^^Perhaps they believe that the only thing that matters is how popular China’s government is in China.^^
Nearly so.
Maintaining its grip on power is front and center in all CCP top leadership calculations, 24/7, always and at all times. If there's a conflict between "doing what's in the national interest" and "doing what's in the interest of solidifying party control" the regime will go with the latter. Every time.
(It's true they'll also never acknowledge there's any daylight between these two things; and some of them no doubt believe that! But too many party members are too intelligent not to comprehend this is BS. The deep-seated knowledge of their lack of moral authority is, I believe, what drives their fury at a base level).
I find it a bit strange that you don't consider the effect of the pandemic, which originated in China, on these polls – it seems like a massive confounding factor! I genuinely don't know how much blame China gets among ordinarily people worldwide, but I think there's definitely an association between the two, and a lot of conspiracy theories as well, and that's pretty likely to have an effect on overall opinion. Not sure most people are even aware of China's bellicose shift in messaging.
I was just thinking about this today. It seems counterproductive, almost Trumpian in the way it goes about making whatever problem you're trying to solve worse for...what? Owning the libs to score points with people who already like you? The Trump era gave a golden opportunity to these guys to go on a PR campaign, and they somehow managed to blow it completely. We sure have to get our ducks in order, but...what's their deal? Do they just believe that fervently in their own hype?
My sense is top CCP leadership generally isn't overly nimble or flexible. So, although it's abundantly clear there's been a sea change in foreign public opinion toward China, they're still trying to operate foreign policy with 2013's owner's manual. Also, it's not obvious at a micro-level that current practice *isn't* working tolerably well (there continues to be lots of investment in and engagement with mainland China on the part of others -- especially Europeans.) Finally, internal CCP politics is blood sport. So imprudently showing weakness -- and demonstrating solicitousness wrt foreign opinion might well be interpreted as just that -- could be dangerous for one's career, or one's freedom.
To put it bluntly, a whole lot of officials in China have to have realized things have gone off the rails a bit. But nobody wants to be the nail that sticks out and gets hammered. Especially right now, during the current wave of Xi-pandemic triumphalism. America has primary challenges. China has asset seizures, kangaroo courts and lengthy prison terms.
Opinions about China in other countries is massively skewed given near Western monopoly on news. Further, negative views do not mean that these countries will want to actively engage in containment of China. On the contrary, almost all say they don't want to choose, as Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, even Indonesia have made very clear. Japan is a US client state. Let's just call a spade a spade. Let's not forget that Japan isn't the favourite neighbour of other Asian countries as well. The Koreans may dislike Japan more than China does. For Japan to actively engage in taking Taiwan off China, one can only assume that they are merely US puppets, or perhaps they've never really given up their WW2 ambitions. I can only hope it's the former. Noah's surprise that Chinese diplomats are actually starting to stand up for themselves is telling. I consider this view as subconscious racism. The West beats up on China, never let's them tell their side of the story. Then they are incredulous, even outraged, that yellow people talk back to them. It's a veiled form of anti Asian racism. In any case, certainly the develppibg world knows that China can make them prosperous and that the US containment policy cannot. If the US is successfull in containment, then what? What's the end game? To break up China and carve up between north America, Europe and Japan? Surely we are not doing this again are we? I'm actually beginning to think it might be because this is the only outcome that makes sense of the west's foreign policy towards China. And that is a frightening proposition.
Agree. And agree with Jasper. Doesn't China have legitimate claims as a great power? I understand that the Chinese govt is oppressive and worse, but by what right do we take superior than they attitude and tell them how to manage their interior affairs when we can't do anything to stop them?
^^In any case, certainly the develppibg world knows that China can make them prosperous and that the US containment policy cannot.^^
The polling data casts doubt on this sweeping statement, at least among those developing countries closest to China. For Beijing there are signs of worrying trends with respect to public opinion in Africa, too:
China is the biggest trading partner of all of its closest neighbours. Again, the reality doesn't reflect the polls. Africans are very comfortable dealing with China vis-a-vis the West. These surveys are often skewed to shape opinion. China gets things done in Africa. It should be a matter of shame that all the West did in Africa was pillage... literally that's it. Africans know this better than anyone. And whilst not everything the Chinese do may be welcome all the time, the infrastructure they've brought to Africa is viewed positively.
I don't understand why people can't hold two concepts in their head at the same time. The US is an evil empire run by and for a handful of oligarchs, commits war crimes constantly, and does not care about human rights or democracy at all except as a cynical propaganda weapon. China is an authoritarian dystopia that does not tolerate dissent. If you can't agree to both of those statements your nationalism is showing.
^^The US is an evil empire run by and for a handful of oligarchs^^
The GOP's nomination of Donald Trump wouldn't have occurred were the situation in America quite as your simplistic caricature suggests. At minimum Trump wasn't the choice of the Republican Party's donor class (that is, rich people). They supported Cruz, Walker and Bush in the early going. It was working class voters who delivered the nomination (and, to a substantial degree, the US presidency) to Trump.
He wasn't the oligarchy's first choice, but it's not like he did anything to harm them. I know "all the good Billionaires" supported HRC, but plenty didn't. And the Example of how determined the oligarchy was to stop Bernie, both times, is proof enough.
Certainly China is not perfect. But what they've achieved for their people in the last 30 years is unambiguously positive. It is unprecedented in it's success. Many other countries have benefited substantially as well. We can hold two ideas together in our heads at the same time. The US foreign policy has been downright devastating for many countries in the middle East, Latin America and Asia. China has nowhere near this track record of destruction. It's not perfect, but it's a far more benign country given its relative power. Think of how belligerent Japan and Germany were at far lower levels of power than China has now. How could one conclude anything but that China's rise has been overwhelming peaceful give it's relative strength?
The Uighurs, Kazakhs, homosexuals, prison population, citizens of Shanghai, Taiwan and India might disagree, not to mention people who just want to use the internet.
Prison population? I mean, the US has got to be world champion this regard. In terms of their social policy, China is not unique in the social norms towards LGBT communities. And you're downright wrong to bring up the Uighurs and Kazahks. Chinese policy has been overwhelmingly favourable towards all minorities. They were exempt from the former 1 child policy for instance. The Uighur population has grown exponentially, counter to the genocide narrative currently being cultivated in the West.
I think you're confused there. A growing population is antithetical to claims of genocide. I note that there are some commentators in the West who are now questioning the mainstream XJ narrative for lack of evidence. And yes, China's policies towards minorities are favourable. You might even label these policies as "affirmative action".
It's easy to have a growing population when you schlep Han Chinese migrants into now mysteriously vacant Uyghur lands. Also, the total fertility rate of Uyghur women has gone down at a sharp rate, too fast to be considered natural outside of a nuclear plant spill.
It's actually quite the opposite. It's pointing out how we are glad to overlook everything when our "allies" do it, but when any government we don't like does something far less perverse we go insane. e.g. No one care about Saudi Arabia's non existent elections but they all insist on murdering poor people in Venezuela via sanctions when we don't like the results of their elections.
I take your point that we're quicker to point out other abuses than our own. What got me, though, was your standard for proof was specifically Saudi Arabia and Palestine. Like, to your point, there are other countries (i.e. Venezuela and Iran) the US could conceivably help in the name of human rights.
I lived in Chengdu, China, while finishing my economics degree in 2010. One of the most startling observations I had when there was not that the city was growing by 1,000 vehicles a day, or that there were more NBA viewers in China than there were people in the United States, but that as I was watching the Chinese middle class grow from 400 million to 500 million, that still left nearly a billion people living at or below the global poverty line. This is inherently China's biggest weakness in my opinion, and all of their actions, words, and tactics revolve around the dangerous equation of 1 billion to half a billion. China MUST continue to grow its middle class until it gets to the point that a single major market collapse would not instantly cause a revolution that would topple the ruling regime. It desperately needs its middle class to out-weight its lower class. As such, it is incumbent on US leaders to exploit this need to their advantage. China needs the rest of the world much more than the rest of the world needs China. TPP or a similar approach is an effective way to muzzle the Chinese temporarily. Still, a long term strategy for dealing with an authoritarian regime that is intent on operating as a bad actor evades me.
Reading your piece, quoting tweets of other journalists' quotes of Chinese diplomats, it certainly seems like China is the aggressive party, lashing out at America. If you read articles about the negotiations from the Chinese perspective, they say that American diplomats opened the discussion with a volley of stern lectures about Chinese transgressions. Without being present at the negotiating table with a translator, or a full transcript of the discussions, I don't know how you can get a fair assessment of the situation. From reading media reports of both sides, it seems like two kids slinging mud at each other, not really a calibrated strategy to convince anyone of higher moral authority, except perhaps the domestic audience.
Even if we could play back the chain of tit-for-tat exchanges and somehow get to the bottom of who to blame for aggressive messaging, I'm not sure what that would accomplish going forward.
Just what is it that we as a nation hope to accomplish in the "Indo-Pacific" area? Do we want to make China do what we want it to internally? Do we want to maintain the Pacific as our lake, militarily dominant from LA to Hong Kong? Do we want to suppress the "Yellow Peril"? Do we want China to play by the rules of international commerce most of the rest of the world plays by? What do we envision our relationship with China will be in five, ten, 25 years? Do want to do whatever seems like pundits, militarists, nationalists, etc. convince the public is a good idea? How we answer those questions determines US policy, not what "wolf warriors" do. And I don't see any evidence that we have clear answers to any of those questions, and that failure, I fear, creates plenty of opportunity of miscalculation, misunderstanding, and, god forbid, war.
I still think the "engage with China in the hopes they eventually reform" paradigm is the only game in town. No less a hardliner than US official Robert Lightizer -- Trump's own trade czar -- told Congress that complete decoupling isn't realistic. And he's right. But that engagement is clearly now competitive in nature, and so the US has to modernize its approach to fit this reality (indeed, I sometimes use the term "competitive engagement" to describe what the West's approach ought to be). I think it probably involves things like: 1) Focusing heavily on strengthening/maintaining US alliances (something Trump's people were very bad at) 2) Shoring up critical areas of US dependence on China/East Asia (rare earths, microprocessors, medical supplies etc) 3) Getting US domestic affairs in order as much as possible (this is obviously a very broad topic) 4) Robust US involvement in international efforts in areas like climate change, nuclear proliferation, etc (I know a lot of people on the right don't like this stuff, but forget about getting the cooperation of our allies on China without it 5) Charm offensive targeting Chinese population; Chinese nation ≠ Communist Party (CCP will fight it tooth and nail; but it must be attempted). 6) Reinvigorating global arms control (dreams of reform in mainland China aside, first and foremost we have to prevent war). 7) Maintain strong defense but don't rely excessively on a "military-first" approach. 8) Don't make the same mistake Beijing is making in building a moat around its technology platforms -- America's openness has been a key strength. 9) Know your adversary but refrain from silly caricature: China's a tough customer, but they're not Nazi Germany (or Stalin's Russia). Hysterical, over-the-top rhetoric makes US officials looks silly and unserious in the eyes of foreigners (yes, many of the latter are jaded, but still).
Stuff like that. I think the endgame is that some combination of worsening demographics, weaker growth and related, domestic unrest (and maybe Xi's death?) eventually weakens the party's grip on power. And reform ensues. That could take a very long time, so the US and its allies have to be prepared for a long competition. It's not sexy but I see no alterative. And I hope everyone agrees war isn't an option (although I do hear a lot of loose talk of war coming from the US side, and I worry more frequent discussion of war eventually might begin to normalize consideration of war as a realistic option. That would be bad).
I agree100%. If I may, I want to elaborate a bit on how important it is that China isn't Stalin's USSR or Hitler's Germany. Both were double threats, military and ideological. And the ideological was the more potent--Hitler's is still with us. China is neither. It seems to be communist the same way it was imperial and Confucian. It makes no ideological appeal. It doesn't have military around the world, and for all the saber rattling about India, Taiwan, and the China Sea, I've yet to see any explanation of how it's going to invade and conquer Taiwan or India or how it's transforming hunks of rocks into bases does anything but create targets. What China is almost but not quite is a traditional balance of power challenge to Australia, Japan, etc., and us. We can and should accommodate to her legitimate ambitions, negotiate conflicts, and find ways to cooperate.
Here's a discussion the risks we run if our goal is to prevent China from taking control of what it calls its province of Taiwan. I think it goes with what I said above: what is our policy? What are our goals? If it's maintain Taiwan's independence at all costs, we will fail. It's something we don't have the means to achieve and I'm sure few of our fellows citizens want to do if it means war. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-21/niall-ferguson-a-taiwan-crisis-may-end-the-american-empire?srnd=opinion
"Media of U.S. allies is controlled by the U.S." isn't news. Either way, China doesn't need to be popular. It just needs to get elites on its side -look at its ability to muster 64 countries in support of its Xinjiang policies. The idea popular support, rather than elite incentives, drive national policy is a fallacy.
"This newfound bellicosity is earning lots of media attention and Twitter followers. But is it helping China’s cause?"
Yes, it is. The most important thing a country can do in the propaganda sphere to promote its rise is exude domestic self-confidence.
"The aggressive rhetoric online is matched by aggressive action, as China sends increasing numbers of ships and planes to harass its maritime neighbors, pushes on its border with India, steps up cyberattacks, etc. "
Which country has military bases on China's every side again?
"A survey of Southeast Asian elites — policymakers, writers, and businesspeople — at the beginning of this year found rising trust in the U.S. and falling trust in China. 61.5% of respondents said they’d rather align with the U.S., compared to only 38.5% for China — a 7.9% deterioration for China since last year. (Japan was the most popular country.)"
And yet, every country in Southeast Asia except Vietnam is buying vaccines from China (including Indonesia, which is primarily using Sinovac for its vaccination program). This is hardly bad news for China.
"making plans with the U.S. to defend Taiwan in case of a Chinese invasion:"
Nobody's going to defend Taiwan. It's not Israel or America's Nagorno-Karabakh.
- I agree the US is diplomatically hamstrung by the rise in anti-Asian hate. I disagree, however, there is no evidence showing a connection between the criticism of China and anti-Asian hate. The perpetrators don't leave a list of citations when they yell, scream, and abuse Asian people, but they do often say things like "you brought this virus here", etc. You're right it will be hard to prove definitively a relationship between the two, China criticism and anti-Asian violence, but as pubic opinion has risen against China, and increasingly ludicrous bad takes have spread (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GyE55eB9Afc&t=50s), I think we ought to shift our default assumptions a bit. (Note: It's not clear to me where you come down on the relationship between China criticism and anti-Asian violence, so feel free to tell me if I've misrepresented your position).
- We have our own form of "Wolf Diplomacy": "Obviously this meeting didn't look fun, but good for @JakeSullivan46 and @SecBlinken for forcefully calling China out about their treatment of the Uighurs. Trump gave China a pass on Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Biden will not." (https://twitter.com/TVietor08?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor). It is easy for America to call out China on it's human rights abuses, just as it is easy for Chinese diplomats to do the same about us. What is harder for each is to face their own support for terrible regimes: for the US, Saudi Arabia; for China, Myanmar.
- What happens after we defeat the Anti-Asian hate? What happens after we defeat China in this diplomatic war and/or larger great power struggle? An American vision that is absent a response to China, something China may oppose or opt into, but is not dependent upon them, seems more compelling to me.
- Speculating here, but I think you have a good response to my third point in you (as I'm sure you do to the other two points as well). To me, your article 'Taiwan is a Civilization' seemed like a good building block for a more positive, hopeful vision.
My view is that China learned from European and US imperialism, and kind of looked at it as a long-term model for them. When we backed out of the TPP (they kind of liked it), they saw us as weak, but our reality was that we were attempting to evolve into something better. Then democracy reared it's sometimes confused head and elected Trump. He did some things ok on technology trade, but overall his policies were a failure because of his personality -- he's less evolved that most of humanity. He didn't fit with where the US needed to go with trade policy. He mainly offended them along with the rest of the world, and now they see an even bigger weakness to exploit. Doing so will not make them many friends.
If we'd have followed the failed TPP with a new plan, an evolved plan, a less imperialist and more democratic plan, a more fair plan, then I think they would have respected us again. Now they think we've shown democracy's weakness to the world and feel they can dominate democratic territories. It's a big problem, so the US is probably going to have find a way to make it an undesirable option for them to destroy Taiwan's politics.
Democracy will win in the long term, but China currently has no interest in pursuing democracy, and in the short term it can cause a lot of trouble. It doesn't have to be that way. We really need the western economists to break the bonds of the profit motive to advocate the better plan for world trade and finance. It's already a well-known plan, I think.
The Iraq war seems to have had a positive effect on people’s opinions (the world is complicated, our actions have lots of unintended consequences, the US and its allies do lots of bad things) but also a negative one, (a virtue signaling distrust of the US, even in multilateral contexts). The harder, more complex truth is that diplomacy is slow and hard, not glamorous, that’s how it should work.
> There’s simply no arguing against the idea that criticism of China is the cause of anti-Asian hate; even if it’s bullshit, that argument has too much intuitive power. Unless and until America succeeds in suppressing the tide of racist hate, the “wolf warrior” diplomats will be handed free victories...
Thanks for validating my own suspicions as to who the Chinese government thinks needs convincing and reinforcement. But what do I know about China, having only ever made a brief visit to Hong Kong? [checks Kindle, notes 36 titles containing "China"] A little, maybe. Still learning.
^^Perhaps they believe that the only thing that matters is how popular China’s government is in China.^^
Nearly so.
Maintaining its grip on power is front and center in all CCP top leadership calculations, 24/7, always and at all times. If there's a conflict between "doing what's in the national interest" and "doing what's in the interest of solidifying party control" the regime will go with the latter. Every time.
(It's true they'll also never acknowledge there's any daylight between these two things; and some of them no doubt believe that! But too many party members are too intelligent not to comprehend this is BS. The deep-seated knowledge of their lack of moral authority is, I believe, what drives their fury at a base level).
One part of the puzzle is CCP must be met with TPP-like counterparties, economic, cultural, technological & military
yep
I find it a bit strange that you don't consider the effect of the pandemic, which originated in China, on these polls – it seems like a massive confounding factor! I genuinely don't know how much blame China gets among ordinarily people worldwide, but I think there's definitely an association between the two, and a lot of conspiracy theories as well, and that's pretty likely to have an effect on overall opinion. Not sure most people are even aware of China's bellicose shift in messaging.
Exactly my first thought. Might imply this it temporary.
I think this probably true, and I hope it's true.
Oh no, I think you're completely right.
How is this confounding (at least in a strict sense) though? It contributes to mistrust of China.
I was just thinking about this today. It seems counterproductive, almost Trumpian in the way it goes about making whatever problem you're trying to solve worse for...what? Owning the libs to score points with people who already like you? The Trump era gave a golden opportunity to these guys to go on a PR campaign, and they somehow managed to blow it completely. We sure have to get our ducks in order, but...what's their deal? Do they just believe that fervently in their own hype?
My sense is top CCP leadership generally isn't overly nimble or flexible. So, although it's abundantly clear there's been a sea change in foreign public opinion toward China, they're still trying to operate foreign policy with 2013's owner's manual. Also, it's not obvious at a micro-level that current practice *isn't* working tolerably well (there continues to be lots of investment in and engagement with mainland China on the part of others -- especially Europeans.) Finally, internal CCP politics is blood sport. So imprudently showing weakness -- and demonstrating solicitousness wrt foreign opinion might well be interpreted as just that -- could be dangerous for one's career, or one's freedom.
To put it bluntly, a whole lot of officials in China have to have realized things have gone off the rails a bit. But nobody wants to be the nail that sticks out and gets hammered. Especially right now, during the current wave of Xi-pandemic triumphalism. America has primary challenges. China has asset seizures, kangaroo courts and lengthy prison terms.
Resurrect the TPP!
Well, that's a start.
Strip out the IP chapters and we'll talk.
Opinions about China in other countries is massively skewed given near Western monopoly on news. Further, negative views do not mean that these countries will want to actively engage in containment of China. On the contrary, almost all say they don't want to choose, as Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, even Indonesia have made very clear. Japan is a US client state. Let's just call a spade a spade. Let's not forget that Japan isn't the favourite neighbour of other Asian countries as well. The Koreans may dislike Japan more than China does. For Japan to actively engage in taking Taiwan off China, one can only assume that they are merely US puppets, or perhaps they've never really given up their WW2 ambitions. I can only hope it's the former. Noah's surprise that Chinese diplomats are actually starting to stand up for themselves is telling. I consider this view as subconscious racism. The West beats up on China, never let's them tell their side of the story. Then they are incredulous, even outraged, that yellow people talk back to them. It's a veiled form of anti Asian racism. In any case, certainly the develppibg world knows that China can make them prosperous and that the US containment policy cannot. If the US is successfull in containment, then what? What's the end game? To break up China and carve up between north America, Europe and Japan? Surely we are not doing this again are we? I'm actually beginning to think it might be because this is the only outcome that makes sense of the west's foreign policy towards China. And that is a frightening proposition.
Agree. And agree with Jasper. Doesn't China have legitimate claims as a great power? I understand that the Chinese govt is oppressive and worse, but by what right do we take superior than they attitude and tell them how to manage their interior affairs when we can't do anything to stop them?
^^In any case, certainly the develppibg world knows that China can make them prosperous and that the US containment policy cannot.^^
The polling data casts doubt on this sweeping statement, at least among those developing countries closest to China. For Beijing there are signs of worrying trends with respect to public opinion in Africa, too:
https://theconversation.com/how-popular-is-china-in-africa-new-survey-sheds-light-on-what-ordinary-people-think-149552
China is the biggest trading partner of all of its closest neighbours. Again, the reality doesn't reflect the polls. Africans are very comfortable dealing with China vis-a-vis the West. These surveys are often skewed to shape opinion. China gets things done in Africa. It should be a matter of shame that all the West did in Africa was pillage... literally that's it. Africans know this better than anyone. And whilst not everything the Chinese do may be welcome all the time, the infrastructure they've brought to Africa is viewed positively.
I don't understand why people can't hold two concepts in their head at the same time. The US is an evil empire run by and for a handful of oligarchs, commits war crimes constantly, and does not care about human rights or democracy at all except as a cynical propaganda weapon. China is an authoritarian dystopia that does not tolerate dissent. If you can't agree to both of those statements your nationalism is showing.
^^The US is an evil empire run by and for a handful of oligarchs^^
The GOP's nomination of Donald Trump wouldn't have occurred were the situation in America quite as your simplistic caricature suggests. At minimum Trump wasn't the choice of the Republican Party's donor class (that is, rich people). They supported Cruz, Walker and Bush in the early going. It was working class voters who delivered the nomination (and, to a substantial degree, the US presidency) to Trump.
He wasn't the oligarchy's first choice, but it's not like he did anything to harm them. I know "all the good Billionaires" supported HRC, but plenty didn't. And the Example of how determined the oligarchy was to stop Bernie, both times, is proof enough.
Certainly China is not perfect. But what they've achieved for their people in the last 30 years is unambiguously positive. It is unprecedented in it's success. Many other countries have benefited substantially as well. We can hold two ideas together in our heads at the same time. The US foreign policy has been downright devastating for many countries in the middle East, Latin America and Asia. China has nowhere near this track record of destruction. It's not perfect, but it's a far more benign country given its relative power. Think of how belligerent Japan and Germany were at far lower levels of power than China has now. How could one conclude anything but that China's rise has been overwhelming peaceful give it's relative strength?
The Uighurs, Kazakhs, homosexuals, prison population, citizens of Shanghai, Taiwan and India might disagree, not to mention people who just want to use the internet.
Prison population? I mean, the US has got to be world champion this regard. In terms of their social policy, China is not unique in the social norms towards LGBT communities. And you're downright wrong to bring up the Uighurs and Kazahks. Chinese policy has been overwhelmingly favourable towards all minorities. They were exempt from the former 1 child policy for instance. The Uighur population has grown exponentially, counter to the genocide narrative currently being cultivated in the West.
“The Uighur population has grown exponentially”
over last 30 years? and that’s why CCP is now geocoding Uyghur minorities and sterilising men/women in Xinjiang.
Yeah, that calls china’s policy ”overwhelmingly favourable towards all minorities.”
I think you're confused there. A growing population is antithetical to claims of genocide. I note that there are some commentators in the West who are now questioning the mainstream XJ narrative for lack of evidence. And yes, China's policies towards minorities are favourable. You might even label these policies as "affirmative action".
It's easy to have a growing population when you schlep Han Chinese migrants into now mysteriously vacant Uyghur lands. Also, the total fertility rate of Uyghur women has gone down at a sharp rate, too fast to be considered natural outside of a nuclear plant spill.
I'll believe we care about human rights and democracy when we regime change Saudi Arabia and liberate the Palestinians.
Really? We only care about human rights if we do something in regards to Saudi Arabia and the Palestinians? This seems crazy specific.
It's actually quite the opposite. It's pointing out how we are glad to overlook everything when our "allies" do it, but when any government we don't like does something far less perverse we go insane. e.g. No one care about Saudi Arabia's non existent elections but they all insist on murdering poor people in Venezuela via sanctions when we don't like the results of their elections.
I take your point that we're quicker to point out other abuses than our own. What got me, though, was your standard for proof was specifically Saudi Arabia and Palestine. Like, to your point, there are other countries (i.e. Venezuela and Iran) the US could conceivably help in the name of human rights.
This is a crazy oversimplification. Both are big countries with complicated truths about what good and evil they have perpetuated.
I lived in Chengdu, China, while finishing my economics degree in 2010. One of the most startling observations I had when there was not that the city was growing by 1,000 vehicles a day, or that there were more NBA viewers in China than there were people in the United States, but that as I was watching the Chinese middle class grow from 400 million to 500 million, that still left nearly a billion people living at or below the global poverty line. This is inherently China's biggest weakness in my opinion, and all of their actions, words, and tactics revolve around the dangerous equation of 1 billion to half a billion. China MUST continue to grow its middle class until it gets to the point that a single major market collapse would not instantly cause a revolution that would topple the ruling regime. It desperately needs its middle class to out-weight its lower class. As such, it is incumbent on US leaders to exploit this need to their advantage. China needs the rest of the world much more than the rest of the world needs China. TPP or a similar approach is an effective way to muzzle the Chinese temporarily. Still, a long term strategy for dealing with an authoritarian regime that is intent on operating as a bad actor evades me.
Reading your piece, quoting tweets of other journalists' quotes of Chinese diplomats, it certainly seems like China is the aggressive party, lashing out at America. If you read articles about the negotiations from the Chinese perspective, they say that American diplomats opened the discussion with a volley of stern lectures about Chinese transgressions. Without being present at the negotiating table with a translator, or a full transcript of the discussions, I don't know how you can get a fair assessment of the situation. From reading media reports of both sides, it seems like two kids slinging mud at each other, not really a calibrated strategy to convince anyone of higher moral authority, except perhaps the domestic audience.
Even if we could play back the chain of tit-for-tat exchanges and somehow get to the bottom of who to blame for aggressive messaging, I'm not sure what that would accomplish going forward.
Just what is it that we as a nation hope to accomplish in the "Indo-Pacific" area? Do we want to make China do what we want it to internally? Do we want to maintain the Pacific as our lake, militarily dominant from LA to Hong Kong? Do we want to suppress the "Yellow Peril"? Do we want China to play by the rules of international commerce most of the rest of the world plays by? What do we envision our relationship with China will be in five, ten, 25 years? Do want to do whatever seems like pundits, militarists, nationalists, etc. convince the public is a good idea? How we answer those questions determines US policy, not what "wolf warriors" do. And I don't see any evidence that we have clear answers to any of those questions, and that failure, I fear, creates plenty of opportunity of miscalculation, misunderstanding, and, god forbid, war.
I still think the "engage with China in the hopes they eventually reform" paradigm is the only game in town. No less a hardliner than US official Robert Lightizer -- Trump's own trade czar -- told Congress that complete decoupling isn't realistic. And he's right. But that engagement is clearly now competitive in nature, and so the US has to modernize its approach to fit this reality (indeed, I sometimes use the term "competitive engagement" to describe what the West's approach ought to be). I think it probably involves things like: 1) Focusing heavily on strengthening/maintaining US alliances (something Trump's people were very bad at) 2) Shoring up critical areas of US dependence on China/East Asia (rare earths, microprocessors, medical supplies etc) 3) Getting US domestic affairs in order as much as possible (this is obviously a very broad topic) 4) Robust US involvement in international efforts in areas like climate change, nuclear proliferation, etc (I know a lot of people on the right don't like this stuff, but forget about getting the cooperation of our allies on China without it 5) Charm offensive targeting Chinese population; Chinese nation ≠ Communist Party (CCP will fight it tooth and nail; but it must be attempted). 6) Reinvigorating global arms control (dreams of reform in mainland China aside, first and foremost we have to prevent war). 7) Maintain strong defense but don't rely excessively on a "military-first" approach. 8) Don't make the same mistake Beijing is making in building a moat around its technology platforms -- America's openness has been a key strength. 9) Know your adversary but refrain from silly caricature: China's a tough customer, but they're not Nazi Germany (or Stalin's Russia). Hysterical, over-the-top rhetoric makes US officials looks silly and unserious in the eyes of foreigners (yes, many of the latter are jaded, but still).
Stuff like that. I think the endgame is that some combination of worsening demographics, weaker growth and related, domestic unrest (and maybe Xi's death?) eventually weakens the party's grip on power. And reform ensues. That could take a very long time, so the US and its allies have to be prepared for a long competition. It's not sexy but I see no alterative. And I hope everyone agrees war isn't an option (although I do hear a lot of loose talk of war coming from the US side, and I worry more frequent discussion of war eventually might begin to normalize consideration of war as a realistic option. That would be bad).
I agree100%. If I may, I want to elaborate a bit on how important it is that China isn't Stalin's USSR or Hitler's Germany. Both were double threats, military and ideological. And the ideological was the more potent--Hitler's is still with us. China is neither. It seems to be communist the same way it was imperial and Confucian. It makes no ideological appeal. It doesn't have military around the world, and for all the saber rattling about India, Taiwan, and the China Sea, I've yet to see any explanation of how it's going to invade and conquer Taiwan or India or how it's transforming hunks of rocks into bases does anything but create targets. What China is almost but not quite is a traditional balance of power challenge to Australia, Japan, etc., and us. We can and should accommodate to her legitimate ambitions, negotiate conflicts, and find ways to cooperate.
Here's a discussion the risks we run if our goal is to prevent China from taking control of what it calls its province of Taiwan. I think it goes with what I said above: what is our policy? What are our goals? If it's maintain Taiwan's independence at all costs, we will fail. It's something we don't have the means to achieve and I'm sure few of our fellows citizens want to do if it means war. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-21/niall-ferguson-a-taiwan-crisis-may-end-the-american-empire?srnd=opinion
"Media of U.S. allies is controlled by the U.S." isn't news. Either way, China doesn't need to be popular. It just needs to get elites on its side -look at its ability to muster 64 countries in support of its Xinjiang policies. The idea popular support, rather than elite incentives, drive national policy is a fallacy.
"This newfound bellicosity is earning lots of media attention and Twitter followers. But is it helping China’s cause?"
Yes, it is. The most important thing a country can do in the propaganda sphere to promote its rise is exude domestic self-confidence.
"The aggressive rhetoric online is matched by aggressive action, as China sends increasing numbers of ships and planes to harass its maritime neighbors, pushes on its border with India, steps up cyberattacks, etc. "
Which country has military bases on China's every side again?
"A survey of Southeast Asian elites — policymakers, writers, and businesspeople — at the beginning of this year found rising trust in the U.S. and falling trust in China. 61.5% of respondents said they’d rather align with the U.S., compared to only 38.5% for China — a 7.9% deterioration for China since last year. (Japan was the most popular country.)"
And yet, every country in Southeast Asia except Vietnam is buying vaccines from China (including Indonesia, which is primarily using Sinovac for its vaccination program). This is hardly bad news for China.
"making plans with the U.S. to defend Taiwan in case of a Chinese invasion:"
Nobody's going to defend Taiwan. It's not Israel or America's Nagorno-Karabakh.
Four Things (three critical, one positive):
- I agree the US is diplomatically hamstrung by the rise in anti-Asian hate. I disagree, however, there is no evidence showing a connection between the criticism of China and anti-Asian hate. The perpetrators don't leave a list of citations when they yell, scream, and abuse Asian people, but they do often say things like "you brought this virus here", etc. You're right it will be hard to prove definitively a relationship between the two, China criticism and anti-Asian violence, but as pubic opinion has risen against China, and increasingly ludicrous bad takes have spread (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GyE55eB9Afc&t=50s), I think we ought to shift our default assumptions a bit. (Note: It's not clear to me where you come down on the relationship between China criticism and anti-Asian violence, so feel free to tell me if I've misrepresented your position).
- We have our own form of "Wolf Diplomacy": "Obviously this meeting didn't look fun, but good for @JakeSullivan46 and @SecBlinken for forcefully calling China out about their treatment of the Uighurs. Trump gave China a pass on Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Biden will not." (https://twitter.com/TVietor08?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor). It is easy for America to call out China on it's human rights abuses, just as it is easy for Chinese diplomats to do the same about us. What is harder for each is to face their own support for terrible regimes: for the US, Saudi Arabia; for China, Myanmar.
- What happens after we defeat the Anti-Asian hate? What happens after we defeat China in this diplomatic war and/or larger great power struggle? An American vision that is absent a response to China, something China may oppose or opt into, but is not dependent upon them, seems more compelling to me.
- Speculating here, but I think you have a good response to my third point in you (as I'm sure you do to the other two points as well). To me, your article 'Taiwan is a Civilization' seemed like a good building block for a more positive, hopeful vision.
My view is that China learned from European and US imperialism, and kind of looked at it as a long-term model for them. When we backed out of the TPP (they kind of liked it), they saw us as weak, but our reality was that we were attempting to evolve into something better. Then democracy reared it's sometimes confused head and elected Trump. He did some things ok on technology trade, but overall his policies were a failure because of his personality -- he's less evolved that most of humanity. He didn't fit with where the US needed to go with trade policy. He mainly offended them along with the rest of the world, and now they see an even bigger weakness to exploit. Doing so will not make them many friends.
If we'd have followed the failed TPP with a new plan, an evolved plan, a less imperialist and more democratic plan, a more fair plan, then I think they would have respected us again. Now they think we've shown democracy's weakness to the world and feel they can dominate democratic territories. It's a big problem, so the US is probably going to have find a way to make it an undesirable option for them to destroy Taiwan's politics.
Democracy will win in the long term, but China currently has no interest in pursuing democracy, and in the short term it can cause a lot of trouble. It doesn't have to be that way. We really need the western economists to break the bonds of the profit motive to advocate the better plan for world trade and finance. It's already a well-known plan, I think.
The Iraq war seems to have had a positive effect on people’s opinions (the world is complicated, our actions have lots of unintended consequences, the US and its allies do lots of bad things) but also a negative one, (a virtue signaling distrust of the US, even in multilateral contexts). The harder, more complex truth is that diplomacy is slow and hard, not glamorous, that’s how it should work.
> There’s simply no arguing against the idea that criticism of China is the cause of anti-Asian hate; even if it’s bullshit, that argument has too much intuitive power. Unless and until America succeeds in suppressing the tide of racist hate, the “wolf warrior” diplomats will be handed free victories...
I think there is a flaw in this argument's assumption that reducing anti-Asian hate will reduce the effectiveness of whataboutism. Many of the people who think of "anti-Asian hate" as a problem do so because they've read or heard journalists reporting on it, rather than observing it personally or analyzing crime statistics themselves. However, many journalists recently have been quite willing to shoehorn stories into the narrative of racism even when that didn't really fit, e.g. claiming that even Hispanic Trump voters are motivated by racism (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/15/understand-trumps-support-we-must-think-terms-multiracial-whiteness/), assuming that an educator who talks about black students underperforming academically must be motivated by prejudice (https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/03/georgetown-law-professor-racist-remarks-sandra-sellers-black-students.html), claiming that the motive in the recent Atlanta shooting must have been racism (https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/18/politics/white-supremacy-racism-asian-americans/index.html) even though the police investigation so far contradicts this (https://www.ajc.com/news/crime/alleged-killer-of-spa-workers-tracked-by-gps/F4BPGOOGSFDFRA7GLPEE4AS4BE/). If the discussion of journalistic culture at https://freddiedeboer.substack.com/p/non-nitro-edition-substack-and-media is correct, then there is no reason to expect this to change. So, while fighting against anti-Asian prejudice is obviously good and necessary, it is not clear that reducing anti-Asian prejudice will reduce the *perception* of anti-Asian prejudice in the general population, which is what the strategy of whataboutism depends on.
Thanks for validating my own suspicions as to who the Chinese government thinks needs convincing and reinforcement. But what do I know about China, having only ever made a brief visit to Hong Kong? [checks Kindle, notes 36 titles containing "China"] A little, maybe. Still learning.