As a German, who is sharply observing developments here, I praise your analysis.
Regarding the cut-off, leading associations of German companies were speculating that Russia will not cut-off gas supply and, therefore, most companies were active in lobbying instead of substituting the production process. Substitution only started adequately, with the final cut-off coming from Russia. Since then, German companies have been much more successful in replacing their production inputs than in all predictions of their respective think tanks, IW Köln and IMK Düsseldorf.
Regarding the Chinese competition, Germany has already started to trust less, and the government is already preventing the transfer of specific technology or selling companies that own these technologies. Nonetheless, German discourse is strongly biased by its demographic development, with many older people afraid that reducing trade with China would lead to many adverse short-term effects on the current employment level. The inflation development already creates bizarre discussions and inconsistent policy reactions in Germany (as you know, the German trauma).
Based on your answer, there needs to be clarification. There were serious academic studies from academic economists predicting this capability of substitution (see the study of Ben Moll et al. (2022)).
In contrast, the economists of the think tanks IW Köln and IMK Düsseldorf, working for company associations and labor unions, respectively, predicted much worse economic outcomes. These studies fit with the intentions of companies and labor unions to convince the German government not to introduce any energy embargo against Russia. Some company CEO predicted a total collapse. However, this embargo ultimately came from Russia. Until now, it seems academic economists were right.
But China is heavily dependent on Middle-Eastern oil and Australian coal. Also Taiwanese chips, which the U.S. limited. Economic sanctions issued under the guise of authoritarian COVID restrictions or the genocidal treatment of Uighurs could stand muster and be politically salient.
In other words, the West has the capability to defang the Chinese dragon should it chose to do so. As we did with Russia but cutting them off from SWIFT and a host of other measures. The question is: do Western politicians have the guts to do so?
So the takeaway from Germany is... mercantilism still works. A result whose shock value is likely proportional to the hearer's educational level. Orwell famously said "there are some ideas so stupid only an intellectual can believe them." Unrestricted international trade with a totalitarian country falls into this category.
Even with non-totalitarian countries it is a problem. When Norway setup its oil industry we specifically put lots of restrictions in place as American multinationals drove hard to cease full control over Norwegian oil. Plenty of South American countries know from experience how that works. Big countries whether totalitarian or not can easily rigged the game in their favor while warmly speaking about the virtues of free trade.
Being skeptical isn't the same as seeking to replicate the hermit status of North Korea. But I think a sensible economic policy will be a mix of free trade and some protectionism. Some industries and sectors of strategic or great importance to the economy are worth protecting through various measures.
Very few countries ever play the game of "free trade" fairly. Only a sucker would assume the game is fair and jump in with both eyes closed.
Those who favor unrestricted trade tend to caricature any opposition with comments like "look at N. Korea". This is completely disingenuous and they know it. Comparisons to maximal cases are always intended not to foster but to stifle debate on an issue.
And I was taking the easy case of an obvious adversary. Your example of American multinationals is a very good one. Most Americans have a hard time when you tell them our country has become an imperial power.
Your articles have a simple common theme, i.e. anti-China. It almost makes me believe you're just another paid writer to dis-credit China.
I have seen many Chinese EV reviews and the Chinese EVs are already better than VW and Tesla. The reason we haven't seen any Chinese EV in American market is because of protectionism which, as an economist, you should know it's a bad thing for N. America long term. It made American auto industry uncompetitive in the 80s and ended up killing Detroit.
I disagree. Noah, and to be honest, many intellectuals in the West are favorably disposed towards China--just not the Chinese Communist Party. Since 1972, the West has intentionally courted China and tried to integrate it (rather successfully I might add) in the global economic system.
In that time, it has not been clear that the policy makers in the CCP have reciprocated the goodwill.
There are many people around the world who like America, but not the Republicans or Democrats. Critiquing the policy of an increasingly authoritarian political apparatus does not equate to being anti-China.
Since the CCP has a stranglehold over the Chinese state apparatus, it controls the policy-making, law-making and enforcement mechanisms of the Chinese state. Present day Chinese policy is the policy of the CCP.
In the commercial sense, any business which threatens competition to German firms would pose a “threat” to German industry. The question is are these competitors competing in a free, fair and reciprocal way?
If not, should we blame the EU in general, and Germany in particular, for trying to implement protections for their industries against competition which is backed by the Chinese state?
As an fellow economist, your view of protectionism and trade is out of date. Ricardo's analysis works for 2 countries and 2 mostly agricultural products. There are multiple equilibrium points for many countries competing over many products, and for products which differ appreciably in their future growth curves. National industrial policy is about trying to shift to equilibrium points toward those beneficial to your country instead of your adversary.
In short, it matters whether you export strawberries or solar panels. Even if you can export a similar dollar value of strawberries, you're better off building solar panels in the long run. Trade restrictions are part of the way to get there. China is the perfect example: they use their market as a carrot to extract concessions (like BASF's tech transfer) from foreign companies. That's modern protectionism, and it works.
I agree that the US is really protectionist...maybe not through tariffs, but there are many regulations that make the US/Canadian market very closed to the outside (e.g. rules banning the import of automobiles that aren't US-Spec)…
That may be true for one industry, but the Europe has incredibly rigid import standards on agriculture products, pharmaceuticals, wine, financial products, etc. the idea that the “US is incredibly protectionist” or more protectionist than the Europe is patently absurd. The EU consistently talks about how “regulation” is its super power.
Every country has rules and regulations on imports. It is what it is
Like any county/multinational nation state, there are many considerations, from politics, lobbying, economic concerns, safety, etc. The same question could be ask of “why the European protection of agriculture”
I would say its because China is perceived as having that zero-sum view itself, taking advantage of foreign investment and markets but without actually fully opening up it's domestic economy. And when it does allow it, it demands technology/IP transfers (or steals them).
How accurate of a perception this is may be debatable, but imo that's what drives the difference in treatment.
Yeah I don't think I particularly agree with the view, but that is behind it. Or at least it's the excuse people make to avoid admitting otherwise to themselves.
"Germany has been both far too short-sighted and far too naively trusting when it came to its economic relationship with China."
It seems that Germany was also too short-sighted in trusting Russia as well which is why they are in the energy crunch they helped create for themselves and all of Europe. It seems that 'Ost Politics' and Asian politics are based on naivety or perhaps more likely arrogance. I don't generally think of Germans as being naive.
One thing not mentioned that is in the news here is the effect of the IRA EV credit, restricted to US manufactured vehicles. I understand that there are a lot of complaints from European auto manufacturers about this (arguably WTO-non-compliant) policy.
The authoritarian leaders of China led by Xi (our man in the politburo) seem to be moving in an even more fascist view of the economy. If you are not building big important stuff (includes housing) than it is not really important to the economy. The goal is to dominate industries and rely minimally on imports, trade is based on we win – you lose. This would seem not to bode well for the German export machine. The ultimate goal is to support the military with a technology superior economy. The performance of Russia in Ukraine helps vindicate this position for Chinese leadership, don’t rely on the west for anything.
The big loser for this thinking would seem to be the Chinese people. The quality of life for average person would increase dramatically if the economy were to go in the direction of a consumer based economy with a strong safety net combined with freedom to move about and create economic prosperity without fear and oppressive surveillance. The Chinese people have proved amazing in their ability to build a dynamic economy, the Xi regime seems to be the main obstacle in their way.
When firms sell to China and have their technology stolen, that's obviously bad for the companies in question, like the Siemens example. Is there a clear narrative in economics on what the overall economic impact is? Would Siemens profits pre-unfair-competition be considered normal economic profits or rents? Does additional competition in the market, even if it originated through nefarious means, make the overall market better (i.e., innovative, price competitive)?
I see Russia in the future as a source of almost unlimited cheap energy and resources for China and almost like a vassal state to them.
Cheap resources and energy is a huge boon to any economy imo as is high cost in these a huge hindrance when economies or blocks of them compete globally.
I don't understand how that's a possible motivation. Russia has alienated most of the major importers in the world with the war, and Putin has never seemed particularly concerned with improving Russia's economic situation.
Is this in many ways an argument against the typical Neoliberal drum beat for more deregulation and more free trade? There are advantages to safeguarding certain industries long term. China plays the long game and they will win against players who only look for short term profits in the market rather than looking for long term strategic positions.
Complacency is a hell of a drug. Based on this article it seems like being the cleanest dirty shirt in the EU has made Germany increasingly vulnerable to short-term shock and to long-term damage.
Just want to take up a small point in your analysis:
"But the green transition means that the role of the internal combustion engine in the global economy will shrink dramatically — it’ll still be used for planes and some other applications, but as far as autos are concerned, internal combustion will be more or less obsolete. "
It's an interesting question. Leave aside gas turbines for most larger aircraft and power plants for a minute. What remaining applications for the piston-engined Otto cycle engine are there that aren't well on their way to being replaced by electrification, or easily replaceable with near-term technology?
The only significant ones I have on my list are small fixed-wing aircraft, and small boats. Maybe high-end motorcycles, but they might just get regulated out of existence (to the joy of trauma surgeons the world over). Oh, and large ships, which run on massive two-stroke diesels but as I understand it ammonia is one of the ideas currently kicking around for a zero-carbon replacement.
"Oh, and large ships, which run on massive two-stroke diesels but as I understand it ammonia is one of the ideas currently kicking around for a zero-carbon replacement."
I'm fairly sure most ideas for ammonia still consist of combusting it in internal combustion engines. Fuel cells might be an alternative though, either by cracking the ammonia into hydrogen or perhaps by using fuel cells that can use it directly, don't know much about how feasible that is.
"Anything else?"
Long haul trucks in regions that lack the required fast charging infrastructure that battery powered trucks require. Also, trains running on unelectrified tracks in similar regions. One other use that might continue for quite some time, ironically enough, is electricity generation. Large piston engines have some advantages compared to open cycle gas turbines such as somewhat higher efficiency and better ability to quickly ramp up and down - the latter should become even more important as the amount of solar and wind on the grid increases. Batteries might make the ramping advantage somewhat moot though.
Honestly, While I am definitely more convinced by electric cars then even a few years ago, I am still not convinced that all cars will be electric and customers are going to be ok with that...I mean, many people still prefer flip-phones over smartphones, even if Smartphones are obviously objectively better...and the anti-vax movement might inspire or even morph into an anti-electric car movement …
Its interesting observation. Food for thought: BASF is already repositioning the bulk of its business in China to take advantage of energy at the source. https://www.ft.com/content/f6d2fe70-16fb-4d81-a26a-3afb93e0bf57 - yet BASF's biggest market is still Europe. Erosion of foundational businesses like that sees industrial capability rot from the inside.
This post is interesting to read after the post about artificial intelligence - and how it might not be a threat. Also, the Vietnam post addressing the inefficiency of SOEs and how they hold the country back. Noah, do you think a country *always* has a comparative advantage that it can shift to? Is it turtles all the way down? In your post on AI, you sort of posited the question about whether AI will be good at the things we are good at, or whether it's different enough to be complementary - and you implied that it seems to be the latter. AI is venturing into uncharted territory, so it's a bit TBD, sure. But we now have centuries of globalization to derive conclusions from. Is the answer that Germany should be more careful and guarded, or that they should work quickly to see the writing on the wall and figure out what their comparative advantage is? Would a Siemens that isn't competitive with Chinese companies domestically be good for Germany?
One wrinkle is the extent to which high energy prices are disincentivizing new investment, especially in battery cell plants. See the recent decisions and comments by Northvolt and the CEO of VW:
EU + NAFTA should form a block to lock out Chinese strategic products and keep strategic tech out of Chinese hands.
Then recruit the ANZUS + IJT to join the fray. Others would be welcome to play.
We have procided the Chinese with a LOT of rope, ie, enough to hang us with.
Enough already!
As a German, who is sharply observing developments here, I praise your analysis.
Regarding the cut-off, leading associations of German companies were speculating that Russia will not cut-off gas supply and, therefore, most companies were active in lobbying instead of substituting the production process. Substitution only started adequately, with the final cut-off coming from Russia. Since then, German companies have been much more successful in replacing their production inputs than in all predictions of their respective think tanks, IW Köln and IMK Düsseldorf.
Regarding the Chinese competition, Germany has already started to trust less, and the government is already preventing the transfer of specific technology or selling companies that own these technologies. Nonetheless, German discourse is strongly biased by its demographic development, with many older people afraid that reducing trade with China would lead to many adverse short-term effects on the current employment level. The inflation development already creates bizarre discussions and inconsistent policy reactions in Germany (as you know, the German trauma).
So people who actually run businesses are better at solving serious problems than academics sitting around tables in think tanks. Who knew?
Based on your answer, there needs to be clarification. There were serious academic studies from academic economists predicting this capability of substitution (see the study of Ben Moll et al. (2022)).
In contrast, the economists of the think tanks IW Köln and IMK Düsseldorf, working for company associations and labor unions, respectively, predicted much worse economic outcomes. These studies fit with the intentions of companies and labor unions to convince the German government not to introduce any energy embargo against Russia. Some company CEO predicted a total collapse. However, this embargo ultimately came from Russia. Until now, it seems academic economists were right.
China has refused to open it's market to Western goods. Fine. In response:
1. Tariff targeted Chinese goods, like EVs, so they are uneconomical in the West. Don't give them access to wealthy foreign markets.
2. Condition foreign aid, such as to Latin America and Africa, to reject Chinese products.
3. Sanction Chinese companies, like Huawei, that stole Western IP so they cannot sell in Western and developing world markets.
4. Ban technology transfers on national security grounds.
5. Ban Chinese information surveillance technologies from being deployed in the West. And Chinese "police stations".
China is a bad actor when it comes to de-industrializing the West. See https://www.npr.org/2022/08/03/1114964240/new-battery-technology-china-vanadium as an example. (Although this harm was largely self-inflicted.)
But China is heavily dependent on Middle-Eastern oil and Australian coal. Also Taiwanese chips, which the U.S. limited. Economic sanctions issued under the guise of authoritarian COVID restrictions or the genocidal treatment of Uighurs could stand muster and be politically salient.
In other words, the West has the capability to defang the Chinese dragon should it chose to do so. As we did with Russia but cutting them off from SWIFT and a host of other measures. The question is: do Western politicians have the guts to do so?
Re point number 2, I don't think we'd win that one. Africa and Latin America buy too much from China to even consider it.
So the takeaway from Germany is... mercantilism still works. A result whose shock value is likely proportional to the hearer's educational level. Orwell famously said "there are some ideas so stupid only an intellectual can believe them." Unrestricted international trade with a totalitarian country falls into this category.
Even with non-totalitarian countries it is a problem. When Norway setup its oil industry we specifically put lots of restrictions in place as American multinationals drove hard to cease full control over Norwegian oil. Plenty of South American countries know from experience how that works. Big countries whether totalitarian or not can easily rigged the game in their favor while warmly speaking about the virtues of free trade.
Being skeptical isn't the same as seeking to replicate the hermit status of North Korea. But I think a sensible economic policy will be a mix of free trade and some protectionism. Some industries and sectors of strategic or great importance to the economy are worth protecting through various measures.
Very few countries ever play the game of "free trade" fairly. Only a sucker would assume the game is fair and jump in with both eyes closed.
Those who favor unrestricted trade tend to caricature any opposition with comments like "look at N. Korea". This is completely disingenuous and they know it. Comparisons to maximal cases are always intended not to foster but to stifle debate on an issue.
And I was taking the easy case of an obvious adversary. Your example of American multinationals is a very good one. Most Americans have a hard time when you tell them our country has become an imperial power.
Your articles have a simple common theme, i.e. anti-China. It almost makes me believe you're just another paid writer to dis-credit China.
I have seen many Chinese EV reviews and the Chinese EVs are already better than VW and Tesla. The reason we haven't seen any Chinese EV in American market is because of protectionism which, as an economist, you should know it's a bad thing for N. America long term. It made American auto industry uncompetitive in the 80s and ended up killing Detroit.
DF,
I disagree. Noah, and to be honest, many intellectuals in the West are favorably disposed towards China--just not the Chinese Communist Party. Since 1972, the West has intentionally courted China and tried to integrate it (rather successfully I might add) in the global economic system.
In that time, it has not been clear that the policy makers in the CCP have reciprocated the goodwill.
There are many people around the world who like America, but not the Republicans or Democrats. Critiquing the policy of an increasingly authoritarian political apparatus does not equate to being anti-China.
Since the CCP has a stranglehold over the Chinese state apparatus, it controls the policy-making, law-making and enforcement mechanisms of the Chinese state. Present day Chinese policy is the policy of the CCP.
In the commercial sense, any business which threatens competition to German firms would pose a “threat” to German industry. The question is are these competitors competing in a free, fair and reciprocal way?
If not, should we blame the EU in general, and Germany in particular, for trying to implement protections for their industries against competition which is backed by the Chinese state?
As an fellow economist, your view of protectionism and trade is out of date. Ricardo's analysis works for 2 countries and 2 mostly agricultural products. There are multiple equilibrium points for many countries competing over many products, and for products which differ appreciably in their future growth curves. National industrial policy is about trying to shift to equilibrium points toward those beneficial to your country instead of your adversary.
In short, it matters whether you export strawberries or solar panels. Even if you can export a similar dollar value of strawberries, you're better off building solar panels in the long run. Trade restrictions are part of the way to get there. China is the perfect example: they use their market as a carrot to extract concessions (like BASF's tech transfer) from foreign companies. That's modern protectionism, and it works.
I agree that the US is really protectionist...maybe not through tariffs, but there are many regulations that make the US/Canadian market very closed to the outside (e.g. rules banning the import of automobiles that aren't US-Spec)…
Literally every county has rules and regulations on the specs that can be imported. Have you seen the regulations have on imports?
Well, the EU doesn't make it impossible to import US-spec automobiles, unlike the US and their "25-year" rule for non-US automobiles...
That may be true for one industry, but the Europe has incredibly rigid import standards on agriculture products, pharmaceuticals, wine, financial products, etc. the idea that the “US is incredibly protectionist” or more protectionist than the Europe is patently absurd. The EU consistently talks about how “regulation” is its super power.
Every country has rules and regulations on imports. It is what it is
Well...maybe. Why does the US have to have these specific duties for cars though?
Like any county/multinational nation state, there are many considerations, from politics, lobbying, economic concerns, safety, etc. The same question could be ask of “why the European protection of agriculture”
Regulations I mean...as for the EU being a "regulatory" superpower...that's not taken seriously by anyone, not even the Eurocrats probably :D.
I would say its because China is perceived as having that zero-sum view itself, taking advantage of foreign investment and markets but without actually fully opening up it's domestic economy. And when it does allow it, it demands technology/IP transfers (or steals them).
How accurate of a perception this is may be debatable, but imo that's what drives the difference in treatment.
Yeah I don't think I particularly agree with the view, but that is behind it. Or at least it's the excuse people make to avoid admitting otherwise to themselves.
"Germany has been both far too short-sighted and far too naively trusting when it came to its economic relationship with China."
It seems that Germany was also too short-sighted in trusting Russia as well which is why they are in the energy crunch they helped create for themselves and all of Europe. It seems that 'Ost Politics' and Asian politics are based on naivety or perhaps more likely arrogance. I don't generally think of Germans as being naive.
Germans are very naïve from my experience...certainly in terms of trusting politicians etc. at least...
One thing not mentioned that is in the news here is the effect of the IRA EV credit, restricted to US manufactured vehicles. I understand that there are a lot of complaints from European auto manufacturers about this (arguably WTO-non-compliant) policy.
The authoritarian leaders of China led by Xi (our man in the politburo) seem to be moving in an even more fascist view of the economy. If you are not building big important stuff (includes housing) than it is not really important to the economy. The goal is to dominate industries and rely minimally on imports, trade is based on we win – you lose. This would seem not to bode well for the German export machine. The ultimate goal is to support the military with a technology superior economy. The performance of Russia in Ukraine helps vindicate this position for Chinese leadership, don’t rely on the west for anything.
The big loser for this thinking would seem to be the Chinese people. The quality of life for average person would increase dramatically if the economy were to go in the direction of a consumer based economy with a strong safety net combined with freedom to move about and create economic prosperity without fear and oppressive surveillance. The Chinese people have proved amazing in their ability to build a dynamic economy, the Xi regime seems to be the main obstacle in their way.
When firms sell to China and have their technology stolen, that's obviously bad for the companies in question, like the Siemens example. Is there a clear narrative in economics on what the overall economic impact is? Would Siemens profits pre-unfair-competition be considered normal economic profits or rents? Does additional competition in the market, even if it originated through nefarious means, make the overall market better (i.e., innovative, price competitive)?
I see Russia in the future as a source of almost unlimited cheap energy and resources for China and almost like a vassal state to them.
Cheap resources and energy is a huge boon to any economy imo as is high cost in these a huge hindrance when economies or blocks of them compete globally.
I don't understand how that's a possible motivation. Russia has alienated most of the major importers in the world with the war, and Putin has never seemed particularly concerned with improving Russia's economic situation.
Is this in many ways an argument against the typical Neoliberal drum beat for more deregulation and more free trade? There are advantages to safeguarding certain industries long term. China plays the long game and they will win against players who only look for short term profits in the market rather than looking for long term strategic positions.
Complacency is a hell of a drug. Based on this article it seems like being the cleanest dirty shirt in the EU has made Germany increasingly vulnerable to short-term shock and to long-term damage.
Lenin was right: "the capitalists will sell us the rope with which we hang them."
Just want to take up a small point in your analysis:
"But the green transition means that the role of the internal combustion engine in the global economy will shrink dramatically — it’ll still be used for planes and some other applications, but as far as autos are concerned, internal combustion will be more or less obsolete. "
It's an interesting question. Leave aside gas turbines for most larger aircraft and power plants for a minute. What remaining applications for the piston-engined Otto cycle engine are there that aren't well on their way to being replaced by electrification, or easily replaceable with near-term technology?
The only significant ones I have on my list are small fixed-wing aircraft, and small boats. Maybe high-end motorcycles, but they might just get regulated out of existence (to the joy of trauma surgeons the world over). Oh, and large ships, which run on massive two-stroke diesels but as I understand it ammonia is one of the ideas currently kicking around for a zero-carbon replacement.
Anything else?
"Oh, and large ships, which run on massive two-stroke diesels but as I understand it ammonia is one of the ideas currently kicking around for a zero-carbon replacement."
I'm fairly sure most ideas for ammonia still consist of combusting it in internal combustion engines. Fuel cells might be an alternative though, either by cracking the ammonia into hydrogen or perhaps by using fuel cells that can use it directly, don't know much about how feasible that is.
"Anything else?"
Long haul trucks in regions that lack the required fast charging infrastructure that battery powered trucks require. Also, trains running on unelectrified tracks in similar regions. One other use that might continue for quite some time, ironically enough, is electricity generation. Large piston engines have some advantages compared to open cycle gas turbines such as somewhat higher efficiency and better ability to quickly ramp up and down - the latter should become even more important as the amount of solar and wind on the grid increases. Batteries might make the ramping advantage somewhat moot though.
Agricultural equipment, and other off-road equipment in remote areas (forestry, mining, construction).
I can't imagine electric sports cars being that popular among the set that buys them...
Honestly, While I am definitely more convinced by electric cars then even a few years ago, I am still not convinced that all cars will be electric and customers are going to be ok with that...I mean, many people still prefer flip-phones over smartphones, even if Smartphones are obviously objectively better...and the anti-vax movement might inspire or even morph into an anti-electric car movement …
Thanks for the reply. My understanding is that piston engines dominate the generator market up to about 1-2 MW; bigger than that it’s gas turbines.
Sports Cars, Off-road Vehicles for remote areas, large trucks...
Its interesting observation. Food for thought: BASF is already repositioning the bulk of its business in China to take advantage of energy at the source. https://www.ft.com/content/f6d2fe70-16fb-4d81-a26a-3afb93e0bf57 - yet BASF's biggest market is still Europe. Erosion of foundational businesses like that sees industrial capability rot from the inside.
This post is interesting to read after the post about artificial intelligence - and how it might not be a threat. Also, the Vietnam post addressing the inefficiency of SOEs and how they hold the country back. Noah, do you think a country *always* has a comparative advantage that it can shift to? Is it turtles all the way down? In your post on AI, you sort of posited the question about whether AI will be good at the things we are good at, or whether it's different enough to be complementary - and you implied that it seems to be the latter. AI is venturing into uncharted territory, so it's a bit TBD, sure. But we now have centuries of globalization to derive conclusions from. Is the answer that Germany should be more careful and guarded, or that they should work quickly to see the writing on the wall and figure out what their comparative advantage is? Would a Siemens that isn't competitive with Chinese companies domestically be good for Germany?
Europe needs to follow the US's lead and not transfer any future technology to the fascist slave-state of China.
One wrinkle is the extent to which high energy prices are disincentivizing new investment, especially in battery cell plants. See the recent decisions and comments by Northvolt and the CEO of VW:
https://europe.autonews.com/suppliers/vw-backed-northvolt-may-delay-german-battery-plant