"the economic cost China would pay from going to war"
Noah's argument has a glaring flaw. He talks about the economic downside of war primarily as a loss of access to foreign markets. The biggest and decisive economic cost would be the destruction of all those gigantic factories situated along the coast within easy reach of American missiles. American means of production are by no means as vulnerable. We don't need to target civilian residential areas. Doubtless the destruction of several hundred factories, the factories where the Chinese people work, would make a vivid impression and make It obvious to them how wrong headed their leadership is.
Indeed, war might even be prevented by the US pointing this out to Chinese leadership.
We all know that Xi wants a leaner, meaner China, but despite his current frustration, he is also aware that the Chinese people have their limits. They don't want to see the country go 30 years in reverse.
I have many thoughts more thoughts on this issue, and a few of them are expressed in my Substack post.
Are the United States and China “At Each Other’s Throats?”
What would be China's war aims here?? Take Taiwan, then what? Be embargoed by the entire G7, and lose markets to sell products in? Seems incredibly stupid, because the second order effects are all very predictable and all very bad for China. Of course, countries can blunder into wars and stymie themselves(Germany circa 1914 says hi), but China's whole shtick was that they weren't susceptible to the hubris and arrogance of the Americans, because decisions were made by the new mandarins, who were smart enough to avoid these things.
I think that their idea is to old on Taiwan and wait for us to cave: sure, we would embargo them for a few years, but then new politicians would come to power and they will decide that, after all, we would better off if we reopened economic relationship with them. Russia played this game with Crimea and almost succeeded: many politicians in Europe had already accepted Russian ownership of Crimea, were already talking about dropping sanctions, and Germany kept building Northstream 2, I imagine that with China the pressure to do so would be even bigger.
So, at the end of the day, they think, China would end up gaining Taiwan and, after a few years of economic hardships, the West will reopen economic relationship again.
That's a hell of a gamble, and call me naive, but countries are motivated by more than just trade flows. Countries in Asia want to retain their sovereignty and not become a Chinese client-state, but since Chinese nationalists like Xi believe they're destined to rule all of Asia, they act like the biggest bully imaginable. America has always put a premium on having high quality diplomats, and playing the long game, to not annoy your allies. Soft power baby!! Does anyone like China, besides other countries everyone hates?? North Korea, Russia, really??? These are the best friends you can find?? China dosen't want mutually beneficial relationships because they believe in a world where might makes right, and they have no overarching narrative like America does, of "we'd like to trade with you, but we also believe that your country can benefit from becoming more democratic, and more free by having closer ties with us"'.
Considering less people live in extreme poverty than 50 years ago, and the US can point to programs like the Marshall Plan, or the Bush era program, that's been wildly successful in reducing deaths in Africa from AIDS by distributing antiviral drugs, I'd say that's a pretty compelling narrative. You can say it's cynical self-interest, but if you believe as generations of policymakers did, from the Founders all the way up to Joe Biden believed and believe otherwise. China took away the wrong lesson from the century of humiliation and the Opium Wars, namely that you can just bully other countries into submission, or browbeat them. That only works in a unipolar world, where countries don't have other options.
The EU is a mercantilist entity (well, run by mercantilist France and Germany) focused on exports. They are desperate to resume trade with Russia and will never cutoff trade with China.
The Korean and Japanese and Taiwanese political systems are also heavily influenced by large exporters who want more business with China (though Japanese patriotism, at least, overrides economic benefits for now). Not so much in Taiwan (where the Foxconn guy is running for prez on a pro-China platform) or Korea
Outside of Vietnam, much of the rest of political leadership around SE Asia can be bribed by China.
The US has neglected its own hemisphere while expending trillions cajoling unreliable and untrustworthy allies and at the same time being undermined by its pro-China tech tycoons and domestic pols on China’s payroll (including the Bidens)
Wars post WW2 rarely benefit countries, the way that WW2 benefited America. Israel might be the only exception I can think of , but those wars were mainly about stopping territorial expansion of the Arab states, and their desire to wipe Israel off the map. China would become a pariah state if they did this, with Russia, North Korea n Iran being their only real allies. Meanwhile, the rest of Asia and Africa would seek closer ties with Europe and the US. I think it's pretty obvious that the average Chinese citizen's support of the CCP isn't based on love for communism, but exchanging freedom and liberty for money and wealth. If that dries up, it's very bad news for Xi.
Total agreement. I had a refinement to my war plan. American planes and ships could defend Taiwan airspace and the straits, while Taiwanese pilots shot missiles at the factories.
How would the Air Force and Navy get into Chinese airspace?? If my memory is correct, the largest US base is on Guam, but war games indicated that China would launch a barrage of missiles at Guam to destroy the runways at the start of the conflict. Launch from allied countries, like Japan or the Philippines??
The 50 ship 7th fleet in the Pacific seldom goes to port for supplies or repairs. Instead CFL ships come to them. Recently a 7th fleet ship went to India for repairs.
"CLF are the supply lines to U.S. Navy ships while at sea. These ships provide virtually everything Navy ships need including fuel, food, fleet ordnance, dry cargo, spare parts, mail, and other supplies."
The Navy and affiliated researchers seem to think otherwise. If you read the article, they believe that the Navy would lose a significant number of ships in a conflict, due to Chinese anti-ship missiles, that have a range of hundreds of nautical miles. It's possible that's wrong, but the Navy seems to think it's a legitimate concern. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/04/us/politics/us-navy-ships.html
Our greatest Pacific base is the aircraft carriers with their planes and the cruisers with their missiles. We have them patrolling in the western Pacific 24/7. Guam is no more relevant than Hawaii.
I figure if it's confined to the factories, it might have that effect. We should never target civilians because it's a war crime and because it is counterproductive. Indeed, the Chinese government might bomb civilians and say it was us! I was throwing ideas off the top of my head, but the basic point that the impact on the Chinese economy might go well beyond sanctions.
You raise a very good point in noting the military vulnerability of China's manufacturing, Ms. Weber. I can see the logic of it. But I'm not sure that the model you've created to predict Chinese behavior fits this specific case. You're framing this as a two-player confrontation between the PRC and the US. But while the response of the US to an attack on Taiwan is undoubtedly one principal factor in the Politburo's thinking, it may not be determinative.
As I see it (but I'm no specialist in contemporary PRC politics!), from the standpoint of Xi's administration, the primary threat of cascading economic problems is likely viewed as a domestic political one. The CCP's legitimacy, once tied to its revolutionary success and the secular religion of Maoism that was adopted by the dominant rural class, shifted under Deng to economic deliverables. When the Party can no longer produce those deliverables, its continued legitimacy is unstable, and under those circumstances the fractures in the CCP become a driving factor. We saw this play out earlier in a different form in the periods 1959-62 and 1962-66, when Maoist overreach produced manufacturing collapse and broad famine in the countryside, and while the still-young Party survived, its survival depended on an underlying split within the CCP forcing out Mao and his faction in favor of the faction Deng belonged to (but did not then lead). (The reaction in 1966 was a Maoist revolt to dissolve the government, and then to discredit and then seize the Party: the Cultural Revolution, but that doesn't seem likely to find a parallel in China's near future.)
While Xi's control over the Party seems very strong, the recent realignment of leadership that ousted key figures whose connections to Xi were not strong reflects the fact that his dominance is not like Stalin's, free from internal challenges after wiping out contesting rivals, but more like Mao's, where the internal threats--networks that have fallen from favor--remain present within the Party, waiting for the current leadership's vulnerabilities to allow them to become the dominant faction. Xi initially was successful in restoring one-faction dominance (which Deng tried to end) by a combination of largely non-lethal purges (in the anti-corruption campaigns of his initial years) and ideological adjustments (Xi is the first leader since Mao to really be viewed as an ideological innovator, hence the semi-revival of personality-cult leadership), and continued economic growth. As the anti-corruption moment has receded and the economy has waned, Xi's faction has come to need replacement supports, a need that was strengthened by general dissatisfaction in urban centers with the zero-Covid regime.
One of the replacements seems to have been a decision to shift gears on the long-simmering Taiwan issue, which is probably the most powerful trigger of nationalist sentiment that can be pulled in the PRC. There seems no logical reason for Xi's government to have dramatically increased this drum beat on this unless it serves his purpose in this type of domestic dynamic. As far as the US role is concerned, there is no reason to be certain how vigorously we would mobilize, especially if former president Trump returns to office. The idea of directly launching an aerial assault on Chinese manufacturing on the coast assumes a full US commitment to an essentially bilateral war, and I think Xi knows, as we all do, that Taiwan may not be a hill Americans want their troops to die on. (The dynamics of an actual war would be more complex, I think, and not involve a direct US assault on PRC territory: prudent, but with much less assurance that a PRC attack on Taiwan would ultimately fail.)
So I think your ingenious animal behavior model and your insight on the military vulnerability of the PRC's manufacturing base may not actually fit the dynamic driving the PRC's thinking on Taiwan. The animals Xi and his cohort may be focused on are factional rivals and herds of disillusioned young people without work.
I don't get the point. If Xi is seeking to impact his domestic scene, I don't see how diplomacy could play a role. The impact of diplomacy usually ceases at the border. It usually can affect only what happens between countries. And China resents opinions about its internal affairs more than most.
My goal was to point out that Noah had failed to take into account other possible economic downsides of war for China. He seemed to think that we would simply attempt to parry China's attacks without any military pushback.
I realize that my off-the-cuff suggestions might not be optimal.
However, I posit these things:
Xi Is mad about what he sees as a lack of patriotism and willingness to suffer on the part of the Chinese, esp the young.
He doesn't want to see the economic progress of China completely undone.
He has acted to moderate Russia's nuclear saber rattling.
He hopes to achieve great influence on the world stage, but nations are backing away from China and the predicted Western decadent collapse never seems to arrive.
The only one of the things you posit that I'd question is that Xi is mad about lack of patriotism. I think he was very concerned that the type of patriotism that helps entrench the Party and its dominant faction was waning, and he's found that the hot button of Taiwan will help boost it back up. (Ten years ago I thought, like many, Xi had some principled commitments, but I no longer believe that to be true.)
My view of the likelihood of our attacking the PRC directly is like Noah's, but this is not my area of expertise. I enjoyed your analysis using animal behavior and I'm persuaded it can shed light on how we construe political behavior. Like all analyses, the utility of applying it depends on the way it's framed to fit specific contexts and perspectives. Noah's frame of PRC/US at each other's throats (which I read but don't actually recall) may have been a good fit for that model, but the issues set forth here may require adjusting the model for a different perspective.
I've got another long post brewing on China that will bring in two other concepts to frame the US-China relationship. I assume that you are subscribed to "As Time Goes By" so you will be able to comment.
High chance of the war turning nuclear though, especially since any Chinese retaliation is likely to come in the form of ICBMs, which could be mistaken for a nuclear first strike.
The forest analogy leaves out one other possibility. If the forrest is large enough, selective cutting will allow for the taking of mature trees, giving the youngr ones room to grow. If done correctly, this will allow the forrest to survive for a long period of time. This has been accomplished in the Southern portion of the United States and has worked for over 100 years. Some reports seem to indicate that todays forrest is larger and more productive than ever before. Selective cutting also allows for the removal of brush and this provides less fuel for forrest fires.
In the past, wars provided away for countries or empires to grow and become richer, but that is no longer possible. War is so destructive that the captured terriorty is basically worhtless - from an economic perspective.
The one thing China would gain, but only in their own belief perspective, is to capture a run away territory that they feel should be under their control. They have destroyed any semblence of freedom in Hong Kong and they would do the same in Taiwan. Resistence to Chinese control will be very strong and could lead to a nuclear exchnage between China nd America. If so, everyone loses.
A factor Noah doesn't mention is that China's military-age population is decreasing. They might feel that puts them under pressure to act sooner rather than later.
I think this is a good analysis, and economic factors do matter somewhat, but I think ultimately wars generally happen much for internal reasons than external ones. Not 'what is good for China?' but 'what is good for the CCP' or, given consolidation of power around himself, 'what is good for Xi Jinping?' As such all instability increases the risk of war, because of the temptation to cut off rivals by forcing everyone to rally around the flag - or be denounced as a wartime traitor. If he feels a threat to his power, considerations for China as a whole - economic or otherwise - will be a distant concern.
"Meanwhile semiconductors, the most important sector where developed countries still retain a slim edge, are now subject to export controls. And China’s ability to appropriate technologies by buying companies in the U.S. and other developed nations has been impeded by inbound investment restrictions. Between these measures and the drop in FDI into China, much of the country’s appropriation of foreign technology will probably now shift to traditional Cold War-style espionage rather than voluntary economic partnerships."
The scary part of China invading Taiwan is not the loss of TSMC's 2nm process foundries. It is the loss of access to all the ancillary electronic components Taiwan manufacturers. The modern world runs on surface-mount resistors and capacitors and transistors. On various components that support the microprocessors and comprise other circuitry as well. And the U.S. off-shored manufacture of said electronic components many years ago. You can't build Tomahawk or PATRIOT or HiMARS missiles with entirely domestically sourced electronic components.
The Cold War in the region has already started. Taiwan and now Japan are being constantly assaulted by Chinese hacking & locally sowed disinformation. If they gain an edge from the information they get it can easily turn into a war. That’s the missing piece I’m trying to execute a ‘quick’ conflict to get exactly those things you mentioned
The opportunity cost of war in a young country (lots of prime-age males) is lower than a demographically older one.
By this standard, China should be reluctant to start a war. However, China's sex ratio is so skewed (https://www.statista.com/statistics/282119/china-sex-ratio-by-age-group/) that, even though they're old, they still have lots of excess young males. Regardless of Taiwan, societies with lots of young men with no marriage prospects are often very violent places. Not sure how that combination plays out.
I'm not sure the TSMC angle will be salient for much longer - granted the veracity of these statements by China and their SOEs is suspect but if true would suggest a much faster and larger leap in manufacturing than many had thought:
I think the real angle is the historical agenda of reintegration of Taiwan and the economic malaise to come. The fiscal stimulus from war and the potential assets either taken or scorched would be a benefit to China as it uses it's manufacturing base and manipulated currency to support exports.
If their economy does deteriorate further and they decide to let the yuan go lower to support exports in industries they deem "important" then we wouldn't need a war. We'd be on the brink of an economic war we haven't seen in our lifetimes.
Absolutely, China is already hacking the hell out of Taiwan, and now Japan as well. Every step the US makes w/r/t Taiwan is responded to with ‘this is against out one-China policy’ by the admin. The conquest is for glory first and economics second, similar to Russia. If they can get an edge through their hacking then the active regional Cold War becomes a hot one - https://open.substack.com/pub/socialdawn/p/will-the-world-ever-learn-to-deal
Some authors have noted that China and Russia would prefer to wait for a Trump Presidential victory before deciding on the fate of their wars. For the same reasons, the US military would probably prefer to begin war before a potential Trump reelection. As I see it, many pieces are being put in place to fight such a war, rather than simply deterring it. For some reason, the US does not appear to fear a nuclear war. Technology must be a deciding factor for all parties of whether to go early or go late.
Surely the fact that the US isn't currently fighting Russia directly is evidence against your proposition that it "does not appear to fear a nuclear war"?
Here is a Harpers article that someone recently posted on Substack, regarding the history of Ukraine since the end of the Cold War. It contains pieces of history that I had forgotten about.
The more relevant section has to do with the heightened precision of the US nuclear arsenal. Combined with the history of SDI in the 1980's, there really were/are attempts to allow for victory in a nuclear confrontation, neutralizing the MADD stalemate. What SDI promised in the 1980's is likely achievable, or even yet implemented, now.
'Meanwhile, as Russia’s nuclear capabilities decayed, America’s grew increasingly lethal. Reflecting the seemingly exponential progress of its so-called military-technological revolution, America’s arsenal became immensely more precise and powerful, even as it declined in size.
These improvements didn’t fit with the aim of deterring an adversary’s nuclear attack—which requires only the nuclear capacity for a “countervalue” strike on enemy cities. They were, however, necessary for a disarming “counterforce” strike, capable of preempting a Russian retaliatory nuclear response. “What the planned force appears best suited to provide,” as a 2003 RAND report on the U.S. nuclear arsenal concluded, “is a preemptive counterforce capability against Russia and China. Otherwise, the numbers and the operating procedures simply do not add up.”'
If one is observing the European theatre, there are B2's now in Iceland, Gerald Ford is in the Eastern Mediterranean, F35's are in the Middle East, keeping tabs in Syria. In the Pacific, the US is signing security guarantees for the countries having border disputes in the 9 dash line, Starlink is servicing Japan, and more recently, the White House signed an $80 million military assistance package for Taiwan, which is generally reserved for sovereign states. This fact was not lost on China. They've gone ballistic. So the US is poised for war in both theaters. If there are nuclear weapons, there is likely a plan to win.
I was surprised to see this: "outweighs the modest gains from conquering pieces of Asia"
I don't think conquering Taiwan would be a 'modest' gain. Control of the entire South China Sea, heavier influence on all the other smaller countries in the region, power projection opportunities into the Pacific. The list goes on. It has the potential to be a historic prize.
Interesting argument - but remember the 'Wolf-Warrior' strategy Chinese diplomats embarked on a couple of years ago - picking fights all over the world. However, remember that it failed and now they have reversed course. One thing Noah did not mention is the Russia-Ukraine war. My guess is that Xi Jingping will be heavily influenced by the outcome - if the Ukrainians lose then he will probably go ahead with an invasion of Taiwan. If not he will probably think twice.
Noah, I think you're right that invading Taiwan would pose foolish risks for China. One thing the past 200 years have taught us is that major powers that launch voluntary wars rarely do well. I can think of the Bismarckian wars of German unification and Operation Desert Storm as the only successful examples. Germany launched WWI and WW2 and suffered defeats. The US lost Vietnam (and Afghanistan and I'd argue Iraq). The Soviet Union paid a high price for its Afghanistan adventure, as is Russia in Ukraine.
China would pay a terrible economic price for even a successful invasion of Taiwan and its gains from doing so would be paltry.
But, as you note, sometimes leaders (and nations) don't act rationally. Ironically, a Chinese attack on Taiwan, no matter the outcome (other than nuclear war) would probably result in an overall relative strengthening of the US position in the world, along with its allies, and a diminishing of China's despite its seizure of a devastated Taiwan.
Gordon Chang of CNN also touts the theory that Xi is pushing to be more aggressive with the Americans to deflect blame of the Chinese economy from himself. There have been recent changes in top military positions as well as the foreign minister, which have been inexplicable.
Imagine an international blockade of China. Maybe they can feed themselves, but they’re one wheat harvest failure away from their own Arab Spring. Why assume Chinese youth have an appetite for war? I just don’t believe the Chinese people are lemmings that can be herded over a cliff. They gain nothing if they takeover Taiwan. All the chips fabs would grind to a halt. Then what would be the reaction if nobody’s smart phones could be replaced? Smart phones are an addiction. Many Chinese have two. Maybe Xi lacks judgment (he’s made a series of mistakes) or is desperate. Time will tell. But in the event of Xi starting a war, think of all the countries who suddenly would be willing to default on Chinese loans. That would present a serious economic problem.
To add to what Kathleen Weber wrote: the reason the US, in particular, benefited from WWII is our geographic isolation. The only American territories bombed in WWII were Hawaii and two Aleutian Islands. The US was not only a massive industrial power in the 1940s, we were also the only massive industrial power that remained outside of wartime conditions. The American home front was spared the fate of Germany, the USSR, Japan and Britain. This meant that not only did the US get to massively stimulate its economy: it got even MORE demand from its Allies. We then compounded this by rebuilding Europe with American made equipment postwar.
Needless to say I do not think China will find itself in this position in a war for Taiwan. American missiles would hit Chinese targets (causing damage), to say nothing of the escalatory risks of a direct Chinese-American conflict.
But I will be honest, I do not think a conflict over Taiwan will be chosen due to economic calculations but geopolitical ones. My suspicion is China is actually waiting for someone like Donald Trump to take office. Joe Biden has basically declared his intention to intervene in a resumption of the Chinese civil war. Trump has basically said the opposite, claiming the US can't stop China from retaking Taiwan. The return of a populist demagogue who does not want to send American soldiers to Taiwan to fight and die feels inevitable and without the US it's highly likely China can conquer Taiwan.
I suspect China is waiting for that to occur, and not for an economic case to be made. The only other thing that would convince them is if they think they have such a military advantage over the US that they would win before American forces can even reach Taiwan, OR if Taiwan unilaterally declares independence.
"the economic cost China would pay from going to war"
Noah's argument has a glaring flaw. He talks about the economic downside of war primarily as a loss of access to foreign markets. The biggest and decisive economic cost would be the destruction of all those gigantic factories situated along the coast within easy reach of American missiles. American means of production are by no means as vulnerable. We don't need to target civilian residential areas. Doubtless the destruction of several hundred factories, the factories where the Chinese people work, would make a vivid impression and make It obvious to them how wrong headed their leadership is.
Indeed, war might even be prevented by the US pointing this out to Chinese leadership.
We all know that Xi wants a leaner, meaner China, but despite his current frustration, he is also aware that the Chinese people have their limits. They don't want to see the country go 30 years in reverse.
I have many thoughts more thoughts on this issue, and a few of them are expressed in my Substack post.
Are the United States and China “At Each Other’s Throats?”
https://kathleenweber.substack.com/
There are multiple risks to going to war, and this is one of them. But only one.
What would be China's war aims here?? Take Taiwan, then what? Be embargoed by the entire G7, and lose markets to sell products in? Seems incredibly stupid, because the second order effects are all very predictable and all very bad for China. Of course, countries can blunder into wars and stymie themselves(Germany circa 1914 says hi), but China's whole shtick was that they weren't susceptible to the hubris and arrogance of the Americans, because decisions were made by the new mandarins, who were smart enough to avoid these things.
I think that their idea is to old on Taiwan and wait for us to cave: sure, we would embargo them for a few years, but then new politicians would come to power and they will decide that, after all, we would better off if we reopened economic relationship with them. Russia played this game with Crimea and almost succeeded: many politicians in Europe had already accepted Russian ownership of Crimea, were already talking about dropping sanctions, and Germany kept building Northstream 2, I imagine that with China the pressure to do so would be even bigger.
So, at the end of the day, they think, China would end up gaining Taiwan and, after a few years of economic hardships, the West will reopen economic relationship again.
That's a hell of a gamble, and call me naive, but countries are motivated by more than just trade flows. Countries in Asia want to retain their sovereignty and not become a Chinese client-state, but since Chinese nationalists like Xi believe they're destined to rule all of Asia, they act like the biggest bully imaginable. America has always put a premium on having high quality diplomats, and playing the long game, to not annoy your allies. Soft power baby!! Does anyone like China, besides other countries everyone hates?? North Korea, Russia, really??? These are the best friends you can find?? China dosen't want mutually beneficial relationships because they believe in a world where might makes right, and they have no overarching narrative like America does, of "we'd like to trade with you, but we also believe that your country can benefit from becoming more democratic, and more free by having closer ties with us"'.
Considering less people live in extreme poverty than 50 years ago, and the US can point to programs like the Marshall Plan, or the Bush era program, that's been wildly successful in reducing deaths in Africa from AIDS by distributing antiviral drugs, I'd say that's a pretty compelling narrative. You can say it's cynical self-interest, but if you believe as generations of policymakers did, from the Founders all the way up to Joe Biden believed and believe otherwise. China took away the wrong lesson from the century of humiliation and the Opium Wars, namely that you can just bully other countries into submission, or browbeat them. That only works in a unipolar world, where countries don't have other options.
I agree that it's a hell of a gamble, the invasion of Ukraine was also a gamble, but it happened nevertheless.
Also thinking they don’t need the west if they have Africa, Russia and the silk road
Ultimately the control of the South and East China Sea requires military dominance of Vietnam, Taiwan, Luzon and the Korean Peninsula
The EU is a mercantilist entity (well, run by mercantilist France and Germany) focused on exports. They are desperate to resume trade with Russia and will never cutoff trade with China.
The Korean and Japanese and Taiwanese political systems are also heavily influenced by large exporters who want more business with China (though Japanese patriotism, at least, overrides economic benefits for now). Not so much in Taiwan (where the Foxconn guy is running for prez on a pro-China platform) or Korea
Outside of Vietnam, much of the rest of political leadership around SE Asia can be bribed by China.
The US has neglected its own hemisphere while expending trillions cajoling unreliable and untrustworthy allies and at the same time being undermined by its pro-China tech tycoons and domestic pols on China’s payroll (including the Bidens)
Wars post WW2 rarely benefit countries, the way that WW2 benefited America. Israel might be the only exception I can think of , but those wars were mainly about stopping territorial expansion of the Arab states, and their desire to wipe Israel off the map. China would become a pariah state if they did this, with Russia, North Korea n Iran being their only real allies. Meanwhile, the rest of Asia and Africa would seek closer ties with Europe and the US. I think it's pretty obvious that the average Chinese citizen's support of the CCP isn't based on love for communism, but exchanging freedom and liberty for money and wealth. If that dries up, it's very bad news for Xi.
Total agreement. I had a refinement to my war plan. American planes and ships could defend Taiwan airspace and the straits, while Taiwanese pilots shot missiles at the factories.
How would the Air Force and Navy get into Chinese airspace?? If my memory is correct, the largest US base is on Guam, but war games indicated that China would launch a barrage of missiles at Guam to destroy the runways at the start of the conflict. Launch from allied countries, like Japan or the Philippines??
The 50 ship 7th fleet in the Pacific seldom goes to port for supplies or repairs. Instead CFL ships come to them. Recently a 7th fleet ship went to India for repairs.
"CLF are the supply lines to U.S. Navy ships while at sea. These ships provide virtually everything Navy ships need including fuel, food, fleet ordnance, dry cargo, spare parts, mail, and other supplies."
https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/3131831/us-navys-military-sealift-command-conducts-maintenance-in-india/
The Navy and affiliated researchers seem to think otherwise. If you read the article, they believe that the Navy would lose a significant number of ships in a conflict, due to Chinese anti-ship missiles, that have a range of hundreds of nautical miles. It's possible that's wrong, but the Navy seems to think it's a legitimate concern. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/04/us/politics/us-navy-ships.html
Our greatest Pacific base is the aircraft carriers with their planes and the cruisers with their missiles. We have them patrolling in the western Pacific 24/7. Guam is no more relevant than Hawaii.
Bombing by enemies generally doesn’t make people hate their own leaders
I figure if it's confined to the factories, it might have that effect. We should never target civilians because it's a war crime and because it is counterproductive. Indeed, the Chinese government might bomb civilians and say it was us! I was throwing ideas off the top of my head, but the basic point that the impact on the Chinese economy might go well beyond sanctions.
You raise a very good point in noting the military vulnerability of China's manufacturing, Ms. Weber. I can see the logic of it. But I'm not sure that the model you've created to predict Chinese behavior fits this specific case. You're framing this as a two-player confrontation between the PRC and the US. But while the response of the US to an attack on Taiwan is undoubtedly one principal factor in the Politburo's thinking, it may not be determinative.
As I see it (but I'm no specialist in contemporary PRC politics!), from the standpoint of Xi's administration, the primary threat of cascading economic problems is likely viewed as a domestic political one. The CCP's legitimacy, once tied to its revolutionary success and the secular religion of Maoism that was adopted by the dominant rural class, shifted under Deng to economic deliverables. When the Party can no longer produce those deliverables, its continued legitimacy is unstable, and under those circumstances the fractures in the CCP become a driving factor. We saw this play out earlier in a different form in the periods 1959-62 and 1962-66, when Maoist overreach produced manufacturing collapse and broad famine in the countryside, and while the still-young Party survived, its survival depended on an underlying split within the CCP forcing out Mao and his faction in favor of the faction Deng belonged to (but did not then lead). (The reaction in 1966 was a Maoist revolt to dissolve the government, and then to discredit and then seize the Party: the Cultural Revolution, but that doesn't seem likely to find a parallel in China's near future.)
While Xi's control over the Party seems very strong, the recent realignment of leadership that ousted key figures whose connections to Xi were not strong reflects the fact that his dominance is not like Stalin's, free from internal challenges after wiping out contesting rivals, but more like Mao's, where the internal threats--networks that have fallen from favor--remain present within the Party, waiting for the current leadership's vulnerabilities to allow them to become the dominant faction. Xi initially was successful in restoring one-faction dominance (which Deng tried to end) by a combination of largely non-lethal purges (in the anti-corruption campaigns of his initial years) and ideological adjustments (Xi is the first leader since Mao to really be viewed as an ideological innovator, hence the semi-revival of personality-cult leadership), and continued economic growth. As the anti-corruption moment has receded and the economy has waned, Xi's faction has come to need replacement supports, a need that was strengthened by general dissatisfaction in urban centers with the zero-Covid regime.
One of the replacements seems to have been a decision to shift gears on the long-simmering Taiwan issue, which is probably the most powerful trigger of nationalist sentiment that can be pulled in the PRC. There seems no logical reason for Xi's government to have dramatically increased this drum beat on this unless it serves his purpose in this type of domestic dynamic. As far as the US role is concerned, there is no reason to be certain how vigorously we would mobilize, especially if former president Trump returns to office. The idea of directly launching an aerial assault on Chinese manufacturing on the coast assumes a full US commitment to an essentially bilateral war, and I think Xi knows, as we all do, that Taiwan may not be a hill Americans want their troops to die on. (The dynamics of an actual war would be more complex, I think, and not involve a direct US assault on PRC territory: prudent, but with much less assurance that a PRC attack on Taiwan would ultimately fail.)
So I think your ingenious animal behavior model and your insight on the military vulnerability of the PRC's manufacturing base may not actually fit the dynamic driving the PRC's thinking on Taiwan. The animals Xi and his cohort may be focused on are factional rivals and herds of disillusioned young people without work.
So, if it's all for the domestic market, I hope you're right!
Actually, I think this makes things more dangerous. It provides fewer options for diplomacy to work.
I don't get the point. If Xi is seeking to impact his domestic scene, I don't see how diplomacy could play a role. The impact of diplomacy usually ceases at the border. It usually can affect only what happens between countries. And China resents opinions about its internal affairs more than most.
We agree. That's why I said that a domestic basis provides fewer options for diplomacy.
My goal was to point out that Noah had failed to take into account other possible economic downsides of war for China. He seemed to think that we would simply attempt to parry China's attacks without any military pushback.
I realize that my off-the-cuff suggestions might not be optimal.
However, I posit these things:
Xi Is mad about what he sees as a lack of patriotism and willingness to suffer on the part of the Chinese, esp the young.
He doesn't want to see the economic progress of China completely undone.
He has acted to moderate Russia's nuclear saber rattling.
He hopes to achieve great influence on the world stage, but nations are backing away from China and the predicted Western decadent collapse never seems to arrive.
The only one of the things you posit that I'd question is that Xi is mad about lack of patriotism. I think he was very concerned that the type of patriotism that helps entrench the Party and its dominant faction was waning, and he's found that the hot button of Taiwan will help boost it back up. (Ten years ago I thought, like many, Xi had some principled commitments, but I no longer believe that to be true.)
My view of the likelihood of our attacking the PRC directly is like Noah's, but this is not my area of expertise. I enjoyed your analysis using animal behavior and I'm persuaded it can shed light on how we construe political behavior. Like all analyses, the utility of applying it depends on the way it's framed to fit specific contexts and perspectives. Noah's frame of PRC/US at each other's throats (which I read but don't actually recall) may have been a good fit for that model, but the issues set forth here may require adjusting the model for a different perspective.
I've got another long post brewing on China that will bring in two other concepts to frame the US-China relationship. I assume that you are subscribed to "As Time Goes By" so you will be able to comment.
High chance of the war turning nuclear though, especially since any Chinese retaliation is likely to come in the form of ICBMs, which could be mistaken for a nuclear first strike.
Hi, this page you've linked to appears to be private.
Try this:
https://kathleenweber.substack.com/
Looks fine to me. I am using the Substack app though
The forest analogy leaves out one other possibility. If the forrest is large enough, selective cutting will allow for the taking of mature trees, giving the youngr ones room to grow. If done correctly, this will allow the forrest to survive for a long period of time. This has been accomplished in the Southern portion of the United States and has worked for over 100 years. Some reports seem to indicate that todays forrest is larger and more productive than ever before. Selective cutting also allows for the removal of brush and this provides less fuel for forrest fires.
In the past, wars provided away for countries or empires to grow and become richer, but that is no longer possible. War is so destructive that the captured terriorty is basically worhtless - from an economic perspective.
The one thing China would gain, but only in their own belief perspective, is to capture a run away territory that they feel should be under their control. They have destroyed any semblence of freedom in Hong Kong and they would do the same in Taiwan. Resistence to Chinese control will be very strong and could lead to a nuclear exchnage between China nd America. If so, everyone loses.
A factor Noah doesn't mention is that China's military-age population is decreasing. They might feel that puts them under pressure to act sooner rather than later.
I think this is a good analysis, and economic factors do matter somewhat, but I think ultimately wars generally happen much for internal reasons than external ones. Not 'what is good for China?' but 'what is good for the CCP' or, given consolidation of power around himself, 'what is good for Xi Jinping?' As such all instability increases the risk of war, because of the temptation to cut off rivals by forcing everyone to rally around the flag - or be denounced as a wartime traitor. If he feels a threat to his power, considerations for China as a whole - economic or otherwise - will be a distant concern.
"Meanwhile semiconductors, the most important sector where developed countries still retain a slim edge, are now subject to export controls. And China’s ability to appropriate technologies by buying companies in the U.S. and other developed nations has been impeded by inbound investment restrictions. Between these measures and the drop in FDI into China, much of the country’s appropriation of foreign technology will probably now shift to traditional Cold War-style espionage rather than voluntary economic partnerships."
The scary part of China invading Taiwan is not the loss of TSMC's 2nm process foundries. It is the loss of access to all the ancillary electronic components Taiwan manufacturers. The modern world runs on surface-mount resistors and capacitors and transistors. On various components that support the microprocessors and comprise other circuitry as well. And the U.S. off-shored manufacture of said electronic components many years ago. You can't build Tomahawk or PATRIOT or HiMARS missiles with entirely domestically sourced electronic components.
The Cold War in the region has already started. Taiwan and now Japan are being constantly assaulted by Chinese hacking & locally sowed disinformation. If they gain an edge from the information they get it can easily turn into a war. That’s the missing piece I’m trying to execute a ‘quick’ conflict to get exactly those things you mentioned
The opportunity cost of war in a young country (lots of prime-age males) is lower than a demographically older one.
By this standard, China should be reluctant to start a war. However, China's sex ratio is so skewed (https://www.statista.com/statistics/282119/china-sex-ratio-by-age-group/) that, even though they're old, they still have lots of excess young males. Regardless of Taiwan, societies with lots of young men with no marriage prospects are often very violent places. Not sure how that combination plays out.
I'm not sure the TSMC angle will be salient for much longer - granted the veracity of these statements by China and their SOEs is suspect but if true would suggest a much faster and larger leap in manufacturing than many had thought:
https://www.livemint.com/technology/tech-news/huawei-and-smic-unveil-advanced-7nm-processor-for-mate-60-pro-signaling-chinas-chipmaking-progress-11693894593831.html
I think the real angle is the historical agenda of reintegration of Taiwan and the economic malaise to come. The fiscal stimulus from war and the potential assets either taken or scorched would be a benefit to China as it uses it's manufacturing base and manipulated currency to support exports.
If their economy does deteriorate further and they decide to let the yuan go lower to support exports in industries they deem "important" then we wouldn't need a war. We'd be on the brink of an economic war we haven't seen in our lifetimes.
Absolutely, China is already hacking the hell out of Taiwan, and now Japan as well. Every step the US makes w/r/t Taiwan is responded to with ‘this is against out one-China policy’ by the admin. The conquest is for glory first and economics second, similar to Russia. If they can get an edge through their hacking then the active regional Cold War becomes a hot one - https://open.substack.com/pub/socialdawn/p/will-the-world-ever-learn-to-deal
Some authors have noted that China and Russia would prefer to wait for a Trump Presidential victory before deciding on the fate of their wars. For the same reasons, the US military would probably prefer to begin war before a potential Trump reelection. As I see it, many pieces are being put in place to fight such a war, rather than simply deterring it. For some reason, the US does not appear to fear a nuclear war. Technology must be a deciding factor for all parties of whether to go early or go late.
Surely the fact that the US isn't currently fighting Russia directly is evidence against your proposition that it "does not appear to fear a nuclear war"?
Here is a Harpers article that someone recently posted on Substack, regarding the history of Ukraine since the end of the Cold War. It contains pieces of history that I had forgotten about.
The more relevant section has to do with the heightened precision of the US nuclear arsenal. Combined with the history of SDI in the 1980's, there really were/are attempts to allow for victory in a nuclear confrontation, neutralizing the MADD stalemate. What SDI promised in the 1980's is likely achievable, or even yet implemented, now.
'Meanwhile, as Russia’s nuclear capabilities decayed, America’s grew increasingly lethal. Reflecting the seemingly exponential progress of its so-called military-technological revolution, America’s arsenal became immensely more precise and powerful, even as it declined in size.
These improvements didn’t fit with the aim of deterring an adversary’s nuclear attack—which requires only the nuclear capacity for a “countervalue” strike on enemy cities. They were, however, necessary for a disarming “counterforce” strike, capable of preempting a Russian retaliatory nuclear response. “What the planned force appears best suited to provide,” as a 2003 RAND report on the U.S. nuclear arsenal concluded, “is a preemptive counterforce capability against Russia and China. Otherwise, the numbers and the operating procedures simply do not add up.”'
https://harpers.org/archive/2023/06/why-are-we-in-ukraine/
If one is observing the European theatre, there are B2's now in Iceland, Gerald Ford is in the Eastern Mediterranean, F35's are in the Middle East, keeping tabs in Syria. In the Pacific, the US is signing security guarantees for the countries having border disputes in the 9 dash line, Starlink is servicing Japan, and more recently, the White House signed an $80 million military assistance package for Taiwan, which is generally reserved for sovereign states. This fact was not lost on China. They've gone ballistic. So the US is poised for war in both theaters. If there are nuclear weapons, there is likely a plan to win.
I was surprised to see this: "outweighs the modest gains from conquering pieces of Asia"
I don't think conquering Taiwan would be a 'modest' gain. Control of the entire South China Sea, heavier influence on all the other smaller countries in the region, power projection opportunities into the Pacific. The list goes on. It has the potential to be a historic prize.
Interesting argument - but remember the 'Wolf-Warrior' strategy Chinese diplomats embarked on a couple of years ago - picking fights all over the world. However, remember that it failed and now they have reversed course. One thing Noah did not mention is the Russia-Ukraine war. My guess is that Xi Jingping will be heavily influenced by the outcome - if the Ukrainians lose then he will probably go ahead with an invasion of Taiwan. If not he will probably think twice.
Noah, I think you're right that invading Taiwan would pose foolish risks for China. One thing the past 200 years have taught us is that major powers that launch voluntary wars rarely do well. I can think of the Bismarckian wars of German unification and Operation Desert Storm as the only successful examples. Germany launched WWI and WW2 and suffered defeats. The US lost Vietnam (and Afghanistan and I'd argue Iraq). The Soviet Union paid a high price for its Afghanistan adventure, as is Russia in Ukraine.
China would pay a terrible economic price for even a successful invasion of Taiwan and its gains from doing so would be paltry.
But, as you note, sometimes leaders (and nations) don't act rationally. Ironically, a Chinese attack on Taiwan, no matter the outcome (other than nuclear war) would probably result in an overall relative strengthening of the US position in the world, along with its allies, and a diminishing of China's despite its seizure of a devastated Taiwan.
I would be curious to get your thoughts on the new Huawei phone with 7nm chip
Gordon Chang of CNN also touts the theory that Xi is pushing to be more aggressive with the Americans to deflect blame of the Chinese economy from himself. There have been recent changes in top military positions as well as the foreign minister, which have been inexplicable.
Imagine an international blockade of China. Maybe they can feed themselves, but they’re one wheat harvest failure away from their own Arab Spring. Why assume Chinese youth have an appetite for war? I just don’t believe the Chinese people are lemmings that can be herded over a cliff. They gain nothing if they takeover Taiwan. All the chips fabs would grind to a halt. Then what would be the reaction if nobody’s smart phones could be replaced? Smart phones are an addiction. Many Chinese have two. Maybe Xi lacks judgment (he’s made a series of mistakes) or is desperate. Time will tell. But in the event of Xi starting a war, think of all the countries who suddenly would be willing to default on Chinese loans. That would present a serious economic problem.
If we gauge the reaction to Covid locks
To add to what Kathleen Weber wrote: the reason the US, in particular, benefited from WWII is our geographic isolation. The only American territories bombed in WWII were Hawaii and two Aleutian Islands. The US was not only a massive industrial power in the 1940s, we were also the only massive industrial power that remained outside of wartime conditions. The American home front was spared the fate of Germany, the USSR, Japan and Britain. This meant that not only did the US get to massively stimulate its economy: it got even MORE demand from its Allies. We then compounded this by rebuilding Europe with American made equipment postwar.
Needless to say I do not think China will find itself in this position in a war for Taiwan. American missiles would hit Chinese targets (causing damage), to say nothing of the escalatory risks of a direct Chinese-American conflict.
But I will be honest, I do not think a conflict over Taiwan will be chosen due to economic calculations but geopolitical ones. My suspicion is China is actually waiting for someone like Donald Trump to take office. Joe Biden has basically declared his intention to intervene in a resumption of the Chinese civil war. Trump has basically said the opposite, claiming the US can't stop China from retaking Taiwan. The return of a populist demagogue who does not want to send American soldiers to Taiwan to fight and die feels inevitable and without the US it's highly likely China can conquer Taiwan.
I suspect China is waiting for that to occur, and not for an economic case to be made. The only other thing that would convince them is if they think they have such a military advantage over the US that they would win before American forces can even reach Taiwan, OR if Taiwan unilaterally declares independence.
We'll see. I pray we never find out.