Thanks again for sharing your insight in history and theory. I suggest that a tried and true method of testing hypotheses and expected outcomes is “Goal Attainment Scaling” whereby expected outcomes are rated across 5 possibilities with appropriate evaluation of each outcomes which can be scored +2 = much more than expected +1 = more than expected 0= expected -1 less than expected-2 much less than expected. See some of my papers on GAS see https://personalresearchandevaluation.com/goal-settings/
I would push back hard on Lafayette being seen as a main character in either revolutions, tbh.
When it comes to the American Revolution, a more honest appraisal of the contribution of the French wouldn't go amiss, imho (it's not all plucky pioneer farmers against the Evil Empire) but, even then, the French crown did it mostly to sabotage the English, not for love of liberty...
As to the French revolution, sure, Lafayette started as a reformer, as anyone with a brain cell could see the Ancien Regime was sclerotic and fucked up (Louis the XV had been interested in reforms but failed to push them through against its court. I recommend Gilles Perrault's Le Secret du Roi. The third tome covers the American Revolution from the French secret service point of view but is alas the weakest of the three tomes. Still the series is top notch and very much worth anyone's time https://academic.oup.com/fh/article-abstract/7/3/359/589395?redirectedFrom=PDF )
... but he couldn't bring himself to throw away monarchy completely. He wasn't cancelled. He just lost the political debate. Extremists like Robespierre and St Just also ended up guillotined for their excesses and when, tired of extremism, more moderate politicians prevailed.
The manner in which Robespierre lost is interesting in and of itself. Fair amount of historical contingencies, mistakes and randomness.
I noticed during this interview that Duncan offered an observation that could easily be interpreted as a theory: that revolutions never unfold in the way that their instigators expected or intended. I imagine that if he were pressed on this Duncan have restated his observation to seem less like a model of how all revolutions invariably proceed, but this sent me back to Smith's "On the wisdom of the historians" piece.
That piece uses Bret Devereaux's "Ancient Insurrections—and Ours" as the prime example of how historians in the public sphere use untested models, but I think that Smith is overstating the point that he wants to make. Devereaux undoubtedly offers an apparently uncategorical "lesson of history," one that is so important in the argument that he offers that it is also the subhead for the piece: that would-be tyrants keep trying until they succeed. However, a closer reading of Devereaux's piece suggests that it wasn't intended that way. First, he doesn't phrase it in absolute terms, through use of a modifier such as "always." Admittedly, he also doesn't phrase in a qualified fashion, but that might be the result of Devereaux or a Bulwark editor wanting to make that particular sentence less limp. Second, Devereaux doesn't offer the type of evidence that one would expect if he intended to support a strong, uncategorical thesis. Finally, Devereaux framed his piece as an examination of the way that the ancient Greeks thought about political change, and it's possible to see this as Devereaux's interpretation of how they thought, which was frequently done through the types of theories that Smith cautions against.
Smith would have had a stronger and more convincing argument if he had cautioned readers, not about historians offering untested theories, but against interpreting their public work as though they did. As Duncan pointed out in this interview, it's been quite some time since historians tried to formulate laws of history. Nonetheless, it's quite easy for readers to fall into the Santayana trap of thinking that history will repeat unless its lessons are heeded. Here, I think, is where the danger lies.
Thanks again for sharing your insight in history and theory. I suggest that a tried and true method of testing hypotheses and expected outcomes is “Goal Attainment Scaling” whereby expected outcomes are rated across 5 possibilities with appropriate evaluation of each outcomes which can be scored +2 = much more than expected +1 = more than expected 0= expected -1 less than expected-2 much less than expected. See some of my papers on GAS see https://personalresearchandevaluation.com/goal-settings/
liked his book. i always remember this warning from him: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R70eegNOBgc&t=2394s
Stoked to see this! Mike Duncan really is the best.
I would push back hard on Lafayette being seen as a main character in either revolutions, tbh.
When it comes to the American Revolution, a more honest appraisal of the contribution of the French wouldn't go amiss, imho (it's not all plucky pioneer farmers against the Evil Empire) but, even then, the French crown did it mostly to sabotage the English, not for love of liberty...
As to the French revolution, sure, Lafayette started as a reformer, as anyone with a brain cell could see the Ancien Regime was sclerotic and fucked up (Louis the XV had been interested in reforms but failed to push them through against its court. I recommend Gilles Perrault's Le Secret du Roi. The third tome covers the American Revolution from the French secret service point of view but is alas the weakest of the three tomes. Still the series is top notch and very much worth anyone's time https://academic.oup.com/fh/article-abstract/7/3/359/589395?redirectedFrom=PDF )
... but he couldn't bring himself to throw away monarchy completely. He wasn't cancelled. He just lost the political debate. Extremists like Robespierre and St Just also ended up guillotined for their excesses and when, tired of extremism, more moderate politicians prevailed.
The manner in which Robespierre lost is interesting in and of itself. Fair amount of historical contingencies, mistakes and randomness.
I noticed during this interview that Duncan offered an observation that could easily be interpreted as a theory: that revolutions never unfold in the way that their instigators expected or intended. I imagine that if he were pressed on this Duncan have restated his observation to seem less like a model of how all revolutions invariably proceed, but this sent me back to Smith's "On the wisdom of the historians" piece.
That piece uses Bret Devereaux's "Ancient Insurrections—and Ours" as the prime example of how historians in the public sphere use untested models, but I think that Smith is overstating the point that he wants to make. Devereaux undoubtedly offers an apparently uncategorical "lesson of history," one that is so important in the argument that he offers that it is also the subhead for the piece: that would-be tyrants keep trying until they succeed. However, a closer reading of Devereaux's piece suggests that it wasn't intended that way. First, he doesn't phrase it in absolute terms, through use of a modifier such as "always." Admittedly, he also doesn't phrase in a qualified fashion, but that might be the result of Devereaux or a Bulwark editor wanting to make that particular sentence less limp. Second, Devereaux doesn't offer the type of evidence that one would expect if he intended to support a strong, uncategorical thesis. Finally, Devereaux framed his piece as an examination of the way that the ancient Greeks thought about political change, and it's possible to see this as Devereaux's interpretation of how they thought, which was frequently done through the types of theories that Smith cautions against.
Smith would have had a stronger and more convincing argument if he had cautioned readers, not about historians offering untested theories, but against interpreting their public work as though they did. As Duncan pointed out in this interview, it's been quite some time since historians tried to formulate laws of history. Nonetheless, it's quite easy for readers to fall into the Santayana trap of thinking that history will repeat unless its lessons are heeded. Here, I think, is where the danger lies.
Dear Noah
I really enjoyed this post AND your post about untested historical theory. Indeed I have responded to it and you twice:
A) P.E.R.S.O.N.A.L.-concerns post PERSONAL-concerns@substack.com
- in which I posit another use of untested historical analogy = strategic case study;
B) A method of testing historical analogy = Goal Attainment Scaling
(See you ‘liked’) which was accidentally sent by my nom de plume: Dr Caspar Alexander Pearson (casparcases@substack.com ).
Thank you for your consideration
Yours sincerely,
Colin
------------------
Dr. Colin A. Sharp, FAES, FGIA FCGI (CGP)
South Australia
http://au.linkedin.com/in/colinasharpphd
SubStack: PERSONAL-concerns@substack.com
Or
http://twitter.com/#!/ColinASharp
Political scientists could definitely use the help creating datasets. Hard to measure events and institutions
Speaking of interview requests, interview Michael Pettis! Or maybe on hexapodia?
clearly not heard sandbrook and Holland - no disrespect to Duncan or even Carlin.. but there’s no comparison. Sorry!!
What are your thoughts about Ray Dalio ?