Book review: "Status and Culture", by W. David Marx
A grand theory of why human beings do what we do
“The world needs wannabes/ So, hey, hey, do that brand-new thing” — The Offspring
W. David Marx is someone I’ve always looked up to. In the 2000s and 2010s I was very into into Japanese underground culture, and David Marx (or “Marxy”, as he was sometimes known in those days) was the Western aficionado of Japanese underground culture. When he gave me the chance to write some guest posts for his old blog back in 2014 and 2015, I viewed it as a big break.
David has graduated from being the king of the Japan hipsters, and is now an exec at a major tech company, handling their Asia-Pacific communications. He is also the author of some of the most interesting books in the market today. David is a diagonal thinker; he always comes at you obliquely. His book Ametora: How Japan Saved American Style — which I reviewed here — purports to be a history of postwar Japanese men’s fashion, but it’s really about the history of postwar Japan. And on another level, it’s a book about the beauty of cultural appropriation. There are always layers.
Status and Culture: How Our Desire for Social Rank Creates Taste, Identity, Art, Fashion, and Constant Change is a far more ambitious effort. It purports to be about art and fashion, and it is about art and fashion, but really it’s a grand theory of human society and behavior.
Our age has a distinct lack of grand theories of human society and behavior. In the olden days, people like Immanuel Kant or Karl Marx or Antonio Gramsci would just get out their pens and write huge dense tomes in which they made a million assertions about how the world works, and then just dump those tomes on the world and leave lesser scholars to argue for centuries about whether they were right and what they really meant. Over the years we’ve gotten away from this sort of grandiosity, moving toward small-bore ideas and empirically grounded hypotheses. Today, if you want to win arguments, bring data.
David Marx (no relation to Karl) has revived the old grand-theory tradition with Status and Culture. Many of our explanations of human society and behavior, whether Econ 101 or communist, are fundamentally materialist — they’re about how much stuff each person gets. In recent years, it has become fashionable to supplement materialist paradigms with theories about power. But relatively few thinkers assert that most of what we do is in pursuit of social status.
If you think about it, though, it makes sense. Even if you don’t believe in the strict textbook version of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, it’s pretty obvious that even after a society provides most of its people with material security, many people still care about life and have ambitions and desires and work very hard. There are social needs that are, in some sense, on top of the physical ones. Maslow thought that these needs were A) love and acceptance, and B) esteem and respect. David Marx rolls these ideas, and others, into a unifying concept: social status.
Most of us don’t want to think of humanity in general as a bunch of status-seekers, and especially not ourselves. But Marx makes a convincing case by pointing out that most people aren’t after adulation and fame, but simply trying to attain normal status — to be accepted as average, rather than being an outcast or a loser. Wanting to be normal is OK, right? And then of course it feels good to earn recognition from our peers — when people at work tell you that you did a good job, it makes you happy, right? And although a big house is nice in its own right, there’s also a little bit of a warm glow when people compliment you on it, right? The more examples like this you think of, the more Marx’s overarching status-based framework makes sense. He doesn’t say status is everything — just that it’s always a factor.
An economist might say this is a story about rational behavior under incomplete markets. Money can’t buy everything — it can’t buy you love, and it also can’t buy you social status. Of course, money gets you status, but you don’t just go buy it from the status store for a set price — you need to have more than your neighbor. So this is also a story about social preferences. But lots of people go after status in ways that don’t depend on money — they make cool art, they wear cool clothes and get trendy haircuts, they learn esoteric knowledge to become hipsters and geeks. These activities are what Marx spends most of his pages thinking about. The grand theory of human society and behavior is just a warm-up; what he really cares about is the trendy haircuts.
So why do we make art and fashion and all that stuff? In Marx’s telling, the churn of cultural creativity is a byproduct of millions upon millions of status-seeking efforts. Perhaps some working-class kids try to turn the tables on the middle-class people who call them losers by creating a punk subculture where they pierce their lips and wear mohawks and listen to musicians who can’t play their instruments. And perhaps some artists and musicians draw inspiration from the punk subculture to create works of art that get them recognition from the critics and literati. And perhaps some rich people, seeing those novel punk styles, try to distinguish themselves from other rich people by adopting some of those punk conventions (in a tamer form, of course). This latter makes punk tragically un-hip, of course, so the punk kids have to move on to something else — grunge, or post-punk, or hip-hop, or Harajuku fashion, or whatever. And so it goes, round and round, with the wannabes and the imitators chasing down the cool new thing, and the subcultural rebels and avant-garde artists trying to stay one step ahead.
This is the basic sketch, I think, but it doesn’t really do justice to the sheer density and richness of David Marx’s ideas. Status and Culture can be a frustrating book, because David throws out ideas and theses and claims about the world faster than I can decide whether I agree with them. It’s sort of like a DDOS attack on one’s faculty of critical skepticism, and it’s probably why to this day we still spend so much time arguing over Kant. The book took me literally months to read, because I had to pause and consider each paragraph — sometimes, each sentence. Seen another way, this means that if you like thinking about stuff, Status and Culture will give you value for your money.
I won’t go through any of my more minor disagreements and nitpicks here, but there is one big thing that nagged at me. In the later chapters of Status and Culture, Marx turns to the question of how the internet is changing the game. The fact that any subculture can be easily penetrated by outsiders and weekend warriors, he laments, means fewer awards for originality. Trends that last only fifteen minutes don’t have time to make their artistic mark — everything becomes remakes and sequels. When social media allows everyone to consume an omnivorous diet of culture and style and media, the only real status signaling comes from having money, or things like Twitter follower count. And that, Marx worries, is making our culture more boring.
What nagged at me is this: In a world where culture exists only for the purpose of status, why does it matter if culture is boring? Perhaps “taste” is just the pretension of hipsters and the old-money rich, but why would we worry about internet-driven homogenization and cultural stasis unless novelty was an important part of why we like art and culture in the first place?
In fact, Marx does deal a bit with this, arguing near the end of the book that cultural complexity is inherently valuable for various instrumental reasons. But this fails to satisfy. Perhaps we evolved to love novelty for a reason, but in the here and now, many of us enjoy novelty because it sparks joy.
And if novelty sparks joy for the consumer, why not for the artist as well? I write things that I never show anyone, simply because there was something I needed to express to myself. And I have seen David Marx himself making music in his basement just for the fun of it, with no prospect of any sort of status gain. Emily Dickinson wrote 1800 poems and published only 10 of them; she only became famous after her death, when her sister discovered her secret cache.
Self-expression isn’t exactly the same as novelty, of course. And there are a whole bunch of other reasons we like what we like. Maybe a song reminds us of a romance gone by, or of our childhood friends. Maybe a movie speaks to our own experiences and makes us realize that someone, somewhere can empathize with our struggles? And so on. Consumption of art and other creative products isn’t just about status; it’s about individuation.
But David Marx isn’t trying to explain the whole world — just a piece of it. And status relations in human society are a sorely neglected topic — partly because, as Marx notes, making explicit status comparisons is kind of a taboo. In recent years some people have become a bit bolder in talking about status, but it seems likely that many of the upheavals in our society are being driven by status resentments and anxieties that we’re still loath to mention explicitly.
Marx touches on this a bit at the end of the book. He expresses hope for a world where material equality — not the perfect equality of a communist utopia, but the muted differences of a social democracy — blunts the downsides of status competition by ensuring that there are few abject losers. This was an extremely tantalizing note on which to end a book like this — the hope that we might find some way of redistributing status itself. Now that is a kind of Marxism I could really get behind. (You knew I’d eventually get around to making that joke, right?)
In the meantime, if you like to think about big ideas, go grab a copy of Status and Culture. Hopefully this review has increased David’s status — he certainly deserves it!
Of the many things that moving to and living in Sweden from the United States has taught me, perhaps the most surprising was how quietly status-conscious Swedes are. Here we have the Nordic Social Democracy Par Excellence, subject of satirical maxims about "Jantelagen" (i.e. Tall Poppy Syndrome) and stereotypes that variously flatter Left-Liberal Utopian Dreams about equality on the one hand and Conservative Fever Dreams about grey Marxist sameness on the other. But even here, status and the envy thereof peek through!
Sweden may have extremely low inequality by Gini Coefficient and one of the flattest income inequalities in the world, but Swedes still remain extremely differentiated in both wealth and status. Wealth inequality is actually *higher* than in the United States, a fact that still shocks me.
And the more nebulous matter of status may be equally stratified: Before the neoliberal turn caught up with Sweden in the mid-1990s (helping to spike wealth inequality to the highest levels in Europe) and even at the peak of the Social Democratic Folkhemmet in the 1970s, there were sharp status distinctions and status anxieties largely unnoticed by outside observers. Sweden is one of the few countries in the world with a monarchy, but less known is that it retains an intact aristocracy, too. There is a Baroque mansion, the House of Nobility, at a commanding point on an island right in the middle of the city, where card-carrying aristocrats can host fête or summit, alike. Even less known, perhaps, is the dominance that dynastic family wealth and status (typified by the Wallenbergs) holds over Sweden today. Imagine Medici-era Italy, but with old money funding tech unicorns. Subtler still is the hold that British status signalling and mores hold over Swedes. TV is full of British programming, and with it, very British attitudes about class. Something that seemed paradoxical and discordant to me, at first, but makes perfect sense now.
Walking around extremely segregated and status-stratified Stockholm, you can quickly see that there are high-status areas that stand apart: Östermalm is Stockholm's Upper West Side, Södermalm its Williamsburg, Brooma perhaps Park Slope, Danderyds an Essex or Westchester County, and Lidingö a Sands Point Long Island-type seaside commuter town. Housing in these areas rivals or exceeds prices in the United States' most rarefied zip codes. And the price for entry into the high-status club is jealously guarded by more immaterial means, too.
If you are anyone who's anyone, you will also maintain a summerhouse on the Stockholm Archipelago, where you migrate in July, just as well-heeled New Yorkers make for the Hamptons. There you will engage in sailing and tasteful entertaining, just as if you were on Martha's Vineyard. Some of the "cottages" that will host you are quite grand, but Swede's True Preps know that something more understated confers higher status, still. (The rest of us can watch this ritual play out on TV, where various celebrities will flatter us with a vicarious invite). Now, it may be equally relaxing to take the caravan to lounge around a local lake or take a package holiday to the Canary Islands, but you may feel the need to obscure or even apologize for such mass-tourist, middlebrow activities. (The truly cool kids can deftly manage the mix of high-low culture to brew up a status cocktail even more potent!). In the winter, it's to the mountain retreats in the Alps or Åre for the outdoor activities that precede "After-Ski" (Swedes employ English phrases as a pretension similar to how pompous English speakers pepper their speech with French).
On the other side of the status divide, there are the other places you'd best avoid: marginal, low-income, high-unemployment, high-crime suburbs of the big cities; deindustrializing towns (like my wife is from); and fast-emptying agricultural areas. To a New Yorker, everywhere north of central park is "Upstate" and to a Swede, everywhere north of Stockholm is "Norrland," which is lower-status. Sweden's vast, less-populated, more-industrial Northern two-thirds has been essential for creating the raw materials that under-girded the state's wealth and power, and even today has some the the highest incomes in the country. But, like Northern England, the stark countryside and earthy settlements of Norrland lacks the Southern metropole's cache.
But you can also be far while being close. Marginal suburbs ringing the cities might be right at the edge of Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö, and well-connected by Sweden's excellent public transit systems. But they might as well be far beyond the outer reaches of Norrland for how alienated they are from mainstream Swedish society. Again, Netflix hosts plenty of Nordic Noir crime dramas to deepen your anxieties about what goes on there.
Even being from certain low-status neighborhoods can fill a Swede with deep shame (as dramatized in the Netflix miniseries, "The Playlist," about the rise of Spotify and its low-born, Rågsved-native billionaire founder, Daniel Ek). I live in a great, little urbanist area just up the train line from Rågsved, and my Swedish wife is often apologizing for this fact to guests. The *mere proximity* is shameful, you see! In a country where equality reigns, the stain of birth shouldn't have such a hold on people, and yet it does. Another hit Swedish drama on Netflix, "Snabba Cash" ("Fast Cash") plays the upstairs-downstairs contrast between "vulnerable" immigrant suburbs and monied Östermalm for narrative tension in a way very relatable to American (or British) audiences, watching from our own, unequal and status-anxious societies.
The famous Social Democratic Swedish prime minister of the 1960s and 70s, Olaf Palme, was an outspoken Leftist, but also a high-status individual long before he assumed office. Like a Swedish Kennedy or FDR, he was a scion of old money, aristocratic associations, and high-status, elite institutions. For high school, he attended the exclusive Sigtunaskolan Humanistiska Läroverket boarding school outside Stockholm (an inspiration for the setting of another status-driven Netflix series "Young Royals").
Palme is now as famous in death as he was lionized and infamous in life, since the prime minister was shot on a busy street in central Stockholm in a case that remained unsolved until the present. For those unfamiliar with the story, Netflix offers yet another Swedish-produced series ("The Unlikely Murderer") about Palme's killing that follows a prevailing theory about his assassination at the hand of Stig Engström (AKA Skandiamannen or "Skandia Man") and the alleged assassin's various status-anxieties and disappointments. By the show's telling, Engström was born into a "good family" who left him at a Swedish boarding school to rub shoulders with the right people, but became the butt of jokes his whole life, pursued a middling corporate track at Skandia, and resented and coveted "cool-guy" Palme so much that he shot him. He may be the perfect exemplar for "elite overproduction theory" and how it creates surplus elites nursing dangerous status-anxieties.
Flash forward to our present day's political scene, and you could see the rise of the far-right Swedish Democrats, too, through the prism of status competition. SD's voters, like Trump's voters in the United States, are often referred to by academics here as the "left behinds" of Sweden's declining rural and industrial areas. If assassin Engström's murderous delusions and spoiled sense of entitlement were about the frustrations of a "surplus elite" who never achieved the potential of his station, the SD voter's status-anxiety is more about a native working-class and merely-middle-class seeking and failing to find that "normalcy" you referred to. And, here, unlike in the US, they really are the working class: fully half of the largest labor union in Sweden, LO, voted for SD in the last election. These declining-in-status regular Swedes seem to want the respect and stability due to the average worker during the Mid-Century Folkhemmet Era (ironically achieved under the decades-long dominance of the Social Democrats). This persona yearns for the Everyman status they remember their parents and grandparents having. The villains in their narrative are the usual suspects for the far-right: immigrants, globalists, urban elites, etc. Their preferred means of national renewal are a return to various nostalgically remembered things: a Sweden for Swedes, decent pay for honest hard work, revival of nuclear energy, and even (perhaps surprisingly) a stronger welfare state. When you strip away the racism, xenophobia, misogyny, and general thuggishness, you can even understand the appeal! If American Trumpists are said to want a return to the 1950s, Swedish Democrats seem to want a return to the 1970s. The time when people like them still had normal status, if not great income or wealth.
So, if disruptive status anxiety plagues even a country with low income inequality, perhaps status is an even more fundamental driver even than money? If a financially-comfortable middle-manager like Stig Engström could be driven to murder by humiliation and status-frustration, perhaps it wouldn't even be enough if all Swedes were upper-middle-class and materially thriving? Maybe money (either as income or wealth) is merely a means for status? Maybe we could even come up with a way to give more people status, even as it seems a zero-sum good?
A delightfully enthusiastic review, thank you. (I do enjoy a review where the reviewer allows their affection for the writer, and enthusiasm for the book, to spill over, and doesn't try to step back a little from that enthusiasm, or ironise it.)
Oh, and Noah, if you enjoyed this book, and enjoy thinking about these ideas, you might get a lot out of a very short but powerful essay by Brian Eno from his 1995 diary (published by Faber in 1996 as A Year With Swollen Appendices).
There's a PDF of the whole essay here: http://designblog.uniandes.edu.co/blogs/dise2102/files/2008/11/brian-eno-culture-essay.pdf
This is how it opens:
"Let's start here: 'culture' is everything we don't have to do. We have to eat, but we don't have to have 'cuisines', Big Macs or Tournedos Rossini. We have to cover ourselves against the weather, but we don't have to be so concerned as we are about whether we put on Levi's or Yves Saint-Laurent. We have to move about the face of the globe, but we don't have to dance. These other things, we choose to do. We could survive if we chose not to."
And it ends up in some interesting places. I think it would complement W. David Marx's book nicely, because Marx is so (understandably!) enthusiastic about his central thesis that he perhaps may have neglected some of the other large forces driving culture, and cultural change, and the cycles of culture he discusses.
If you like the essay, it overlaps a lot with Eno's excellent, longer and more detailed, Peel lecture, broadcast on the BBC in 2015, which you can listen to here:
https://www.openculture.com/2015/12/brian-enos-peel-lecture-on-art.html
Transcript here, if you prefer reading (you can skip the long introduction by Mark Radcliffe):
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/6music/johnpeellecture/brian-eno-john-peel-lecture.pdf
Anyway, thanks again for the review, I'll go get the book. (But do check out the Eno essay; I suspect a dash of Eno's salt in Marx's soup could make for a remarkably nourishing meal – while also filling in some of the gaps in Marx's book which you worry about in your review.)