Europe's fate is in Germany's hands now

That's a scary thought, but not for the reason it used to be.

"Bundestag" by enovision.net is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

Sixty years ago, the sentence “Europe's fate is in Germany's hands now” would have been terrifying. The wars of the early 20th century left many Europeans with the deep conviction that German power was a bad thing for the region. Even though West Germany was a bulwark of NATO’s defense during the Cold War, the alliance was constructed in such a way as to limit Germany from getting too powerful or independent — NATO’s first secretary general is said to have declared that the purpose of the alliance was “to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” That attitude persisted for a remarkably long time — Margaret Thatcher was a vehement opponent of German reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall, because she feared the reemergence of a powerful Germany at the heart of Europe.

What a difference half a century makes. The U.S., which was supposed to be the guarantor of stability in Europe, is now the world’s most unstable great power. The likely return of Trump to the presidency will probably signal the end of U.S. support for Ukraine, and at least a partial disengagement from NATO and the transatlantic alliance in general. Here are some excerpts from a recent in-depth report by Politico:

Trump would be unlikely to quit NATO outright, according to interviews with former Trump national security officials and defense experts who are likely to serve in a second Trump term. But even if he doesn’t formally leave the organization, that doesn’t mean NATO would survive a second Trump term intact…

In return for continued U.S. participation, Trump would not only expect that European countries drastically increase their spending on NATO…but also undertake …a “radical reorientation” of NATO…[T]he U.S. would keep its nuclear umbrella over Europe…by maintaining its airpower and bases in Germany, England and Turkey, and its naval forces as well. Meanwhile, the bulk of infantry, armor, logistics and artillery would ultimately pass from American to European hands. Parts of this plan were floated in an article published in February 2023 by the Trump-affiliated Center for Renewing America, but in the months since, there’s been an emerging and more detailed consensus among Trump supporters on an outline of a new concept for NATO…

The shift…would involve “significantly and substantially downsizing America’s security role — stepping back instead of being the primary provider of combat power in Europe, somebody who provides support only in times of crisis,” said…a senior advisor to Russell Vought…who is expected to play a senior role in a second Trump administration…

“We can’t be doing 10 times what the Germans are doing anymore, and we’ve got to be prepared to be tough with them. There’s got to be consequences,” [former Trump official Elbridge] Colby said in an interview. “We want NATO to be active, but we want it to be with the Europeans in the lead…The United States does not have enough military forces to go around. … We can’t break our spear in Europe against the Russians when we know the Chinese and Russians are collaborating, and the Chinese are a more dangerous and significant threat.”

In fact, I’ve long predicted that this shift would happen whether or not Trump returned to power. Colby is simply correct — the U.S.’ atrophied defense-industrial base, manufacturing capacity, and defense budget mean that it’s simply not capable of standing against both Russia and China by itself. And China is the bigger threat, so most of America’s resources need to go to East Asia. This is simply the brutal logic of the relative balance of economic and military forces.

America’s partial withdrawal leaves Germany as the most economically and militarily important country in Europe. With 83 million people, Germany is the most populous state in the EU. It commands over a fifth of the EU’s GDP, about a quarter of the EU’s manufacturing output:

Source: Eurostat

Germany’s level of technological sophistication, at least in manufactured goods, is also arguably higher than that of other European countries. Despite having an economy that’s more weighted toward manufacturing than almost all other European nations — usually a characteristic of less developed countries — Germany also manages to have higher living standards than the other major European economies (and higher than the UK):

None of this is to say that Germany is the leader of the EU, or of NATO. The EU has no single leader, and with the U.S. disengaging, neither does NATO. But Germany is so big and important that if it doesn’t step up and exercise some sort of leadership within those organizations, they will tend to be rudderless and inertial.

“Rudderless and inertial” certainly described the European response to the banking and fiscal crisis of the early 2010s. In that crisis, German insistence on fiscal austerity and opposition to bailouts delayed Europe’s macroeconomic recovery. Most of the region has grown decidedly slower since that crisis, possibly because Europe failed to take the kind of the swift macroeconomic action that the U.S. did.

And “rudderless and inertial” definitely describes the European response to the increasingly dire Russian threat. Some smaller European countries, like Poland, are raising their defense spending by large amounts. But Germany, despite repeatedly promising to raise defense spending, has only done so by a paltry amount. It will barely manage to meet its NATO commitment of spending 2% of its GDP on its military. This would be sufficient for peacetime, but Europe is not at peace, and Germany shows no sign at all of being willing or able to muster the much larger sums required. Poland is at 5% of GDP, and Russia is at more than 6%. Germany’s defense-industrial base is ramping up only with painstaking slowness.

Leon Mangasarian vented his frustration with Germany’s torpor in a recent article for the Spectator:

[W]ithout a leading political and military role for Germany, Carl von Clausewitz’s ‘centre of gravity’ – the thing that allows an army, institution, or country to keep going – won’t hold for either the EU or the continent’s defence. ‘Germany cannot do any of these things on its own, but without Germany none of them will happen,’ says Garton Ash…

€100 billion (£84 billion) for the military is peanuts compared to what’s needed after decades of underspending…Scholz’s government refused to make Nato’s 2 per cent of GDP target for military spending legally binding. If German leaders were serious about defence they would justify cutting butter for guns by saying Germany faces an existential threat…

German military procurement moves at a glacial pace and there are backlogs of orders for critical systems such as missiles and anti-missile systems. Even if ordered, new equipment will take years or decades to become operational…But Germany isn’t even ordering, says Frank Haun, CEO of KNDS which builds the Leopard II tank…West Germany alone had over 7,000 tanks and armoured vehicles in the 1980s. Germany now has about 300 tanks.

In other words, Germany is sleepwalking into disaster — and Europe with it. With America largely out of the picture, Europe is on its own against Putin and his new Russian empire. On paper, Europe outmatches Russia economically and demographically. But without Germany taking a leading role, reality will be very different than paper.

I can’t know exactly what is going on in the minds of German leaders, German elites, or the German populace at large. But here are a few points that I think they should consider at this pivotal moment in history.

First, Germany is not the villain of Europe anymore.

I would never claim that Germany’s collective guilt over the horrors of the Nazi regime has been excessive. It has been fully appropriate — the Nazis were the most destructive and villainous regime of the entire modern age so far. But the Germany of today is not the Nazis. Not only are the individuals culpable for Nazi atrocities dead and gone, but the modern German state is built on liberal values that are utterly antithetical to everything the Nazis stood for. (As for the notion that Germany was a uniquely militarist country before the Nazis, this is hogwash; France, Britain, and Russia were all equally militaristic and equally responsible for World War 1.)

The lesson of World War 2 is not “Germany is bad”. It’s that a country’s values are a choice. Any country can become a genocidal totalitarian dictatorship, and any country can become a liberal defender of peace and freedom. Modern Germany, to its great credit, has chosen the latter. Half of my extended family were murdered by the Nazis, and yet when I look at the Germany of today, I have zero doubt that I’m looking at an admirable and virtuous nation.

And the world as a whole sees it too. Pew finds that Germany is favored over either the U.S. or China, by countries in Europe and Asia:

Source: Pew

And Gallup finds that Germany is seen more positively than any other great power in the world:

In 2023, median approval of Germany’s leadership across 134 countries and territories stood at 46%, making it the top-rated global power for the seventh year in a row…Germany continues to have the highest-rated leadership in both Europe and Asia…

The other three countries continue to lag behind Germany significantly. The U.S. remains in second place behind Germany, with a median 41% approval rating in the region, while China and Russia earned ratings of 16% and 7%, respectively.

Germans therefore ought to take pride in their nation. The word “nationalism” understandably carries ugly connotations in Germany — it conjures up memories of the world wars, and is associated with rightist parties like AfD. But liberal nationalism is perfectly appropriate and good for a country that embodies liberal values. And modern Germany does.

If authoritarian countries have national pride, but liberal countries don’t, then the former will overcome the latter and the world will become a dark place. Germans need to realize that it’s morally right for their country to stand up and lead Europe’s defense against the new Russian Empire. And German elites can use liberal nationalism as a reason to ask their people to make temporary sacrifices in order to rearm their nation and supply Ukraine and East Europe with arms. Once Germans realize that they haven’t been the villain of Europe in a very long time, they’ll hopefully feel more confident in becoming the hero.

The second thing Germans should realize is that in a very real sense, Germany is already at war — not a war of its own choosing, but one that it cannot choose to avoid.

Recently, Russia tried to assassinate the CEO of Rheinmetall, Germany’s top arms manufacturer. Russians are believed to have sabotaged a German arms factory in May, and Germany has detained some other Russians believed to be planning more sabotage. Russia is also waging constant cyberwarfare against Germany.

This shows that Russia considers Germany to be its enemy, even if not all Germans feel the same way. For decades, Germany tried to cozy up to Russia. It bought Russian natural gas, even to the point of becoming economically dependent on it, in an attempt to both show goodwill and to bind Russia economically to Europe. Some top German politicians pushed Russian propaganda or even went to work for the Russians after retiring. But none of this worked. The Russians still view Germany as an enemy and a threat, and are bent on weakening it economically and politically no matter what Germany does.

Germans are understandably very reluctant to take on Russia, especially after the disaster of the world wars a century ago. But Russia isn’t going to give Germany a choice in the matter. Germany can stand up and fight back, or it can simply lose.

And Germans should not deceive themselves with the idea that Putin or his successors will be satisfied with conquering Ukraine. Ukraine, Poland, and the rest of East Europe are not a buffer that will keep Germany safe. Instead, they are potential fuel for Russia’s war machine.

Russia’s empire has always worked by enslaving conquered peoples and forcing them to fight in further wars of conquest. Ukrainians from the conquered territories have been rounded up en masse and sent to the front to fight against the Ukrainians who are still free. If the rest of Ukraine is conquered, a similar process will occur — the Poles, Estonians, Moldovans, and whoever else is next on Putin’s menu will find themselves fighting against “meat assaults” by enslaved Ukrainians. And if Poland and the rest of East Europe should fall, Germans will then find themselves fighting against “meat assaults” by enslaved Poles, Estonians, and Moldovans.

In other words, the more peoples Russia is allowed to conquer, the stronger it becomes. The reason the USSR and the old Russian Empire were such formidable enemies is that they could draw upon vast numbers of subjugated Poles, Ukrainians, other Europeans, and Central Asians to swell the ranks of their armies and take the brunt of the fighting. If Putin’s Russia is allowed to reconstitute that hierarchy, it will be far more formidable than it is today.

Germany must fight to prevent that from happening. A good historical analogy here might be be France’s role in the Crimean War. France had tried and failed to conquer Russia just four decades earlier, but in 1853, France’s demographic and industrial heft was decisive in helping the UK and Turkey check Russia’s territorial expansion. Like France in the Crimean War, Germany today won’t be fighting alone against Russia — it’ll have allies that share its liberal values.

The stakes here are very high. If Germany doesn’t step up and lead, Europe will fragment, decline, and fall under the sway of Russia. Germany needs to rearm in a serious, vigorous way — it needs to spend at least 4% of its GDP on the military, not 2%, and it needs to become the biggest provider of armaments to Ukraine. This will require some economic sacrifices in the short term — higher deficits, and some cuts to welfare spending — though as Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick point out, a rearmament program could actually boost the German economy substantially in the long run.

Whether this is politically feasible, I have no idea. But German leaders need to understand the urgency of the situation they face. The United States was Germany’s and Europe’s great distant protector since the end of World War 2, and that’s over now. Germany, and by extension Europe, must now stand up for itself, or fall under the Russian bootheel.

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