I agree with the sentiment of this but the Ming/Qing China comparison is way off base. Those are a story of overly strong central governments mandating stasis and isolation. Europe is fragmented with the EU subordinate to the member states. Many of the issues raised in this piece are symptomatic of that, e.g. German gas policy or French technology transfer to China. These make sense for the individual member states but not the EU as a whole. This fragmentation also precludes long-term stasis. The EU isn't able to force Denmark to burn the Maersk fleet nor get all 27 states to close their borders. Some kind of local-optimum temporary stasis is all you get.
"Someday someone will show up on Europe’s doorstep who can’t easily be bought off, and the era of harmonious stasis will come to a nasty end." This is a prediction of something that already happened - Russia/Ukraine. The process of military renewal has already begun. Yes, the EU will probably not be a 'third superpower'. Even if it re-arms and re-industrialises so will other areas of the world at as great a rate.
Europe won't be a superpower, nor will it's individual states be superpowers again. However, greater military power is very likely (and will have unpredictable effects in the region). As for technology, Europe has not meaningfully fallen behind yet, and re-establishing industries in already advanced economies may prove to be easier than establishing new industry in developing economies. Under the current system of trade most industry in Europe simply doesn't make sense no matter EU or state policies. But if that system is upended by China/USA conflict then that calculation would change in an instant.
A marvellous assessment. Although I am not of the view that the ongoing war in Ukraine is in Europe's best interests or any positive interests at that, it is true that in many ways, Europe is becoming a sclerotic society whose first instinct to new technology is to regulate it out of profitability in an approach I can only describe as that of a jealous older brother.
I suppose this is mainly due to historical tendencies. History fades away but the necessities which shaped that history often remain. The United Kingdom, and Britain in particular, has never felt comfortable with a strong and powerful Europe. Britain, insulated by its geography and its pride, never adopted the Euro and has pulled out of the EU altogether. Its recent trans Pacific trade alliance is a desperate attempt to grasp at the glory of better days long gone.
France and Germany, in contrast, want a unified Europe but for different reasons. France, motivated by its long history of anti Americanism and firmly attached to its former colonial outposts, would prefer an EU which pivoted towards the global south and Asia.
Germany, on the other hand, would benefit from a deeper and closer relationship with Russia ( there's a good argument that Gorbachev's ill-fated perestroika and Glasnost policies were aimed ultimately at rapprochement with Germany.
The rest of the European states want different things for their own selfish reasons. So, the unsolvable problem remains: Europe is a continent trying to behave like a country.
And while the analogies with the Ming and Qing dynasties paint a striking resemblance, what Europe really reminds me of is the Soviet Union.
There are substantial differences of course: the Soviet Union was dominated by Russia while the EU is a more equal partnership, the Soviet Union unlike the EU had extensive military capabilities, and it was of course communist.
But the similarities, given the context, are even more telling: a patchwork of different states with different interests knitted into an uneasy whole, facing a deep demographic crisis, further and further behind on technological innovation, and unable to put aside its political gridlock.
In the case of the Soviet Union, there was at least a centripetal force in Russia pulling everything at great cost to itself and the others towards the centre and maintaining an unstable coalition. In the case of the EU, there is no such centre, no large magnet to attract all the little magnets to itself. Instead, all that is left are smaller magnets of varying size, delicately polarized between attraction and repulsion, and consumed with too much of its past to realize it increasingly has too little of a future.
Great article, thanks. two comments: 1- US is giving a lot of military aid to UKR, which is coming back in high % to the US military industry with orders - so it's not like this money is "lost entirely" for the US - the dominance of US military industry is undisputed. 2- I believe there is a cynical calculation from most indebted EU governments which is a bit like "if the US is giving zillions of dollars anyway, what's the point in contributing more ourselves". This might be shortsighted of course.
An insightful post, thanks! Broadly, I agree with your analysis and also what could and should be done. I would just like to leave a couple of notes because often such survey’s of Europe’s position tend to gloss over certain aspects. You’re actually much more clear-sighted on the topic than most of Anglo media (kudos to that!), but I still think there are some things that could be put in some context.
I’ll try to keep each point brief:
GDP gap between US & EU:
– Yes, that’s the case, but the crucial context is that the US population grew by well over +50% since the late 1970s – Europe’s practically stagnated. Europe was (and is) much more densely populated, so overall that makes sense. And as you rightly note, birth rates have been converging lately and immigration to Europe is (and has been) very high. So the gap is really for the most part one due to past population growth in the US, which was exceptional for a rich country – and is now slowing down a lot.
Growth of GDP per capita:
– Lots of good stuff has been said by you on the topic regarding living standards (work hours, public goods, different choices etc.). As you rightly note, the real worrying laggard here is southern Europe – and that’s partly due to the self-inflicted austerity, partly due to not enough reforms or entrepreneurial zeal, partly demographics. Reversing that would be very important for Europe. The south also has lots of potential when it comes to renewables.
Military capablities:
– The French military is almost certainly superior to the Russian one in almost every aspect. Numbers don’t do this justice. The Russians have lots of old equipment and what their performance in Ukraine shows is that they can’t even do much with that (except sow destruction). The Italians are quite capable too, as are most of the CEE countries and the Nordics. Europe could and should do VASTLY more if it acted together, on everything from procurement to training and deployment. But Europe is almost certainly militarily stronger than Russia.
Military aid to Ukraine:
– However, and that’s true, due to the much smaller amount of gear which additionally is spread out across many countries, it’s much harder for European countries to donate lots of military hardware to Ukraine. That’s a big problem in and of itself. One note, though: The picture you linked to is quite a bit outdated now already. Germany has become the second biggest donor of military gear after the US by now and has just committed another €12 billion, which is substantial, even compared to America (https://www.rferl.org/a/germany-ukraine-military-support-russia-war/32340550.html). Europe taking together has donated substantial amounts – but I agree, ideally it should be capable of doing all of that alone and more.
Humanitarian aid & refugees:
– You don’t mention it, but I feel its bears mentioning that on humanitarian aid and when it comes to welcoming refugees, the EU has been a giant – and not just now on Ukraine, also before on Syrian, Afghanistan or simply in general. The EU takes in vastly more refugees per capita than the US, UK or almost any other rich country and does so consistently. I just think it’s worth mentioning that, too.
Technology & Manufacturing:
– Yes, Europe has missed the boat on digital tech and social media. And it seems to fall behind on AI. *BUT* you’re underselling Europe’s ongoing technological strengths and prowess in a lot of areas. Europe hosts ASML, the world’s only producer of EUV lithography systems without which modern nanometer chips (such as produced by TSMC and designed in the US) would be impossible. Europe’s factories produce the machines which in turn produced PV panels, windmills and EVs – in China, the US, Europe or elsewhere.
European companies are leading in renewables. The French startup and tech scene has been booming as of late. Lots of hidden champions in crucial sectors dominate their markets and niches. Airbus and the aviation industry is not just an also-ran, but actually out-competed that of America (Boeing) lately – there’s a China risk, yes, but there’s also deep strengths. Europe buys lots of EVs, but it also builds lots of EVs and is ramping up quickly.
The “Pfizer” mRNA vaccine really was developed by BionTech in Germany and tested and marketed by Pfizer, so Europe is also genuinely at the cutting edge when it comes to medicine and pharma. There’s also luxury goods, tourism and so on, which are good for the economy, but admittedly not high-tech. And Europe’s economy is much less carbon-intensive and energy-intensive, while still producing a high GDP per capita and living standards.
So yes, there are genuine challenges and Europe has missed some big opportunities lately (especially on software & tech), but it also has deep strengths that it often undersells or that observers tend to gloss over. I think we shouldn’t. By building on these strengths, Europe can also get better in other areas.
Ming China & stuff:
– And this brings me to the last point: Your warning of becoming too much like Ming China is prescient – as we know, some scaremongering is how to get societies moving sometimes – but just analytically, it’s imho also overblown. Growth per capita in Europe and the US has been surprisingly similar over the past decades, especially given some big policy mistakes Europe made (on tech, austerity, dependence on Russian gas) and Europe has genuine high-tech strengths in many crucial areas. They are not to be sniffed at.
It has also taken big steps to improve its policymaking in many essential areas (common investment in renewables & research after the pandemic, a united stance on Ukraine & a rapid energy transition, boosting startups etc.). And even Macron’s discourse – for whatever one thinks of it – is imho a sign that Europeans are not just looking inwards but are actually acutely aware of their situation and trying to figure out ways to do something about it.
Plus, the simple fact that Ukrainians are fighting for their independence, freedom, democracy and the right to be part of the European Union is an incredibly potent reminder of how important the idea of a united Europe still is, far beyond its current borders. That too counts for a lot, in a very similar way to the attractiveness of the American dream around the world.
So yeah, I think your point is important and well taken, but I also think there’s a lot of nuance that can be added.
I am European and I feel a much stronger allegiance to Europe than to my home country of Austria. Having lived in various European countries and in the US for the last 10 years has given me a very different perspective of Europe. I agree that Europe lacks cohesion and unity to act as a military superpower, but for that its major countries are members of NATO. Economically Europe is a superpower already. As a consequence, Europe will remain a superpower that depends on the United States to fully function as a superpower. Nothing wrong with that.
I can't follow the point about "buying off the Russian barbarians". The most impressive feature of the Western response wasn't military aid to Ukraine, it was the speed with which Europe reversed course on economic integration with Russia, most obviously by shutting off Russian pipeline gas as well as most oil and coal.
We need the EU to become a third superpower as long as this iteration of the Republican Party exists, as America can no longer be trusted to be a bulwark of freedom and democracy
These weaknesses are very real. In the last couple years, we Europeans have had a hard wake-up and throwback to what we thought was well past - modern economies that use war and threats of it against their neighbours. And as many times before, we should be grateful to the Americans for saving our ass.
That being said, the concept of a voluntary union of countries, that accept to pay some 1% of their GDP to the union, seems like more promising for the future than nations states with a unified military. The looseness of the union and tribalism within it is a weakness but also quite a guarantor that unlike the U.S., Russia, or China; the E.U as whole is unlikely to want, or be able to, periodically invade other countries. This is also less fragile to some wannabe dictator taking over the whole thing, as I think many Americans were/are concerned about, perhaps with reason. Here, no single-point failure to forever tyranny.
The E.U. is a concept that can obsolete the nation-state unified around a military. In fact it is the only workable alternative that we know of. It has proven its peacemaking value, and it has also proven its attractivity - neighbouring countries want to join, which as far as I know, is not the wish of most Canadians or Mexicans towards the U.S. - so there.
The best future that looks achievable at the moment is one where other parts of the world also make their own voluntary, non-military, non-tribal unions - with at least a modicum of solidarity, to some 1% of their GDP. But, this future is not there yet, and it's a good thing that our allies saw that.
What’s really wrong with Macron’s comments is that being a superpower is a sucker’s game. Europe had superbly positioned itself in the U.S./ Russia conflict, getting getting its defense subsidized from the U.S. and cheap oil and gas from the Russia. The Ukraine War has brought that to an end, but it the arrangement subsidized European living standards for generations. Well played sir! Is the fact the the EU hasn’t produced a Facebook, a Twitter, or a Tik-Tok a critique or compliment?
"having a second pole committed to democracy and human rights"
Is Europe actually committed to democracy? It doesn't look like it based on their treatment of Hungary (no money until you bring your laws into line with our views instead of your own peoples') and Greece (you will alter your spending or we will let you go bankrupt, to hell with what your population thinks). The EU is committed to secular liberalism -- both economic and social -- and is perfectly willing to use non-democratic (even authoritarian) means to get there.
"even though Europe now lets in tons of immigrants, a[n] issue is slow growth in per capita output."
Perhaps all immigration isn't created equal, Noah? When your immigrants are millions of uneducated and culturally incompatible refugees, this is what happens. Were Europe to choose their immigrants based on skill sets and needs (like Canada does) they would get a different outcome. Canada has also allowed in a lot of people in recent years (as a percent of population), but their productivity hasn't suffered.
"in wide body aircraft... in robotics... in high speed trains... China uses this opportunity to appropriate technology and eventually outcompete Europeans"
To be a "superpower," from purely linguistic analysis alone, wouldn't one need <power>?
Europe is certainly a powerful continent, but all of its power - economic, diplomatic, cultural - is derived from its international security status. That status is contingent and not organic.
"Soft Power" is a mirage based on the fantastical assumption that its physical security (read military capacity to generate kinetic force) is a given, is constant, and secular (permanent). It is not.
A wise man once said, "all of history is governed by the aggressive use of force." That wisdom has yet to be disproven.
Good piece, thanks. The last paragraph is a stunner. I am not sure who is buying off whom, though. It is as much about China and other nefarious regimes buying off European companies and pols as the reverse (go back to the Iraq “oil for food” deal for examples).
France and Germany are mercantilists, and since the days of fascism their corporate sector has been heavily intertwined with the state. The EU (unlike NAFTA) isn’t about free trade but rather restricting competition and preserving the power of state champions. Innovation would harm state champions and upset the balance of interlocking interests (unions, corporations, political parties).
Macron went to China with dozens of French corporations - it was a trade junket, not a foreign policy trip. Or rather, getting contracts for France’s national champions is France’s foreign policy.
Germany and France’s focus on trade was evident after the 2014 Ukraine invasion. They slow-walked subsidies, backed Nordstream and sold hundreds of millions with of equipment to Russia for military use (violating the weak sanctions regime the EU had set up). The Obama/Biden admin wasn’t much better back then - remember they offered Putin an unconditional reset after his invasion of Georgia, promised Russia more flexibility after elections, invited Russia to take a larger role in Syria and refused to sell arms to Ukraine after 2014, and appeased/entreated the mullahs in Iran whilst they were engaging in sectarian pogroms and destabilization across the Middle East. So let’s not overfocus on what seems to be an American backbone at the moment (at least in Ukraine) but at least America can say it is not in Ukraine or appeasing murderous mullahs for the sake of General Motors (though maybe keep a close eye on the Biden family bank accounts).
Anyway, it is clear the US cannot rely on France and Germany for help with China, though it is Americas own companies (with heavy reliance on Chinese manufacturing) who have likely complicated things in Asia more than France and Germany have or will.
It is also clear from Ukraine that Russia presents zero sustainable conventional military threat to Europe (ex-nukes) which does call into question the utility of NATO (if not the nuclear umbrella). What is the US getting in return for NATO and the nuke umbrella? EU bills of attainder targeting US tech companies? Banning of US ag products? Tax havens in Ireland, Lux, Switzerland and Holland that now hold the bulk of American IP in the tech and pharma industries? Is Europe going to be a help in Asia? It is true that without American backing, much of Eastern Europe will be vulnerable to Russian bribery and meddling (Germany and France seem more keen on punishing Poland than helping it). The E Europeans and the Nordic countries are more trustworthy allies for the US than Germany, France, Italy and Spain, though what these allies can do for the US in return seems minimal.
Europe’s biggest failing is probably in its near abroad and former colonial states in Africa and the Mideast. The US, for all of its faults, has taken a different corporate approach to its near abroad (Canada and Latam), offering free trade without these countries having to conform to US enviro or labor laws at home, nor be subject at home to the jurisdiction of the US Supreme Court.
US companies have gone abroad in the spirit of becoming local companies (who export back to the US) and the US wants to see its neighbors develop and prosper. European corporations, in Africa and the Middle East, want to sell/export stuff. The mercantilist approach doesn’t really lend itself to economic development. Politically and militarily France has taken an active role in the Mideast and Africa but the EU really needs to integrate itself with those regions and develop those regions, using imports into its own consumer market as a driver. This would help keep out China and Russia (and Iran) as well as Sunni terrorist groups. This sort of thing is currently not in the EU’s wheelhouse.
If the EU doesn’t engage with and develop Africa, there will soon enough be nearly 2 billion Africans who might like to live and work in Europe.
I agree with the sentiment of this but the Ming/Qing China comparison is way off base. Those are a story of overly strong central governments mandating stasis and isolation. Europe is fragmented with the EU subordinate to the member states. Many of the issues raised in this piece are symptomatic of that, e.g. German gas policy or French technology transfer to China. These make sense for the individual member states but not the EU as a whole. This fragmentation also precludes long-term stasis. The EU isn't able to force Denmark to burn the Maersk fleet nor get all 27 states to close their borders. Some kind of local-optimum temporary stasis is all you get.
"Someday someone will show up on Europe’s doorstep who can’t easily be bought off, and the era of harmonious stasis will come to a nasty end." This is a prediction of something that already happened - Russia/Ukraine. The process of military renewal has already begun. Yes, the EU will probably not be a 'third superpower'. Even if it re-arms and re-industrialises so will other areas of the world at as great a rate.
Europe won't be a superpower, nor will it's individual states be superpowers again. However, greater military power is very likely (and will have unpredictable effects in the region). As for technology, Europe has not meaningfully fallen behind yet, and re-establishing industries in already advanced economies may prove to be easier than establishing new industry in developing economies. Under the current system of trade most industry in Europe simply doesn't make sense no matter EU or state policies. But if that system is upended by China/USA conflict then that calculation would change in an instant.
A shame the UK stepped away from the project, we could at times push the French and German axis forward on some matters.
A marvellous assessment. Although I am not of the view that the ongoing war in Ukraine is in Europe's best interests or any positive interests at that, it is true that in many ways, Europe is becoming a sclerotic society whose first instinct to new technology is to regulate it out of profitability in an approach I can only describe as that of a jealous older brother.
I suppose this is mainly due to historical tendencies. History fades away but the necessities which shaped that history often remain. The United Kingdom, and Britain in particular, has never felt comfortable with a strong and powerful Europe. Britain, insulated by its geography and its pride, never adopted the Euro and has pulled out of the EU altogether. Its recent trans Pacific trade alliance is a desperate attempt to grasp at the glory of better days long gone.
France and Germany, in contrast, want a unified Europe but for different reasons. France, motivated by its long history of anti Americanism and firmly attached to its former colonial outposts, would prefer an EU which pivoted towards the global south and Asia.
Germany, on the other hand, would benefit from a deeper and closer relationship with Russia ( there's a good argument that Gorbachev's ill-fated perestroika and Glasnost policies were aimed ultimately at rapprochement with Germany.
The rest of the European states want different things for their own selfish reasons. So, the unsolvable problem remains: Europe is a continent trying to behave like a country.
And while the analogies with the Ming and Qing dynasties paint a striking resemblance, what Europe really reminds me of is the Soviet Union.
There are substantial differences of course: the Soviet Union was dominated by Russia while the EU is a more equal partnership, the Soviet Union unlike the EU had extensive military capabilities, and it was of course communist.
But the similarities, given the context, are even more telling: a patchwork of different states with different interests knitted into an uneasy whole, facing a deep demographic crisis, further and further behind on technological innovation, and unable to put aside its political gridlock.
In the case of the Soviet Union, there was at least a centripetal force in Russia pulling everything at great cost to itself and the others towards the centre and maintaining an unstable coalition. In the case of the EU, there is no such centre, no large magnet to attract all the little magnets to itself. Instead, all that is left are smaller magnets of varying size, delicately polarized between attraction and repulsion, and consumed with too much of its past to realize it increasingly has too little of a future.
Great article, thanks. two comments: 1- US is giving a lot of military aid to UKR, which is coming back in high % to the US military industry with orders - so it's not like this money is "lost entirely" for the US - the dominance of US military industry is undisputed. 2- I believe there is a cynical calculation from most indebted EU governments which is a bit like "if the US is giving zillions of dollars anyway, what's the point in contributing more ourselves". This might be shortsighted of course.
Hey Noah,
An insightful post, thanks! Broadly, I agree with your analysis and also what could and should be done. I would just like to leave a couple of notes because often such survey’s of Europe’s position tend to gloss over certain aspects. You’re actually much more clear-sighted on the topic than most of Anglo media (kudos to that!), but I still think there are some things that could be put in some context.
I’ll try to keep each point brief:
GDP gap between US & EU:
– Yes, that’s the case, but the crucial context is that the US population grew by well over +50% since the late 1970s – Europe’s practically stagnated. Europe was (and is) much more densely populated, so overall that makes sense. And as you rightly note, birth rates have been converging lately and immigration to Europe is (and has been) very high. So the gap is really for the most part one due to past population growth in the US, which was exceptional for a rich country – and is now slowing down a lot.
Growth of GDP per capita:
– Lots of good stuff has been said by you on the topic regarding living standards (work hours, public goods, different choices etc.). As you rightly note, the real worrying laggard here is southern Europe – and that’s partly due to the self-inflicted austerity, partly due to not enough reforms or entrepreneurial zeal, partly demographics. Reversing that would be very important for Europe. The south also has lots of potential when it comes to renewables.
Military capablities:
– The French military is almost certainly superior to the Russian one in almost every aspect. Numbers don’t do this justice. The Russians have lots of old equipment and what their performance in Ukraine shows is that they can’t even do much with that (except sow destruction). The Italians are quite capable too, as are most of the CEE countries and the Nordics. Europe could and should do VASTLY more if it acted together, on everything from procurement to training and deployment. But Europe is almost certainly militarily stronger than Russia.
Military aid to Ukraine:
– However, and that’s true, due to the much smaller amount of gear which additionally is spread out across many countries, it’s much harder for European countries to donate lots of military hardware to Ukraine. That’s a big problem in and of itself. One note, though: The picture you linked to is quite a bit outdated now already. Germany has become the second biggest donor of military gear after the US by now and has just committed another €12 billion, which is substantial, even compared to America (https://www.rferl.org/a/germany-ukraine-military-support-russia-war/32340550.html). Europe taking together has donated substantial amounts – but I agree, ideally it should be capable of doing all of that alone and more.
Humanitarian aid & refugees:
– You don’t mention it, but I feel its bears mentioning that on humanitarian aid and when it comes to welcoming refugees, the EU has been a giant – and not just now on Ukraine, also before on Syrian, Afghanistan or simply in general. The EU takes in vastly more refugees per capita than the US, UK or almost any other rich country and does so consistently. I just think it’s worth mentioning that, too.
Technology & Manufacturing:
– Yes, Europe has missed the boat on digital tech and social media. And it seems to fall behind on AI. *BUT* you’re underselling Europe’s ongoing technological strengths and prowess in a lot of areas. Europe hosts ASML, the world’s only producer of EUV lithography systems without which modern nanometer chips (such as produced by TSMC and designed in the US) would be impossible. Europe’s factories produce the machines which in turn produced PV panels, windmills and EVs – in China, the US, Europe or elsewhere.
European companies are leading in renewables. The French startup and tech scene has been booming as of late. Lots of hidden champions in crucial sectors dominate their markets and niches. Airbus and the aviation industry is not just an also-ran, but actually out-competed that of America (Boeing) lately – there’s a China risk, yes, but there’s also deep strengths. Europe buys lots of EVs, but it also builds lots of EVs and is ramping up quickly.
The “Pfizer” mRNA vaccine really was developed by BionTech in Germany and tested and marketed by Pfizer, so Europe is also genuinely at the cutting edge when it comes to medicine and pharma. There’s also luxury goods, tourism and so on, which are good for the economy, but admittedly not high-tech. And Europe’s economy is much less carbon-intensive and energy-intensive, while still producing a high GDP per capita and living standards.
So yes, there are genuine challenges and Europe has missed some big opportunities lately (especially on software & tech), but it also has deep strengths that it often undersells or that observers tend to gloss over. I think we shouldn’t. By building on these strengths, Europe can also get better in other areas.
Ming China & stuff:
– And this brings me to the last point: Your warning of becoming too much like Ming China is prescient – as we know, some scaremongering is how to get societies moving sometimes – but just analytically, it’s imho also overblown. Growth per capita in Europe and the US has been surprisingly similar over the past decades, especially given some big policy mistakes Europe made (on tech, austerity, dependence on Russian gas) and Europe has genuine high-tech strengths in many crucial areas. They are not to be sniffed at.
It has also taken big steps to improve its policymaking in many essential areas (common investment in renewables & research after the pandemic, a united stance on Ukraine & a rapid energy transition, boosting startups etc.). And even Macron’s discourse – for whatever one thinks of it – is imho a sign that Europeans are not just looking inwards but are actually acutely aware of their situation and trying to figure out ways to do something about it.
Plus, the simple fact that Ukrainians are fighting for their independence, freedom, democracy and the right to be part of the European Union is an incredibly potent reminder of how important the idea of a united Europe still is, far beyond its current borders. That too counts for a lot, in a very similar way to the attractiveness of the American dream around the world.
So yeah, I think your point is important and well taken, but I also think there’s a lot of nuance that can be added.
Hope I added constructively to the debate :)
Superb.
Plagerism, in the manner of adopting best practices, can be allowable with attribution.
I offer Europe something fundamental they are missing. A Mission Statement. A raisoin d'être
"... to provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity..."
Preamble United States Constitution
I am European and I feel a much stronger allegiance to Europe than to my home country of Austria. Having lived in various European countries and in the US for the last 10 years has given me a very different perspective of Europe. I agree that Europe lacks cohesion and unity to act as a military superpower, but for that its major countries are members of NATO. Economically Europe is a superpower already. As a consequence, Europe will remain a superpower that depends on the United States to fully function as a superpower. Nothing wrong with that.
Phenomenal article. Macron and co should take note. If only
I can't follow the point about "buying off the Russian barbarians". The most impressive feature of the Western response wasn't military aid to Ukraine, it was the speed with which Europe reversed course on economic integration with Russia, most obviously by shutting off Russian pipeline gas as well as most oil and coal.
We need the EU to become a third superpower as long as this iteration of the Republican Party exists, as America can no longer be trusted to be a bulwark of freedom and democracy
Very cool article, thanks Noah.
These weaknesses are very real. In the last couple years, we Europeans have had a hard wake-up and throwback to what we thought was well past - modern economies that use war and threats of it against their neighbours. And as many times before, we should be grateful to the Americans for saving our ass.
That being said, the concept of a voluntary union of countries, that accept to pay some 1% of their GDP to the union, seems like more promising for the future than nations states with a unified military. The looseness of the union and tribalism within it is a weakness but also quite a guarantor that unlike the U.S., Russia, or China; the E.U as whole is unlikely to want, or be able to, periodically invade other countries. This is also less fragile to some wannabe dictator taking over the whole thing, as I think many Americans were/are concerned about, perhaps with reason. Here, no single-point failure to forever tyranny.
The E.U. is a concept that can obsolete the nation-state unified around a military. In fact it is the only workable alternative that we know of. It has proven its peacemaking value, and it has also proven its attractivity - neighbouring countries want to join, which as far as I know, is not the wish of most Canadians or Mexicans towards the U.S. - so there.
The best future that looks achievable at the moment is one where other parts of the world also make their own voluntary, non-military, non-tribal unions - with at least a modicum of solidarity, to some 1% of their GDP. But, this future is not there yet, and it's a good thing that our allies saw that.
What’s really wrong with Macron’s comments is that being a superpower is a sucker’s game. Europe had superbly positioned itself in the U.S./ Russia conflict, getting getting its defense subsidized from the U.S. and cheap oil and gas from the Russia. The Ukraine War has brought that to an end, but it the arrangement subsidized European living standards for generations. Well played sir! Is the fact the the EU hasn’t produced a Facebook, a Twitter, or a Tik-Tok a critique or compliment?
"having a second pole committed to democracy and human rights"
Is Europe actually committed to democracy? It doesn't look like it based on their treatment of Hungary (no money until you bring your laws into line with our views instead of your own peoples') and Greece (you will alter your spending or we will let you go bankrupt, to hell with what your population thinks). The EU is committed to secular liberalism -- both economic and social -- and is perfectly willing to use non-democratic (even authoritarian) means to get there.
"even though Europe now lets in tons of immigrants, a[n] issue is slow growth in per capita output."
Perhaps all immigration isn't created equal, Noah? When your immigrants are millions of uneducated and culturally incompatible refugees, this is what happens. Were Europe to choose their immigrants based on skill sets and needs (like Canada does) they would get a different outcome. Canada has also allowed in a lot of people in recent years (as a percent of population), but their productivity hasn't suffered.
"in wide body aircraft... in robotics... in high speed trains... China uses this opportunity to appropriate technology and eventually outcompete Europeans"
What a shock. Mercantilism works!
To be a "superpower," from purely linguistic analysis alone, wouldn't one need <power>?
Europe is certainly a powerful continent, but all of its power - economic, diplomatic, cultural - is derived from its international security status. That status is contingent and not organic.
"Soft Power" is a mirage based on the fantastical assumption that its physical security (read military capacity to generate kinetic force) is a given, is constant, and secular (permanent). It is not.
A wise man once said, "all of history is governed by the aggressive use of force." That wisdom has yet to be disproven.
Good piece, thanks. The last paragraph is a stunner. I am not sure who is buying off whom, though. It is as much about China and other nefarious regimes buying off European companies and pols as the reverse (go back to the Iraq “oil for food” deal for examples).
France and Germany are mercantilists, and since the days of fascism their corporate sector has been heavily intertwined with the state. The EU (unlike NAFTA) isn’t about free trade but rather restricting competition and preserving the power of state champions. Innovation would harm state champions and upset the balance of interlocking interests (unions, corporations, political parties).
Macron went to China with dozens of French corporations - it was a trade junket, not a foreign policy trip. Or rather, getting contracts for France’s national champions is France’s foreign policy.
Germany and France’s focus on trade was evident after the 2014 Ukraine invasion. They slow-walked subsidies, backed Nordstream and sold hundreds of millions with of equipment to Russia for military use (violating the weak sanctions regime the EU had set up). The Obama/Biden admin wasn’t much better back then - remember they offered Putin an unconditional reset after his invasion of Georgia, promised Russia more flexibility after elections, invited Russia to take a larger role in Syria and refused to sell arms to Ukraine after 2014, and appeased/entreated the mullahs in Iran whilst they were engaging in sectarian pogroms and destabilization across the Middle East. So let’s not overfocus on what seems to be an American backbone at the moment (at least in Ukraine) but at least America can say it is not in Ukraine or appeasing murderous mullahs for the sake of General Motors (though maybe keep a close eye on the Biden family bank accounts).
Anyway, it is clear the US cannot rely on France and Germany for help with China, though it is Americas own companies (with heavy reliance on Chinese manufacturing) who have likely complicated things in Asia more than France and Germany have or will.
It is also clear from Ukraine that Russia presents zero sustainable conventional military threat to Europe (ex-nukes) which does call into question the utility of NATO (if not the nuclear umbrella). What is the US getting in return for NATO and the nuke umbrella? EU bills of attainder targeting US tech companies? Banning of US ag products? Tax havens in Ireland, Lux, Switzerland and Holland that now hold the bulk of American IP in the tech and pharma industries? Is Europe going to be a help in Asia? It is true that without American backing, much of Eastern Europe will be vulnerable to Russian bribery and meddling (Germany and France seem more keen on punishing Poland than helping it). The E Europeans and the Nordic countries are more trustworthy allies for the US than Germany, France, Italy and Spain, though what these allies can do for the US in return seems minimal.
Europe’s biggest failing is probably in its near abroad and former colonial states in Africa and the Mideast. The US, for all of its faults, has taken a different corporate approach to its near abroad (Canada and Latam), offering free trade without these countries having to conform to US enviro or labor laws at home, nor be subject at home to the jurisdiction of the US Supreme Court.
US companies have gone abroad in the spirit of becoming local companies (who export back to the US) and the US wants to see its neighbors develop and prosper. European corporations, in Africa and the Middle East, want to sell/export stuff. The mercantilist approach doesn’t really lend itself to economic development. Politically and militarily France has taken an active role in the Mideast and Africa but the EU really needs to integrate itself with those regions and develop those regions, using imports into its own consumer market as a driver. This would help keep out China and Russia (and Iran) as well as Sunni terrorist groups. This sort of thing is currently not in the EU’s wheelhouse.
If the EU doesn’t engage with and develop Africa, there will soon enough be nearly 2 billion Africans who might like to live and work in Europe.
I agree with the whole analysis, especially the dumb German policies of closing nuclear plants.
Greetings from Germany