interesting is that he focused on what we are currently doing rather than what we could be doing. Our miliatary industrial complex is moribund due to its peacetime setting. Take the Stinger factory line. It was shuttered in 2007. So we shipped a ton Stingers to Ukraine and want to build up our inventory again.
The manufacturer had to recall retired workers to open the line...That isn’t the issue, whether to restart a weapons line. It is that the weapons line was built for peacetime manufacturing.
During peace time you don’t need to keep manufacturing items that you are not using. So you keep the line open by building a few dozen a month, or a few hundred or even a few thousand.
Russia has a 5 to 1 advantage over artillery shells. The one line that was building 155mm artillery shells isn’t close to building anywhere near the need for Ukraine or Israel. The issue for our manufacturing is how much and how fast do you need to build these weapons. We need them NOW, not next year or two years from now. If we get in to a shooting war we’ll go thru anti aircraft missiles, fighter jet missiles like candy corn on Halloween. CR’s are the worst thing for the Pentagon. Our entire military industrial complex is screwed up. The recent Naval assessment on shipbuilding makes the situation look hopeless. This is the issue we confront.
Hope you're not agreeing with Putin's,...er J.D.'s call to ditch Ukraine, as they are our only way of countering the Russian part of this new Sino-Soviet axis. If we can keep giving Kiev the hardware and munitions they need to bleed Russia white, Putin may never militarily join China when they move against us.
Which is why our pro-Putin wing needs to be at least temporarily neutralized this Fall; to ensure that Ukraine stays in the fight, and that the new Bamboo Curtain lies on the Ukrainian border and not the Polish one.
JD Vance is an idiot, but in this case he is repeating something that smarter, good-faith military analysts have pointed out.
US missile defense is a limited resource, and our US manufacturing is not setup to replenish them. Most of the things going to Ukraine and Israel are distinct from Taiwan's needs, but this is the biggest exception. Separately, there is no excuse for our slow make-nothing military procurement process and we need to fix our military manufacturing capabilities.
The supplemental will pay for US factories to build cutting-edge weaponry and munitions for US forces. We then give the older inventory replaced to the Ukrainians.
Since when does the GOP, even under Trump's leadership, fight against giving our own troops the best and newest gear? If not for Russian interference, this would be a serious no-brainer for any American, Left or Right, who thinks our military needs to be strong.
Yeah that very odd thing about Vance....He is against the supplemental money which goes to our contractors.....Seems like an odd way to complain about a shortage of missiles. I brought up our deficit quite a while ago at The Dispatch.....Since the cold war ended it seems everybody has forgotten military needs. Did you read about the Navies study of its shipbuilding? It’s fucked and they have no idea how to fix it.
Isn't there an argument to be made that we should seek a negotiated settlement with Putin instead, such that Russia won't continue to be pushed in the hands off China?
Bleeding Russia white is pointless when they are allied with China. It's like cutting a fingernail of the beast that is China.
I don't understand what China's goals are. They don't seem to be promoting an 'ism, like Mao or Lenin/Stalin and the Nazis. Minor border disputes and the Taiwan issue decided, either win or lose for China, what else is on their agenda? Isn't this all about money and resources and prestige? If so, is war the best way for them to achieve their goals? I encourage you, Noah, to think about what you would advise the Chinese government to do to ensure their economic dominance for the future by any other means than war.
China's ideology is now (Han) Chinese nationalism. They would like to:
1) Expand territory into their neighbors (Taiwan, East China Sea, Himalayas, Mongolia)
2) Have substantial economic and political control over their neighbors (Singapore, Vietnam, Phillipines, Malayasia, Korea, Japan, etc.)
3) Control the lives of ethnic Chinese and Chinese-language worldwide (allowing no dissent and forcibly recruiting talent).
4) Embarass and defeat European, Japanese and America enemies in retaliation for the so-called "century of humiliation".
This is not totally incompatible with the Marxist-Lenist/Maoist framework. Classically there are two pillars of Marxist-Lenism regimes - "socialism" and "anti-imperialism". The expansive foreign policy agenda falls into the "anti-imperialism" bucket, even if the balance of power shifts towards China doing the imperialism. Using the incompleteness of the anti-imperialism project as an excuse, they can delay the socialism project indefinitely (i.e. prefering martial law to an egalitarian worker's paradise). More broadly though, "socialism" in the Chinese case has come to mean "complete control of the communist party" which has come to mean "complete suppression of dissent, democracy, and economic autonomy". So rather than "socialism" and "anti-imperialism", those words now mean "statism" and "revaunchism".
War is indeed not the best way to achieve the goal of economic prosperity, including lavish livestyles for the elites and decent quality of life for the common man. Arguably, the Dengists are satisified with that, but for Xi it appears success only counts if it can be measured as power over Asia and the West.
Thank you for this explanation. It's a short list with no simple resolution to the issues suggested, but it helps to frame what is at risk. I fully understand the century of humiliations. In many ways the west is reaping what it sowed. We will need a president with considerable knowledge and understanding of these issues as they unfold to guide our country, congress, and our allies forward. He or she is out there, but just not a candidate.
As something of a China hawk, I think Biden is underrated and Trump is overrated.
Biden/Democrats have done export controls on chips, supplied Taiwan with defensive weaponry, moved to reshore our supply chains, and bringing allies like Japan, South Korea, and Phillipines closer together. My biggest critcism of Biden/Democrats is that they have failed to do enough, fast enough. We still have a shortage of ships, anti-ship missiles, sea mines, anti-drone technology etc. We still have a lot of supply chains dependent on China (as they do dependent on us!).
Trump/Republicans talk tough on China, but are really two factions. The hawks don't control the Republican party, are somewhat immature in their perspective, and haven't realized yet their hopes must rely on the Democratic party. Whereas the Trumpist are broadly but shallowly anti-China, they are focused on small-ball economic deals (like soybeans), not a strategic perspective on supply chains (like chips and batteries). Being broadly anti-Chinese whatever actions the China takes, Trumpist don't focus any specific economic or diplomatic levers on deterrence and they are poor choice to bring in European and Asian allies. Shallowly, they don't have the stomach to do anything difficult - This was the faction that utterly failed to act when Hong Kong was crushed and actively impedes the defense of Ukraine - the two strongest precedents for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
There may be some possibility yet to deter China on Taiwan and engage it in economically cooperative terms. Unclear to me what level of control Dengists have in Chinese elites, and what level of control Chinese elites have over Xi. And Xi won't live forever. Definitely there are Chinese elites who want to pursue Chinese nationalism by being moral superior to the West, and learning from the West's morally and economically ill-advised adventurism. And on the US side, Obama famously asserted "We don't oppose the peaceful rise of China" and I think we are still prepared to honor that.
You mean other than near total economic domination? China Shock II is in the works...it has already begun, and if unopposed will degrade/destroy much/most of the West's remaining manufacturing base. If that happens, then China has the rest of the world over a proverbial barrel. They can then dictate terms; or go with a war with a weaker West for even better outcomes.
Yes, that's what I mean, but economic domination at what cost? I suspect that Noah would agree that a balanced trading system among nations would generate more prosperity for all than could be had by one country achieving dominance in one or two areas at the expense of all the destruction a war would entail. And holding other countries over a barrel just means those markets are probably cut off from your trade. I just can't see where going to war is in China's best long-term interests. Is anyone asking China what they think they want in the long term, and considering how we might work together to achieve theirs and our goals together? I bet that's exactly what the industrial plant owners on both sides are thinking.
Regarding China’s involvement in Russia-Ukraine war, I believe they are the chief reason why Russia has been able to rearm itself so quickly. So this is not a good situation for Ukraine. Regarding US Allies and the military, the US is an innovation and technology powerhouse. But it gave up manufacturing to Asia decades ago. It is only recently that US Congressmen have noticed that ship building is hurting the Navy and is hampered with delays. But Allies such as Hyundai Heavy Industries is punching ships out like rabbits. It is thought that they may be tasked with taking over the shipyards or even build the ships for the Navy to add the technology. The US will need to leverage all of its allies with their talents to stand up to this competition. As for China, they have no administrative roadblocks. Their barriers are mainly technical.
There are some other aspects to this worth analysing.
1. Space. Space superiority will be a concept in any war between the USA and China because from space you can launch some pretty impressive weapons today are hard to defend against, and do mad surveillance. The USA has a unique asset in SpaceX and I would be hopeful that it could rapidly deny space access to China in any serious conflict
2. Infrastructure disruption through cyber warfare. This hasn't played a big role yet, but there has been some of it in Ukraine. The infrastructure is terribly fragile and I lie awake at night worrying what a strong adversary could do. There are repeated and detailed reports of China infiltration of utilities and other basic infrastructure operations. If they succeed in planting time bombs there, any conflict could easily start with multi day or week power outages, water supply disruptions, mobile network failures and general chaos that would prevent the military from deploying. An invasion of Taiwan could easily be over before we even get TV news back online and figure out what the hell happened.
I would not say that America lazily allowed China to become the dominant manufacturing power in the world. Market dynamics are the most powerful force in the world, and China had competitive advantages in manufacturing that were overwhelming. The United States would have had to rally the whole world to prevent China be from becoming a manufacturing giant. It would have required virtually every participant to go against strong economic incentives.
Nevertheless, the new allies now need to address supply issues for war capacity seriously. Probably, the US should look to Mexico and other Atlantic facing Latin American countries. They can provide cheaper labor and their goods would travel a much shorter distance to the US and Europe in case of a conflict rather than China or Russia. Additionally, if handled well, US investment in Latin America could create significant good will on that continent.
What "overwhelming advantages" did China (especially versus other countries of similar per-capita GDP) have circa 2000, when its meteoric rise in manufacturing was first beginning?
1. Were invited and supported by a government that had capital to build infrastructure. The government was creating entrepreneurship zone specifically to a facilitate direct investment.
2. Knew that their labor force would be docile, backed up by a government that would reinforce management.
And once Apple, IBM, Intel and the cream of the American tech sector had invested mucho billions in manufacturing capacity in China, the CCP used those same American corporations' combined political clout to set American MFN trade status to enable China Shock I, which gutted Western manufacturing.
Sounds like you're saying that those big US computer hardware companies were basically the _pioneers_ of offshoring to China: could you link to any information on that point?
Actually quantifying 2024 dollar value of US-owned (or Western-owned) manufacturing in China is a tougher ask. Or quantifying what % of the goods exported during China Shock I were from said firms.
You should probably add Iran to your new Axis. You should add a long section of food supply as well as Pharma supply. Although i doubt any war would be protracted in a protracted war how many millions of chinese die of hunger, how many americans from lack of pharma? How about the next section on what happens to the economies of the countries at war and how that affects their populations? No thoughts on bio weapons?
Most countries would want to stay out of the conflict simply because it makes good sense to do so and not pick sides. They would supply to both sides and refuse to take part in sanctions. Further, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Israel and Iran and China and Taiwan might only see Japan and a fractured EU get involved mostly for their own self-serving reasons (to assusage a concerned citizenry, preserve trading/supply routes and to deter further aggression that could see its citizens get involved). It's not unthinkable that the New Allies ends up appeasing China and Russia with parts of Taiwan and Ukraine bartered away in exchange for peace. Israel, though, may have to fight for its survival till the very end as I'm not sure if it has any friends in the Middle East.
With Trump in the White House, it's seriously debatable whether US will want to get involved in any international crisis.
Neutrality is always an option; but one that is not necessarily attainable. Denmark & Norway, for example, bet everything on neutrality. But the Nazis invaded them anyway.
If India thinks they can remain neutral during--or after--an armed conflict between China and the West, they're deluded. Consider recent military friction in the Himalayas; the new Chinese highways that stop just at the Indian border; the increasingly pro-Chinese stance of Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka; the Chinese claim to Andhra Pradesh. Not to mention the dramatic Chinese military buildup. The Chinese are gearing up for war, and the only solutions are, A) To deter them from actually warring via strength & diplomatic alliance; B) To fight them; or C) to Submit.
Just a general thought about the benefits of supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia as an intermediate step in addressing long-term issues with China. Please feel free to disagree as I do not claim to be a military analyst. That said,
1) Addressing the Soviet Legacy - Russia had access to thousands of tanks, armored vehicles, support vehicles, etc. prior to invading Ukraine. While Russian is a middling power in terms of industrial production, this legacy was/is quite potent and could be gifted/used against the US and its allies in any future conflict (even if Russian stayed neutral). Forcing Russian to use this legacy now reduces its future power to those items it can produce. So to benefit for Russia's current inability to produce much, it behooves us to have Russia using as much of that equipment as possible now.
2) Reducing Russia's resources/ability to update/maintain nuclear weapons - anything that forces Russia's industrial and scientific resources to be spent on things besides updating nuclear weapons is to all our benefit (including the Russian people). The conventional conflict does this.
3) Ramping up US industrial assets - like it or not...there is a huge degree of uncertainty among US defense contractors about the long-term US expenditures on weaponry. By using our own stores, we set up a kind of "commitment" to buy new weapons. This commitment, while not iron-clad, is much stronger when the industrial base can see the need increase. In the long run, setting up these industries now is more important than the weapons which are used.
4) Signaling to allies - Just like I do not blame the industrial base for being suspicious about making major investments absent long-term commitments, I do not blame our allies for having some concerns about our (the US) commitment internationally. As many have argued, the US could probably sit out a future conflict. In the long run, I do not believe this is a wise course and that we would end up with a Chinese-run international order that would eventually end up with the US on the defensive...that prediction is by no means certain, and I cannot blame people for questioning it. However, anything we do now to signal we are a reliable ally probably helps strengthen existing alliances and build new ones.
5) Turning the conflict into a one-front war - China, absent a Russian threat to Europe, would be in a terrible position in any future conflict. Having basically the entire industrial might of the US and EU in a strategic fortress (i.e., largely inaccessible to most Chinese interventions) would turn China into an island with a very tiny pipeline of supplies via the unreliable Brick and Road projects.
One of the US's biggest assets during WWII was that it could optimize how it produced material (i.e., more efficiency). The Axis were worried about bombing, etc., and had to hide/disperse industry. Obviously, China has some weapons that can reach the US and Europe, but the number would be insufficient if both Europe and the US were largely isolated from attack.
Wearing out Russia now might enable Europe to emerge in a situation similar to the US, where its industry could operate without the distractions associated with being in the war zone. The effects of this would be multiplicative, not additive, in the sense that if it is just the US, which is isolated, it is easier for an enemy to mass missile strikes and overwhelm air defense. If you have two largely isolated sectors, it becomes harder to create that kind of mass.
These are just my thoughts, and of all of them, I find the idea of forcing Russia to spend down its military inheritance to be the most compelling. Basically, if you already have all the weaponry, you really do not need to produce much (this is Russia right now), as that material is spent up, industrial productions become more relevant. This is why I do not find the weak Russian hypothesis very compelling.
How can you re-up this an still exclude Canada and Australia! These are not small Hungary sized countries! Just New Zealand offsets Hungary. If we are talking about resources Australia controls most of the iron ore.
I was really hoping the reason you would update your New Allies/Axis framework is to just do this correctly! You have a very successful substack - would it be so hard to thrown in a few relevant countries for the sake of rigor?
I also don't buy this framework that countries cancel each other out - NK and ROK bring different things to the table. There are also inter-coalitional dynamics - what fraction of the New Allies does the US alone make up depends on how big the coalition we are talking about.
I can understand the rationale for excluding Iran, Israel, Saudia Arabia etc., because although the current Middle East conflict has elements of proxy war, the coalitional dynamics are sufficiently complicated and are not centered around China. In the future, Africa will be the new Asia and the power dynamics there will be more important. But not in time for the present conflict.
Given that Australia is a huge producer of both iron ore and coal, why does it simply export these raw resources to China instead of having its own steel industry?
If there is a true split I think it will have to go that way. Or perhaps they will send it to India, where costs are lower than Australia. Very interesting to think about whether the Chinese economy is set up to handle a loss of Australia ore.
Right now I think the steel is produced by China because 1) China subsidizes heavy industry massively 2) A lot of the steel is used in China anyway.
I have tried to think about whether this is a China risk hedge, to invest in non-Chinese steel companies. One challenge is that if the Chinese economies flounders but doesn't go to war (as it is right now), it dumps steel on the market. The other challenge is that there are many steel companies and its hard to know which to invest in. The ones that make the cheapest steel and have the most international footprint are the most direct competitors to the Chinese steel industry, but maybe the least certain to not to be disrupted themselves.
One of the best things the Allies can do in the short-medium term is try and get into a roughly equal trade balance with the Axis, so if it turns into a hot war they won't be starting with a hollowed out industrial base. To do this they would most likely have to stop importing capital from the Axis.
It is a fascinating question to me whether the Allies (notably the US, but also other players like India) can address their fiscal and trade deficits while maintaining reasonably full employment.
It is easy enough to think of economic solutions to this problem (eg letting SS run out of money if Trump wins, or taxes on the rich if Biden does). But none of these seems like a particularly stable political outcome compared to, say, continuing to kick the can down the road and run huge deficits.
Thanks. As you note, starting this year to care about this year is too late.
I like your economic analysis, on GDP basis. The details count. As you noted, the US spent a couple of years ramping up military production (and providing that production to the Allies) before Pearl Harbor. So the US had a running head start on production capacity. But the shift to Wartime production was really profound. It put women in the workforce, and shifted most commodities to military output. I believe the "Allies" could do this again.
People are important, too. Your Population comparisons don't dig in, but wars are fought mostly by young men, and when it gets tougher, old men. In WWII, the women kept up domestic military production, and men 16 to 50 went to combat. Older workers got locked into domestic industries, operating refineries, factories, transportation logistics. China's population is declining. One Child policy means they have men, but they don't have the next generation. That makes it hard to field troops. The new Allies have a similar problem with declining birth rates. You have to figure on both sides "soldiers" become a constraint, as losses would mount.
Ukraine today has a shortage of ammunition and a shortage of soldiers. Russia has more of both. In a grinding long war, volumes of soldiers, munitions, food and fuel all count.
Why didn't western countries start working on their ammunition production capacity back in the summer of 2022, to counter the Russian artillery superiority demonstrated by that season's Donbas offensive?
I also note Noah's claim that the Japanese (at least initially) had the best fighters of the early part of WWII.
While it was the case that the A6M Zero was both remarkably maneuverable and had a range that the Allies would only match three years later with the P-51 Mustang, it achieved this performance (especially remarkable given the inferiority of Japanese engines) by stripping away almost all protection from battle damage (notably self-sealing fuel tanks, because those didn't just weigh more but had less fuel capacity -- a big problem given that the IJN's air war strategy was premised on out-ranging their opponents)
This was one reason (along with the failure -- shared with the Germans -- to divert ace pilots to teaching duties) why the late air war in the Pacific was such a turkey shoot, as the best Japanese pilots had been killed without the chance to train replacements (which would anyway have been difficult due to lack of fuel).
I actually think the real determinant will be geography. It's not just India that matters here. I strongly suspect it will be 'The Entire World' vs 'China'
We have that China has an attack vector aimed at all of its neighbours: Vietnamn, Thailand, The Phillipines, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and so forth. However, the USA has no attack vectors aimed at any of these countries! Being the far away power.
This means that the rational realist approach for any of these nations is to ally with the United States.
The USA can not threaten the sovereignty of any of these nations the way that China can. Which means they will ally with the USA. Furthermore the USA has proved to uphold international law over the past 60 years or so which allowed these nations to trade freely and they do not know if China will allow them to do the same.
History matters here too, China has invaded many of these countries dozens of times in the past already. And none of them were very happy about that. China already has border disputes with basically all of their neighbours: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_disputes_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China
Some of these nations will try to balance for as long as they and can as I suspect Indonesia will. But if push comes to shove they will ally with the USA.
Due to the USA (And perhaps ultimately the Dutch) creating the current structure of the global liberal word order China is checkmated at the outset because of where all the attack vectors point at. China will undoubtedly try to invade Taiwan, but strongly suspect it will find itself with no allies besides a weak ally in Russia.
I suspect we will have hot proxy conflicts with in total a few million dead the coming decade, and with near certainty we will have navy battles in the Indo-Pacific for a while but I think due to the structure of the international system and nuclear weapons we won't have a WW3.
The global liberal order is indeed dead. The world is multipolar now and you will find a rise in illiberal nationalism in all of the western world (as is already happening(and this is rational btw)), Israel is an apartheid state (and we will continue to support Israel), and you will see China spend all of its energy to carve out it's own block in this world. They will try, and we will try, but we'll mostly end up on top.
(Also 85% of the world's trade is done in dollars and the Ukraine war didn't change this)
We should still manufacture all of the important things as much as possible of course.
The problem of distance cuts both ways. If I were in a country that neighbored China then sure, I wouldn't want to see them dominate the region.
But would I trust the distant United States to protect me from China? Probably not. When push comes to shove, and China's neighbors are forced to choose a side they might(accurately) perceive China as their only real choice. Better to be subservient to China than to be outright conquered by them.
China has bought Indonesia. No attack vector needed. And China is critically important to Japan, S Korea and Taiwan for manufacturing and components. Taiwan’s elite have also been bought off by China for economic reasons. I have yet to meet a wealthy Taiwanese (living in Taiwan) who doesn’t own multiple flats in China.
Japan and Vietnam are stalwart. Philippines and S Korea are now, but they vacillate
The Western order is also buying Indonesia: https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/indonesia-and-australia-move-toward-significant-security-agreement/
Indonesia will be balancing for as long as it can, and then it will fight for the USA (is my claim). Unless indeed the USA is complete shit in projecting power in the indo-pacific, but I doubt that. but idk ultimately ofcourse.
They are playing it smart, very true. But likely no need for them to fight.
Most of Europe refused to participate in keeping the Red Sea open. Well, they were right- it is still not open and that wasn’t Biden’s objective
Just like Putin's rationale for joining China over the West--he has more to lose by opposing China, than joining it--Indonesia has more to lose by joining China over the West in a war. Like England has the English Channel, they have a fabulous and even more bigly moat: the S China Sea.
Another excellent and timely article by Noah. And a lot to unpack.
The absolute best case scenario for deterrence is a global alliance arrayed against China, where an attack against one is an attack against all. NATO, ASEAN, Japan, S.Korea, India and Taiwan. But the 11 ASEAN nations don't have anything like the chummy cohesion and interoperbility shared by fellow NATO states. Vietnam and Myanmar being the most glaring examples. Any divide and conquer scenario where any major stakeholder, like India, remains 'neutral' will strongly favor Chinese war goals.
If the balloon goes up, China will likely steamroll mainland SE Asia; but go no further than the Straits of Malacca (Malaysia). All of their amphibious and airborne (infantry) delivery assets will be committed to Taiwan; at least initially. India will be their real challenge; and only if they can penetrate deep into the Ganges plain would they be able to force India to the negotiating table, and out of the conflict. Taking Phillipines & Indonesia would require enormous amphibious assets that China currently does NOT have. So, just as the English Channel became a major theatre demarcation line in WW2, so would the S.China Sea in a China war.
The biggest STRATEGIC wild card is whether or not Russia would join the conflict militarily. If Putin is too exhausted by his Ukraine gambit--even if he bigly wins it--he might want to be like Franco's Spain was in WW2, friendly neutral (supplying strategic commodities + maybe some 'volunteers'). But if Russia goes all in, then the bulk of any US ground intervention would be needed to shore up NATO forces on the Russian border; and secondarily in Alaska.
If I was the PLA general staff, my war goals would loosely be to: A) Invade and take Taiwan, while; B) Steamrolling mainland SE Asia; then C) Knock India out of the war; and then D) Transfer enough ground assets to the European theatre to crush NATO. Then sit back and enjoy the new world order.
The biggest TACTICAL wild card is the size of China's amphibious and airborne assets. They would almost certainly need enough to establish a decisive beachhead in Taiwan; and then repair/recycle those assets for use later against other possible objectives, like Luzon, Okinawa, Sumatra, Kalimantan. Guam, Alaska, etc.
Regarding strategic commodities, petroleum still tops the list. Not just used in plastics, fertilizers & chemicals, most importantly mechanized/motorized assets as well air and (non-nuclear) naval assets won't run without it. China will need overland access (pipelines) to a sizeable portion of Russia's 11.2 miilion b/d capacity; because even all of SE Asia's 2 million b/d would not satisfy their needs.
Nice summary of how this would go. Imo, all we need to do is defend Taiwan.
I disagree with steamrolling SE being easy. Their last Vietnam venture didn't go so well. The geographic barriers in that region are just absurd. It's not easy to get your tank crew all the way to malaysia. Rivers and jungle everywhere.
Like, what you are describing here is a decade long campaign in the very best case for China. Russia gains like 1km a week of ground in Ukraine, or something, if that. I highly doubt they'd end up in the European theatre to crush NATO, seems like it brings very few strategic benefits after having establish hegemony in the SEA area. Also I think we will start throwing 'tactical' nukes if Russia invades Poland.
But yeah if the balloon goes up...
Anyway, all the more reason to bring Russia into our fold if we can do it.
Ukraine started with extremely fluid thrusts and counter-thrusts by divisions and entire Army Groups. It eventually settled into its current static (trench warfare) phase.
My understanding of China vs. Vietnam 1979, was that the Chinese deployed overwhelming strength, and that Vietnamese forces pulled back. The Chinese troops were recalled after penetrating 30-50km into Vietnamese territory, having taught the Vietnamese 'a lesson'.
As for how fast or slow a Chinese offensive would cover ground in various theatres, it'd be a mix of mostly infantry with some motorized/mechanized. Possibly with some amphibious/airmobile support along the SE Asian coast; but mostly infantry/mountain troops in SE Asian interior & the Himalayas. The Japanese ground conquests in SE Asia in 1941-42 could possibly be a template of how rapidly the PLA might make their way to the Straits of Malacca.
Can't really see Putin prying himself free of his new alliance, for all the reasons stated in an earlier post.
What do you think about the USA and USSR having such a hard time winning in Vietnam? What makes modern China different?
I'm not 100% convinced on the previous statements wrt Russia. I think some agreement of neutrality with NATO benefits Russia more than the relationship he has with China now.
As far as I know, Vietnam's military isn't really set up to factor in dedicated cadres of guerillas to be dispersed in areas invaders (China) would occupy. Historically, insurgencies happen after a country's main armies are smashed, and survivors hide in rough territory forming said cadres.
The effectiveness of guerilla movements would also be inversely proportional to the size of the security garrisons a victorious PLA would leave behind as it moved south. The Vietnam War saw a huge and effective insurgency because the entirety of North Vietnam existed as a sanctuary/resupply zone because US forces refused to invade, lest there be a repeat of Chinese intervention as in the Korean War. In a China war, this would be a non-issue.
Putin has steadily marinated Russians in a stream of anti-NATO propaganda for two years now. The NATO powers are all baby-eating Nazi demons, brazenly arming and aiding Ukraine in its evil fight to invade Russia, etc., etc. To think he could turn on a dime and have his people believe Europeans are now Russia's BFF's against China seems a hard sell.
As you say, if a China war erupts, Putin will be much more likely to stay neutral if Ukraine succeeds in bleeding him white as they have already very skillfully been doing. When we supply them with the munitions to do so. Which is why it is crucial to overcome GOP resistance to building up our own munition manufacturing capacity--and supply source for Ukraine--ASAP. If Johnson continues to serve the Moscow consensus, then he and his party must be voted out.
When you think about it. If China goes all out we are pretty screwed.
Sounds about right, thanks.
California is building lithium extraction operations for US batteries:
https://www.enr.com/articles/58102-groundbreaking-lithium-extraction-plant-launches-in-california
It will need to be protected against drones and missiles the way Israel was today. Fortunately, it is close to US Air Force bases, so as threats materialize, it will not require too much adjustment to defend it.
For the 2024 election, Ukraine hitting Russian oil targets is problematic, because it causes inflation, which US voters get furious about. But it’s a very important illustration of the weakness in the new Axis.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-strikes-may-have-hit-15-russian-refinery-capacity-nato-official-2024-04-04/
This year, EVs are predicted to be 13% of new vehicle sales in the US:
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a46340514/ev-sales-are-just-getting-started/
If oil supplies get disrupted by war, this number can ramp up very rapidly. GM has got a handle on EV production finally, and cheaper models will appear later this year:
https://apnews.com/article/bba3a9cbbd2aad0953cbc113e53d041c
Starting a war with the New Allies would be bad business for China. Selling $15K EVs in the US would destroy our auto industry, which would make us weaker in a war. But it would take a few years, so China would have to wait.
Then again, both Biden and Trump know $15K EVs will destroy the US auto industry (and our economy for several years), so neither are likely going to let China sell them here. Dangling a carrot in the grey area could both keep US auto-makers in business and delay China’s plans for war.
The New Allies are very big markets for Chinese goods and EVs. They would lose those very rapidly.
Russia is not going to switch to EVs: its grid sucks, it is giant, and it’s got lots of oil, which it will keep trying to use, even as Ukraine keeps blowing their facilities up.
India may have a hard time weaning itself from cheap Chinese EVs, but it is developing its own EV industry:
https://restofworld.org/2024/e-rickshaw-yc-electric-india/
In a few years, it should be less dependent.
China is becoming the arsenal of autocracy.
Your link https://www.axios.com/2022/07/29/china-taiwan-xi-pelosi-biden from nearly two years ago, says "But U.S. officials now believe China may make a strong move against Taiwan within the next 18 months" Worth reassessing the credibility of these unnamed officials, I think.
Perhaps. But the recent terrorist attack in Moscow was successfully predicted by the US intelligence establishment, they just got the date wrong by a month or so. And they also predicted that Russia would invade Ukraine and got the timing nearly right for that too. I am not reassured by the fact that they are making such time bounded predictions now
If they predict that the invasion will take place in a month, I'll pay attention. Such a prediction is based on observation of actual preparations, such as assembling troops and landing ships (which China doesn't have in anything like the required numbers).
Congratulations on gandalfing your way into the NYT morning newsletter
J.D. came up with a new retort over his position on Ukraine. The US has limits and needs to focus on ourselves first and our strategic allies in the rest of the world. He doesn’t believe Ukraine is important enough.
To focus mean this. The US according to him manufactures about 550 Patriot missiles a year and with the supplemental it will go to 650 missiles a year. Hardly enough for Ukraine Israel and Taiwan. There for we come first followed by Israel which is far more strategic ally. He mentioned the same problem with 155mm artillery shells.
What I found more interesting is that he focused on what we are currently doing rather than what we could be doing. Our miliatary industrial complex is moribund due to its peacetime setting. Take the Stinger factory line. It was shuttered in 2007. So we shipped a ton Stingers to Ukraine and want to build up our inventory again.
The manufacturer had to recall retired workers to open the line...That isn’t the issue, whether to restart a weapons line. It is that the weapons line was built for peacetime manufacturing.
During peace time you don’t need to keep manufacturing items that you are not using. So you keep the line open by building a few dozen a month, or a few hundred or even a few thousand.
Russia has a 5 to 1 advantage over artillery shells. The one line that was building 155mm artillery shells isn’t close to building anywhere near the need for Ukraine or Israel. The issue for our manufacturing is how much and how fast do you need to build these weapons. We need them NOW, not next year or two years from now. If we get in to a shooting war we’ll go thru anti aircraft missiles, fighter jet missiles like candy corn on Halloween. CR’s are the worst thing for the Pentagon. Our entire military industrial complex is screwed up. The recent Naval assessment on shipbuilding makes the situation look hopeless. This is the issue we confront.
Hope you're not agreeing with Putin's,...er J.D.'s call to ditch Ukraine, as they are our only way of countering the Russian part of this new Sino-Soviet axis. If we can keep giving Kiev the hardware and munitions they need to bleed Russia white, Putin may never militarily join China when they move against us.
Which is why our pro-Putin wing needs to be at least temporarily neutralized this Fall; to ensure that Ukraine stays in the fight, and that the new Bamboo Curtain lies on the Ukrainian border and not the Polish one.
JD Vance is an idiot, but in this case he is repeating something that smarter, good-faith military analysts have pointed out.
US missile defense is a limited resource, and our US manufacturing is not setup to replenish them. Most of the things going to Ukraine and Israel are distinct from Taiwan's needs, but this is the biggest exception. Separately, there is no excuse for our slow make-nothing military procurement process and we need to fix our military manufacturing capabilities.
The supplemental will pay for US factories to build cutting-edge weaponry and munitions for US forces. We then give the older inventory replaced to the Ukrainians.
Since when does the GOP, even under Trump's leadership, fight against giving our own troops the best and newest gear? If not for Russian interference, this would be a serious no-brainer for any American, Left or Right, who thinks our military needs to be strong.
Yeah that very odd thing about Vance....He is against the supplemental money which goes to our contractors.....Seems like an odd way to complain about a shortage of missiles. I brought up our deficit quite a while ago at The Dispatch.....Since the cold war ended it seems everybody has forgotten military needs. Did you read about the Navies study of its shipbuilding? It’s fucked and they have no idea how to fix it.
JD Vance is an asshole
Isn't there an argument to be made that we should seek a negotiated settlement with Putin instead, such that Russia won't continue to be pushed in the hands off China?
Bleeding Russia white is pointless when they are allied with China. It's like cutting a fingernail of the beast that is China.
I don't understand what China's goals are. They don't seem to be promoting an 'ism, like Mao or Lenin/Stalin and the Nazis. Minor border disputes and the Taiwan issue decided, either win or lose for China, what else is on their agenda? Isn't this all about money and resources and prestige? If so, is war the best way for them to achieve their goals? I encourage you, Noah, to think about what you would advise the Chinese government to do to ensure their economic dominance for the future by any other means than war.
China's ideology is now (Han) Chinese nationalism. They would like to:
1) Expand territory into their neighbors (Taiwan, East China Sea, Himalayas, Mongolia)
2) Have substantial economic and political control over their neighbors (Singapore, Vietnam, Phillipines, Malayasia, Korea, Japan, etc.)
3) Control the lives of ethnic Chinese and Chinese-language worldwide (allowing no dissent and forcibly recruiting talent).
4) Embarass and defeat European, Japanese and America enemies in retaliation for the so-called "century of humiliation".
This is not totally incompatible with the Marxist-Lenist/Maoist framework. Classically there are two pillars of Marxist-Lenism regimes - "socialism" and "anti-imperialism". The expansive foreign policy agenda falls into the "anti-imperialism" bucket, even if the balance of power shifts towards China doing the imperialism. Using the incompleteness of the anti-imperialism project as an excuse, they can delay the socialism project indefinitely (i.e. prefering martial law to an egalitarian worker's paradise). More broadly though, "socialism" in the Chinese case has come to mean "complete control of the communist party" which has come to mean "complete suppression of dissent, democracy, and economic autonomy". So rather than "socialism" and "anti-imperialism", those words now mean "statism" and "revaunchism".
War is indeed not the best way to achieve the goal of economic prosperity, including lavish livestyles for the elites and decent quality of life for the common man. Arguably, the Dengists are satisified with that, but for Xi it appears success only counts if it can be measured as power over Asia and the West.
Thank you for this explanation. It's a short list with no simple resolution to the issues suggested, but it helps to frame what is at risk. I fully understand the century of humiliations. In many ways the west is reaping what it sowed. We will need a president with considerable knowledge and understanding of these issues as they unfold to guide our country, congress, and our allies forward. He or she is out there, but just not a candidate.
As something of a China hawk, I think Biden is underrated and Trump is overrated.
Biden/Democrats have done export controls on chips, supplied Taiwan with defensive weaponry, moved to reshore our supply chains, and bringing allies like Japan, South Korea, and Phillipines closer together. My biggest critcism of Biden/Democrats is that they have failed to do enough, fast enough. We still have a shortage of ships, anti-ship missiles, sea mines, anti-drone technology etc. We still have a lot of supply chains dependent on China (as they do dependent on us!).
Trump/Republicans talk tough on China, but are really two factions. The hawks don't control the Republican party, are somewhat immature in their perspective, and haven't realized yet their hopes must rely on the Democratic party. Whereas the Trumpist are broadly but shallowly anti-China, they are focused on small-ball economic deals (like soybeans), not a strategic perspective on supply chains (like chips and batteries). Being broadly anti-Chinese whatever actions the China takes, Trumpist don't focus any specific economic or diplomatic levers on deterrence and they are poor choice to bring in European and Asian allies. Shallowly, they don't have the stomach to do anything difficult - This was the faction that utterly failed to act when Hong Kong was crushed and actively impedes the defense of Ukraine - the two strongest precedents for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
There may be some possibility yet to deter China on Taiwan and engage it in economically cooperative terms. Unclear to me what level of control Dengists have in Chinese elites, and what level of control Chinese elites have over Xi. And Xi won't live forever. Definitely there are Chinese elites who want to pursue Chinese nationalism by being moral superior to the West, and learning from the West's morally and economically ill-advised adventurism. And on the US side, Obama famously asserted "We don't oppose the peaceful rise of China" and I think we are still prepared to honor that.
You mean other than near total economic domination? China Shock II is in the works...it has already begun, and if unopposed will degrade/destroy much/most of the West's remaining manufacturing base. If that happens, then China has the rest of the world over a proverbial barrel. They can then dictate terms; or go with a war with a weaker West for even better outcomes.
Yes, that's what I mean, but economic domination at what cost? I suspect that Noah would agree that a balanced trading system among nations would generate more prosperity for all than could be had by one country achieving dominance in one or two areas at the expense of all the destruction a war would entail. And holding other countries over a barrel just means those markets are probably cut off from your trade. I just can't see where going to war is in China's best long-term interests. Is anyone asking China what they think they want in the long term, and considering how we might work together to achieve theirs and our goals together? I bet that's exactly what the industrial plant owners on both sides are thinking.
Regarding China’s involvement in Russia-Ukraine war, I believe they are the chief reason why Russia has been able to rearm itself so quickly. So this is not a good situation for Ukraine. Regarding US Allies and the military, the US is an innovation and technology powerhouse. But it gave up manufacturing to Asia decades ago. It is only recently that US Congressmen have noticed that ship building is hurting the Navy and is hampered with delays. But Allies such as Hyundai Heavy Industries is punching ships out like rabbits. It is thought that they may be tasked with taking over the shipyards or even build the ships for the Navy to add the technology. The US will need to leverage all of its allies with their talents to stand up to this competition. As for China, they have no administrative roadblocks. Their barriers are mainly technical.
There are some other aspects to this worth analysing.
1. Space. Space superiority will be a concept in any war between the USA and China because from space you can launch some pretty impressive weapons today are hard to defend against, and do mad surveillance. The USA has a unique asset in SpaceX and I would be hopeful that it could rapidly deny space access to China in any serious conflict
2. Infrastructure disruption through cyber warfare. This hasn't played a big role yet, but there has been some of it in Ukraine. The infrastructure is terribly fragile and I lie awake at night worrying what a strong adversary could do. There are repeated and detailed reports of China infiltration of utilities and other basic infrastructure operations. If they succeed in planting time bombs there, any conflict could easily start with multi day or week power outages, water supply disruptions, mobile network failures and general chaos that would prevent the military from deploying. An invasion of Taiwan could easily be over before we even get TV news back online and figure out what the hell happened.
I think Taiwan is lost regardless of what we or our allies do. That's a battle we cannot win.
I would not say that America lazily allowed China to become the dominant manufacturing power in the world. Market dynamics are the most powerful force in the world, and China had competitive advantages in manufacturing that were overwhelming. The United States would have had to rally the whole world to prevent China be from becoming a manufacturing giant. It would have required virtually every participant to go against strong economic incentives.
Nevertheless, the new allies now need to address supply issues for war capacity seriously. Probably, the US should look to Mexico and other Atlantic facing Latin American countries. They can provide cheaper labor and their goods would travel a much shorter distance to the US and Europe in case of a conflict rather than China or Russia. Additionally, if handled well, US investment in Latin America could create significant good will on that continent.
What "overwhelming advantages" did China (especially versus other countries of similar per-capita GDP) have circa 2000, when its meteoric rise in manufacturing was first beginning?
1. Were invited and supported by a government that had capital to build infrastructure. The government was creating entrepreneurship zone specifically to a facilitate direct investment.
2. Knew that their labor force would be docile, backed up by a government that would reinforce management.
3. Infinite supply of eager labor.
And once Apple, IBM, Intel and the cream of the American tech sector had invested mucho billions in manufacturing capacity in China, the CCP used those same American corporations' combined political clout to set American MFN trade status to enable China Shock I, which gutted Western manufacturing.
Sounds like you're saying that those big US computer hardware companies were basically the _pioneers_ of offshoring to China: could you link to any information on that point?
https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/list-of-american-companies-in-china/
Actually quantifying 2024 dollar value of US-owned (or Western-owned) manufacturing in China is a tougher ask. Or quantifying what % of the goods exported during China Shock I were from said firms.
Here's a snapshot of 2012: https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/the-most-popular-american-companies-in-china
And a GAO historical study on tech offshoring to China & India: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-423.pdf
Anecdotally, almost everything of value in our house has a 'made in China' stamp. Not just the computers, TV and router.
Agreed.
You should probably add Iran to your new Axis. You should add a long section of food supply as well as Pharma supply. Although i doubt any war would be protracted in a protracted war how many millions of chinese die of hunger, how many americans from lack of pharma? How about the next section on what happens to the economies of the countries at war and how that affects their populations? No thoughts on bio weapons?
Most countries would want to stay out of the conflict simply because it makes good sense to do so and not pick sides. They would supply to both sides and refuse to take part in sanctions. Further, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Israel and Iran and China and Taiwan might only see Japan and a fractured EU get involved mostly for their own self-serving reasons (to assusage a concerned citizenry, preserve trading/supply routes and to deter further aggression that could see its citizens get involved). It's not unthinkable that the New Allies ends up appeasing China and Russia with parts of Taiwan and Ukraine bartered away in exchange for peace. Israel, though, may have to fight for its survival till the very end as I'm not sure if it has any friends in the Middle East.
With Trump in the White House, it's seriously debatable whether US will want to get involved in any international crisis.
Neutrality is always an option; but one that is not necessarily attainable. Denmark & Norway, for example, bet everything on neutrality. But the Nazis invaded them anyway.
If India thinks they can remain neutral during--or after--an armed conflict between China and the West, they're deluded. Consider recent military friction in the Himalayas; the new Chinese highways that stop just at the Indian border; the increasingly pro-Chinese stance of Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka; the Chinese claim to Andhra Pradesh. Not to mention the dramatic Chinese military buildup. The Chinese are gearing up for war, and the only solutions are, A) To deter them from actually warring via strength & diplomatic alliance; B) To fight them; or C) to Submit.
Just a general thought about the benefits of supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia as an intermediate step in addressing long-term issues with China. Please feel free to disagree as I do not claim to be a military analyst. That said,
1) Addressing the Soviet Legacy - Russia had access to thousands of tanks, armored vehicles, support vehicles, etc. prior to invading Ukraine. While Russian is a middling power in terms of industrial production, this legacy was/is quite potent and could be gifted/used against the US and its allies in any future conflict (even if Russian stayed neutral). Forcing Russian to use this legacy now reduces its future power to those items it can produce. So to benefit for Russia's current inability to produce much, it behooves us to have Russia using as much of that equipment as possible now.
2) Reducing Russia's resources/ability to update/maintain nuclear weapons - anything that forces Russia's industrial and scientific resources to be spent on things besides updating nuclear weapons is to all our benefit (including the Russian people). The conventional conflict does this.
3) Ramping up US industrial assets - like it or not...there is a huge degree of uncertainty among US defense contractors about the long-term US expenditures on weaponry. By using our own stores, we set up a kind of "commitment" to buy new weapons. This commitment, while not iron-clad, is much stronger when the industrial base can see the need increase. In the long run, setting up these industries now is more important than the weapons which are used.
4) Signaling to allies - Just like I do not blame the industrial base for being suspicious about making major investments absent long-term commitments, I do not blame our allies for having some concerns about our (the US) commitment internationally. As many have argued, the US could probably sit out a future conflict. In the long run, I do not believe this is a wise course and that we would end up with a Chinese-run international order that would eventually end up with the US on the defensive...that prediction is by no means certain, and I cannot blame people for questioning it. However, anything we do now to signal we are a reliable ally probably helps strengthen existing alliances and build new ones.
5) Turning the conflict into a one-front war - China, absent a Russian threat to Europe, would be in a terrible position in any future conflict. Having basically the entire industrial might of the US and EU in a strategic fortress (i.e., largely inaccessible to most Chinese interventions) would turn China into an island with a very tiny pipeline of supplies via the unreliable Brick and Road projects.
One of the US's biggest assets during WWII was that it could optimize how it produced material (i.e., more efficiency). The Axis were worried about bombing, etc., and had to hide/disperse industry. Obviously, China has some weapons that can reach the US and Europe, but the number would be insufficient if both Europe and the US were largely isolated from attack.
Wearing out Russia now might enable Europe to emerge in a situation similar to the US, where its industry could operate without the distractions associated with being in the war zone. The effects of this would be multiplicative, not additive, in the sense that if it is just the US, which is isolated, it is easier for an enemy to mass missile strikes and overwhelm air defense. If you have two largely isolated sectors, it becomes harder to create that kind of mass.
These are just my thoughts, and of all of them, I find the idea of forcing Russia to spend down its military inheritance to be the most compelling. Basically, if you already have all the weaponry, you really do not need to produce much (this is Russia right now), as that material is spent up, industrial productions become more relevant. This is why I do not find the weak Russian hypothesis very compelling.
How can you re-up this an still exclude Canada and Australia! These are not small Hungary sized countries! Just New Zealand offsets Hungary. If we are talking about resources Australia controls most of the iron ore.
I was really hoping the reason you would update your New Allies/Axis framework is to just do this correctly! You have a very successful substack - would it be so hard to thrown in a few relevant countries for the sake of rigor?
I also don't buy this framework that countries cancel each other out - NK and ROK bring different things to the table. There are also inter-coalitional dynamics - what fraction of the New Allies does the US alone make up depends on how big the coalition we are talking about.
I can understand the rationale for excluding Iran, Israel, Saudia Arabia etc., because although the current Middle East conflict has elements of proxy war, the coalitional dynamics are sufficiently complicated and are not centered around China. In the future, Africa will be the new Asia and the power dynamics there will be more important. But not in time for the present conflict.
Given that Australia is a huge producer of both iron ore and coal, why does it simply export these raw resources to China instead of having its own steel industry?
If there is a true split I think it will have to go that way. Or perhaps they will send it to India, where costs are lower than Australia. Very interesting to think about whether the Chinese economy is set up to handle a loss of Australia ore.
Right now I think the steel is produced by China because 1) China subsidizes heavy industry massively 2) A lot of the steel is used in China anyway.
I have tried to think about whether this is a China risk hedge, to invest in non-Chinese steel companies. One challenge is that if the Chinese economies flounders but doesn't go to war (as it is right now), it dumps steel on the market. The other challenge is that there are many steel companies and its hard to know which to invest in. The ones that make the cheapest steel and have the most international footprint are the most direct competitors to the Chinese steel industry, but maybe the least certain to not to be disrupted themselves.
One of the best things the Allies can do in the short-medium term is try and get into a roughly equal trade balance with the Axis, so if it turns into a hot war they won't be starting with a hollowed out industrial base. To do this they would most likely have to stop importing capital from the Axis.
It is a fascinating question to me whether the Allies (notably the US, but also other players like India) can address their fiscal and trade deficits while maintaining reasonably full employment.
It is easy enough to think of economic solutions to this problem (eg letting SS run out of money if Trump wins, or taxes on the rich if Biden does). But none of these seems like a particularly stable political outcome compared to, say, continuing to kick the can down the road and run huge deficits.
Thanks. As you note, starting this year to care about this year is too late.
I like your economic analysis, on GDP basis. The details count. As you noted, the US spent a couple of years ramping up military production (and providing that production to the Allies) before Pearl Harbor. So the US had a running head start on production capacity. But the shift to Wartime production was really profound. It put women in the workforce, and shifted most commodities to military output. I believe the "Allies" could do this again.
People are important, too. Your Population comparisons don't dig in, but wars are fought mostly by young men, and when it gets tougher, old men. In WWII, the women kept up domestic military production, and men 16 to 50 went to combat. Older workers got locked into domestic industries, operating refineries, factories, transportation logistics. China's population is declining. One Child policy means they have men, but they don't have the next generation. That makes it hard to field troops. The new Allies have a similar problem with declining birth rates. You have to figure on both sides "soldiers" become a constraint, as losses would mount.
Ukraine today has a shortage of ammunition and a shortage of soldiers. Russia has more of both. In a grinding long war, volumes of soldiers, munitions, food and fuel all count.
Why didn't western countries start working on their ammunition production capacity back in the summer of 2022, to counter the Russian artillery superiority demonstrated by that season's Donbas offensive?
I also note Noah's claim that the Japanese (at least initially) had the best fighters of the early part of WWII.
While it was the case that the A6M Zero was both remarkably maneuverable and had a range that the Allies would only match three years later with the P-51 Mustang, it achieved this performance (especially remarkable given the inferiority of Japanese engines) by stripping away almost all protection from battle damage (notably self-sealing fuel tanks, because those didn't just weigh more but had less fuel capacity -- a big problem given that the IJN's air war strategy was premised on out-ranging their opponents)
This was one reason (along with the failure -- shared with the Germans -- to divert ace pilots to teaching duties) why the late air war in the Pacific was such a turkey shoot, as the best Japanese pilots had been killed without the chance to train replacements (which would anyway have been difficult due to lack of fuel).